State Child Welfare Policy:  Causes and Consequences by Connelly, Dana D
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Theses and Dissertations--Public Policy and 
Administration 
Martin School of Public Policy and 
Administration 
2014 
State Child Welfare Policy: Causes and Consequences 
Dana D. Connelly 
University of Kentucky, dana.d.connelly@gmail.com 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Connelly, Dana D., "State Child Welfare Policy: Causes and Consequences" (2014). Theses and 
Dissertations--Public Policy and Administration. 11. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/msppa_etds/11 
This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Martin School of Public Policy and 
Administration at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Public Policy and 
Administration by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact 
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
STUDENT AGREEMENT: 
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution 
has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining 
any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained needed written permission statement(s) 
from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing 
electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine) which will be 
submitted to UKnowledge as Additional File. 
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and 
royalty-free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of 
media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made 
available immediately for worldwide access unless an embargo applies. 
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in 
future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to 
register the copyright to my work. 
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE 
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on 
behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of 
the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s thesis including all 
changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements 
above. 
Dana D. Connelly, Student 
Dr. Edward T. Jennings, Jr., Major Professor 
Dr. Edward T. Jennings, Jr., Director of Graduate Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STATE CHILD WELFARE POLICY: 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the  
Martin School of Public Policy and Administration  
in the Graduate School at the University of Kentucky 
 
 
By 
Dana Dean Connelly 
 
Lexington, Kentucky 
 
Director:  Dr. Edward T. Jennings, Jr., Professor of Public Policy, Administration, and 
Political Science 
 
Lexington, Kentucky 
 
2014 
 
 
Copyright © Dana Dean Connelly 2014 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
STATE CHILD WELFARE POLICY: 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
 
 On any given day almost 400,000 children in the United States are living in an 
out-of-home care placement due to government intervention.  Federal law allows for 
substantial variance in state child welfare policy on a number of topics. These policy 
decisions, however, are understudied both in terms of the forces driving them and also the 
impacts the policies have on actual outcomes for children in care.   
 
Utilizing a unique panel data set comprised of thirteen child welfare policies that 
vary both between states and over time we examine how well redistributive theory 
(constituent, institutional, paternalistic and resource pressures) explains state policy 
decisions from 2004-2010. The results provide very little confidence that redistributive 
pressures are driving state variance, though there are some noteworthy patterns.  Within 
the four categories of explanatory variables, it would seem that child welfare policies are 
much more sensitive to changes in the social factors associated with a paternalistic 
response (unmarried birth rate and program utilization) and resource pressures than to 
constituent or institutional characteristics. 
 
Subsequently, a series of hazard models were conducted for each possible 
discharge outcome, using child level data from the 2010 AFCARS foster care dataset, 
with primary interest in the influence of policy and state level factors.  Policy-level 
predictors primarily had negative impacts on discharge outcomes for children.  
Exceptions include better outcomes for children in states with higher generosity of 
access, increased rates of adoption and aging out with higher ASFA timeline compliance, 
and more discharges to reunification and adoption with more flexible adoption policy.  
State level factors consistently showed strong influences on child outcomes.  While 
increased unemployment was associated with worse child outcomes, all other state level 
factors considered were associated with positive discharge outcomes for children in out-
of-home care.   
 
 
 
This research broadens the theoretical application of redistributive theory to a new 
policy arena and adds an additional layer of state level explanatory variables to the much-
studied outcomes for children in out-of-home care.  It establishes that children and 
families do not exist in a vacuum and that child welfare research must take broader state 
and policy factors into account for a complete picture.   
 
 
KEYWORDS:  AFCARS Data; Child Welfare Policy; Hazard Model; Permanency 
Outcomes; Redistributive Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Dana Dean Connelly  
Student’s Signature 
 
     April 16, 2014  
 Date  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STATE CHILD WELFARE POLICY: 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
 
 
 
By 
 
Dana Dean Connelly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Dr. Edward T. Jennings, Jr.  
      Director of Dissertation 
 
            Dr. Edward T. Jennings, Jr.  
      Director of Graduate Studies 
 
          April 16, 2014 
  
 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 My journey through this doctoral program has been a winding road and the list of 
individuals who contributed to the trip is long.  Life has always seemed to provide 
exactly the right people and opportunities precisely when I needed them.  Any attempt to 
acknowledge my debts will fall woefully short but I truly believe that without each 
moment, I would not be where I am today.   
First, I should thank Professor Ed Jennings, my committee chair, for his support 
and patience.  My choice to pursue outside employment while enrolled in the Martin 
School, while non-standard, was vital to my personal and professional development.  I 
appreciate the freedom I was allowed and also the gentle reminders when I strayed too far 
afield.  Thank you to my committee members and outside reader – Professors J.S. Butler, 
Jim Ziliak, Rebecca Bromley-Trujillo, and Emily Beaulieu – for providing both 
constructive criticism and encouragement over the past few years.  I have grown from 
each of your contributions and perspectives.  The work is much improved by your 
involvement and all errors contained herein are my own.   
The data used in this publication were made available by the National Data 
Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, and have been used 
with permission.  Data from the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting 
System (AFCARS) were originally collected by the Children’s Bureau.  Funding for the 
project was provided by the Children’s Bureau, Administration on Children, Youth and 
Families, Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services.  The collector of the original data, the funder, NDACAN, Cornell 
 
iv 
 
University and their agents or employees bear no responsibility for the analyses or 
interpretations presented here. 
Thank you to my friends for the “support” over the past five years, since this 
crazy process began.  Thank you to the friends I made during my time at Maryhurst, as it 
was my time there that ignited my passion for child welfare and achieving permanency 
for society’s most vulnerable kids.  I continue to be in awe of what you do on a daily 
basis and count myself lucky to have spent time with you.  Thank you to my Martin 
School cohort – regardless of whether it was hours at CoffeeTimes reading articles, 
impromptu weekday concerts at Busters, afternoons spent in the computer lab wrestling 
calculus, a Dexter marathon to celebrate a snow day, or a road trip to Texas to work on 
qualifying exams – the support you provided ensured my success (and sanity).   
Last, but never least, my family.  Thank you to my parents, Dan and Leslie 
Patrick, for the unwavering belief that I could do this.  And the reminders when I forgot.  
Thank you to my brother and sister-in-law, Drew and Kari Patrick, for your invaluable 
perspective and solidarity in the graduate school struggle.  Also for letting me just show 
up and crash for a week at a time, virtually unannounced, as the dissertation neared 
completion.  Finally, my husband Mike Connelly, who doesn’t want to be thanked but 
without whose support I would not have had the time or resources to finish.  His healthy 
outlook on academia helped keep the stress monster away and hearing him say he’s proud 
makes the headache worth it.   
 
  
 
v 
 
Table of Contents 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iii 
 
List of Tables ...................................................................................................................... x 
 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... xi 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 
Child Welfare .......................................................................................................... 2 
History of child welfare in the United States .............................................. 2 
Pre-1900 .......................................................................................... 3 
1900-1950 ....................................................................................... 4 
1950-1970 ....................................................................................... 5 
1970-1990 ....................................................................................... 6 
1990-Present ................................................................................... 8 
Policy summary ........................................................................................ 10 
Out-of-Home Care Defined .................................................................................. 11 
Out-of-Home Care as a Social Problem ................................................................ 12 
Consequences of out-of-home care ........................................................... 13 
Childbearing .................................................................................. 13 
Educational attainment.................................................................. 14 
Incarceration/criminal behavior .................................................... 15 
Employment .................................................................................. 15 
Out-of-Home Care Summary .................................................................... 16 
Summary ............................................................................................................... 17 
 
Chapter 2 – Theoretical Influences on Child Welfare Policy ........................................... 18 
Framing the Discussion:  Social Construction ...................................................... 18 
Deserving and undeserving poor .............................................................. 20 
Social construction of child welfare populations ...................................... 21 
CPS involved children .................................................................. 22 
CPS involved parents .................................................................... 23 
Foster and adoptive parents .......................................................... 24 
State CPS agency .......................................................................... 25 
Child Welfare Policy and Social Construction ..................................................... 26 
Redistributive Pressures on Social Policy............................................................. 27 
Constituent pressure .................................................................................. 28 
Public liberalism ........................................................................... 29 
Racial composition........................................................................ 29 
Class differences ........................................................................... 29 
Institutional Pressures ............................................................................... 30 
Party control .................................................................................. 30 
Government ideology.................................................................... 31 
Paternalism Pressure ................................................................................. 31 
Reproductive behavior .................................................................. 31 
 
vi 
 
Program utilization........................................................................ 32 
Resource Pressure ..................................................................................... 32 
State financial resources ............................................................... 32 
Financial burden distribution ........................................................ 33 
Redistribution and Child Welfare Policy .............................................................. 33 
Redistribution hypotheses ......................................................................... 34 
Summary ............................................................................................................... 35 
 
Chapter 3 – Redistributive Pressures and State Child Welfare Policy Environment ....... 37 
Testing Redistributive Pressures on Child Welfare Policy ................................... 37 
Data sources .............................................................................................. 37 
Child Welfare Information Gateway ............................................ 37 
State Child Welfare Policy Database ............................................ 38 
Operationalization of dependent variables................................................ 39 
System entry.................................................................................. 41 
Definitions of child abuse and neglect .............................. 41 
Parental Substance abuse as child abuse and neglect ....... 43 
Exemptions to child abuse and neglect definitions ........... 44 
Mandatory Reporters ........................................................ 46 
System exit .................................................................................... 47 
Adoptive parent groups ..................................................... 48 
Relative preference language ............................................ 49 
Kinship care in statute ....................................................... 49 
State ASFA adherence ...................................................... 50 
System generosity ......................................................................... 51 
Benefits ............................................................................. 52 
Expenditures ..................................................................... 54 
Access ............................................................................... 54 
Explanatory Variables ............................................................................... 56 
Constituent pressure ...................................................................... 56 
Public liberalism ............................................................... 56 
Racial composition............................................................ 56 
Class differences ............................................................... 56 
Institutional pressure ..................................................................... 57 
Party control ...................................................................... 57 
Government ideology........................................................ 57 
TANF orientation .............................................................. 57 
Paternalistic pressure .................................................................... 58 
Unmarried birthrate ........................................................... 58 
Program utilization............................................................ 58 
Resource Pressure ......................................................................... 58 
State financial resources ................................................... 58 
Financial burden distribution ............................................ 59 
Adoption incentive funds .................................................. 59 
Analytics ............................................................................................................... 59 
Panel analysis of policy change ................................................................ 59 
 
vii 
 
System entry results ...................................................................... 61 
System exit results ........................................................................ 63 
Generosity results.......................................................................... 65 
Summary ............................................................................................................... 67 
 
Chapter 4 – Factors Influencing Child Welfare Outcomes ............................................... 69 
Permanency Defined ............................................................................................. 69 
Factors affecting permanency ............................................................................... 70 
Child factors .............................................................................................. 71 
Age ................................................................................................ 71 
Race............................................................................................... 72 
Gender ........................................................................................... 73 
Disability status ............................................................................. 73 
Child mental health and substance abuse...................................... 74 
Reason for placement .................................................................... 74 
Location ........................................................................................ 75 
Placement number and type .......................................................... 76 
Family factors ........................................................................................... 76 
Family structure ............................................................................ 76 
Poverty .......................................................................................... 77 
Parent mental health or substance abuse ....................................... 77 
Prison ............................................................................................ 78 
System factors ........................................................................................... 78 
Consequences of not reaching permanency. ......................................................... 79 
Summary ............................................................................................................... 80 
 
Chapter 5 – Policy and State Impacts on Child Welfare Outcomes ................................. 82 
Examining the Impact of State Policy Choices on Child Outcomes .................... 82 
Adoption and foster care analysis and reporting system (AFCARS) ....... 82 
Operationalization of dependent variables................................................ 83 
Length of Stay ............................................................................... 83 
Discharge outcome........................................................................ 84 
Explanatory Variables ............................................................................... 86 
State-level variables ...................................................................... 86 
Unemployment .................................................................. 86 
Urbaness ............................................................................ 86 
Poverty rate ....................................................................... 86 
Child welfare “flow” ......................................................... 87 
Child welfare administrative structure .............................. 87 
Policy variables ............................................................................. 87 
Adoptive parent groups ..................................................... 87 
Biological family statutes ................................................. 87 
System generosity ............................................................. 88 
Family-level factors ...................................................................... 88 
Family structure ................................................................ 88 
Child–level factors ........................................................................ 89 
 
viii 
 
Race................................................................................... 89 
High-utilization county ..................................................... 89 
Disability status ................................................................. 89 
Removal manner ............................................................... 90 
Number of removals from home ....................................... 90 
Removal reason ................................................................. 90 
Number of placements during current spell ...................... 90 
Type of placement............................................................. 90 
Outcomes hypotheses................................................................................ 90 
Analytics ............................................................................................................... 91 
Child Length of Stay ................................................................................. 91 
Length of Stay results ................................................................... 92 
Child Permanency Outcomes .................................................................... 94 
Hazard model results..................................................................... 96 
Policy-level results ............................................................ 99 
State level results ............................................................ 101 
Family level results ......................................................... 102 
Child level results ........................................................... 102 
Elasticities results........................................................................ 103 
State speed of transition results................................................... 106 
Summary ............................................................................................................. 110 
 
Chapter 6 – Discussion ................................................................................................... 112 
Dissertation Summary ......................................................................................... 112 
Implications......................................................................................................... 113 
Theoretical implications.......................................................................... 114 
Policy and practice implications ............................................................. 115 
Limitations of the Study...................................................................................... 117 
Future Research .................................................................................................. 118 
Summary ............................................................................................................. 119 
 
Appendices  .................................................................................................................. 121 
Appendix A: Professional Categories Designated as Mandatory Reporters ...... 121 
Appendix B:  Operationalization and Source of Explanatory Variables in Child 
Welfare Policy Panel .................................................................... 122 
Appendix C:  Summary Statistics for Child Welfare Policy Panel .................... 124 
Appendix D:  Length of Stay Statistics, by state (FY 2010) .............................. 126 
Appendix E:  Discharge reasons, by state (FY 2010) ......................................... 128 
Appendix F:  Operationalization, Source and Summary Statistics for Child 
Outcome Analysis Explanatory Variables ................................... 130 
Appendix G: Full regression analysis results - Impact on child Length of Stay (in 
days), FY 2010 ............................................................................. 135 
Appendix H:  Full Hazard Model Results for Permanency and Specific Discharge 
Outcomes, FY 2010 ...................................................................... 137 
Appendix I:  Marginal Effects of Explanatory Variables on Predicted Time to 
Permanency & Specific Discharge Outcome ............................... 140 
 
ix 
 
Appendix J:  Speed of Discharge to Various Outcomes, Ranked by State......... 142 
Appendix K:  Significant Predictors of Child Discharge Outcomes .................. 143 
 
References  .................................................................................................................. 147 
 
VITA  .................................................................................................................. 160 
 
  
 
x 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1.1:  Adoption Incentive Payment per Child Adopted (Above the Baseline Number 
of Adoptions in the Respective Category) .........................................................9 
Table 2.1:  Child Welfare Group Classifications ...............................................................22 
Table 2.2:  Predicted Impacts of Child Welfare System Policy Dimensions on Socially 
Constructed Target Groups ..............................................................................27 
Table 2.3:  Predicted Relationships between Redistributive Theory Factors and Child 
Welfare Policy Groups .....................................................................................35 
Table 3.1:  Child Welfare Policy Data Source and Availability, by Year .........................38 
Table 3.2:  Operationalization of Policy Variables and Index Results ..............................40 
Table 3.3:  Factor Analysis of Child Welfare Policy Components....................................41 
Table 3.4:  State Statutes Defining Child Abuse and Neglect ...........................................42 
Table 3.5:  Statutes Defining Parental Substance Abuse as Child Abuse and Neglect .....44 
Table 3.6:  Exemptions in State Statutes for Child Abuse and Neglect ............................45 
Table 3.7:  Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect ..........................................46 
Table 3.8:  Placement of Children in OOHC with Relatives .............................................49 
Table 3.9:  State Compliance Rate with ASFA TPR Timeline, by Year ...........................50 
Table 3.10:  State Levels of Benefit and Expenditure Generosity, by Year ......................53 
Table 3.11:  Generosity of Access, Placement Rate per 100 Substantiated Victim of Child 
Abuse and Neglect, by Year ...........................................................................54 
Table 3.12:  Redistributive Pressures and Child Welfare Policies Impacting System 
Entry ...............................................................................................................62 
Table 3.13:  Impact of Redistributive Pressures on Child Welfare Policy Influencing 
System Exit .....................................................................................................64 
Table 3.14:  Impact of Redistributive Pressures on Child Welfare System Generosity ....66 
Table 5.1:  Operationalization of Dependent Variables.....................................................83 
Table 5.2:  Length of Stay (in days) ..................................................................................84 
Table 5.3:  Predicted Relationships between Macro-level Variables and Child-level 
Outcomes .........................................................................................................91 
Table 5.4:  Regression Analysis Results – Impact of Policy and State-level Factors on 
Child Length of Stay (in days), FY 2010 .........................................................93 
Table 5.5:  Policy and State-level Hazard Ratios for Various Discharge Outcomes, FY 
2010................................................................................................................100 
Table 5.6:  Change in Predicted LOS for a 10% Increase in Explanatory Variable ........104 
Table 6.1:  Predicted Relationships between Redistributive Pressures and Socially 
Constructed Groups .......................................................................................114 
  
 
xi 
 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 5.1:  Distribution of Length of Stay Prior to Discharge, FY 2010 .........................84 
Figure 5.2:  Prevalence of Discharge Reasons, FY 2010 ..................................................85 
Figure 5.3:  Hazard Function for Child Discharge to Reunification..................................97 
Figure 5.4:  Hazard Function for Child Discharge to Adoption ........................................97 
Figure 5.5:  Hazard Function for Child Discharge to Guardianship ..................................98 
Figure 5.6:  Hazard Function for Child Discharge to Non-Permanent Outcome ..............98 
Figure 5.7:  Speed of Transition to Permanency, by state (FY 2010) .............................106 
Figure 5.8:  Speed of Transition to Reunification, by state (FY 2010) ...........................107 
Figure 5.9:  Speed of Transition to Adoption, by state (FY 2010) ..................................108 
Figure 5.10:  Speed of Transition to Non-Permanency, by state (FY 2010) ...................109 
 
 
  
 
1 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
Child welfare policy touches the lives of all citizens as it serves to protect children 
from harm.  These policies reflect the moral standards for treatment of children, influence 
behavior by adults and provide an intervention structure for when a child has been or is at 
risk of being harmed.  Yet despite their broad reach, relatively little work has explored 
the forces behind state choices in child welfare policy.  Due to the similarities between 
child welfare and cash assistance programs (i.e. social construction of target population 
and state discretion on policy options), this analysis will use redistributive theory as a 
framework for an investigation into possible influences on state level child welfare 
policies.  Utilizing a unique data set comprised of thirteen child welfare policies that vary 
both between states and over time we will answer the first research question:  how well 
does redistributive theory explain the child welfare policy choices made by states?   
Removal from home and placement in out-of-home care (OOHC), the most 
intrusive child welfare intervention, is intended to be temporary.  However, in 2010 
children in out-of-home care experienced huge variance in the median length of stay 
(LOS) in care, from a low of only 224 days in Minnesota to a high of 878 days in Illinois.  
Another commonly studied outcome measure is the achievement of permanency by 
children discharged from out-of-home care.  Like length of stay, this too varied 
dramatically between states: from a low of 71% in North Dakota and Virginia to a high of 
95% in West Virginia.  While child and family level factors associated with increased 
length of stay and poor discharge outcomes are well established in the literature, state 
child welfare policies are under-examined in relation to these outcomes.  Eight child 
welfare policies will be utilized in subsequent models to answer the second research 
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question:  do state policy decisions in child welfare impact case-level outcomes, both 
length of stay and permanency, for children in out-of-home care? 
This research broadens the theoretical application of redistributive theory to a new 
policy arena and adds an additional layer of state level explanatory variables to the much-
studied outcomes for children in out-of-home care.  As we move forward to the issues of 
child welfare policy and child outcomes, we will first briefly cover the history of the 
child welfare system in the United States, including federal policy.   
Child Welfare 
The very concept of child welfare carries an inherent tension.  The balance 
between the rights of the families and the rights of the child is precarious; government 
officials have to determine when intervention is necessary and what constitutes an 
appropriate course of action.  Much of the variance in the field of child welfare, 
especially in terms of approach and outcomes of interest, can be traced back to the basic 
question of target population.  Focusing on intervention with birth parents can lead to 
very different methods of intervention and goals than if the at-risk children are the target.  
Policy and practice move along a spectrum, at times disrupting family life with a rescue 
mentality which emphasizes child safety and at other times focusing on family 
preservation, which stresses the importance of natural family. 
History of child welfare in the United States.  The U.S. child welfare system 
has evolved over the years, always closely reflecting the popular opinions of the day.  
Even the view of children has changed, from early American history where they were 
valued primarily as a source of labor, to modern day where they are thought to have a 
right to protection from harmful action and environments (Reich, 2005; Pecora, 2006).   
 
3 
 
Pre-1900.  In the early days, the lasting heritage of English common law gave 
guardians unchecked power over their children and complete discretion in child-rearing 
decisions; children had no legal right to protection (Nelson, 1984; Pfohl, 1977).  If there 
was family intervention, leading to the institutionalization of neglected, abused or 
destitute children, it was to protect society (Costin, Karger & Stoesz, 1996; Pfhol, 1977; 
Reich, 2005; Schene, 1998).  It was believed that the flaws of morally unfit parents would 
transfer into the next generation of society through the children if they remained with 
their birth families (Abramovitz & Bloom, 2003; Zimmerman, 1990).   
Abuse came to public attention in 1874 due to increased media coverage and the 
newly coined term “cruelty to children” which unified previously unrelated cases of 
violence against children.  This outrage precipitated the founding of the New York 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (New York SPCC), the first official 
child protection association in the U.S. with the objective of rescuing children from 
situations that imperiled their morals, safety, health or welfare (Bernstein, 2001; Costin et 
al., 1996; Nelson, 1984; Schene, 1998).   
As society moved into the late 19th century, the number of families where the wife 
and children did not work for wages increased, giving birth to the ideal of a protected 
childhood (Nelson, 1984).  The achievement of this ideal led to a clear delineation of 
family types.  Families in which mothers (and/or children) worked were measured against 
this new middle-class definition of parenting where the mother and children stayed home 
(Costin et al., 1996; Miller, Benjamin, & North, 2003; Reich, 2005).  The bulk of 
attention and assistance focused on poor and immigrant families who did not meet this 
ideal, as well as orphans, abandoned, or unsupervised children.  During this period, no 
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emphasis was put on family rehabilitation; child welfare policies were highly localized 
and intervention consisted primarily of children being separated from their parents 
through indenture or placement in refuge institutions (Schene, 1998).   
1900-1950. During the early twentieth century a hotly contested debate began 
regarding the best way to approach the issue of child welfare.  Lines were drawn between 
the preference for traditional child rescue and the new approach of family rehabilitation.  
Poor families, as well as families from racial and ethnic minority groups, continued to be 
judged against a white, middle-class parenting ideal, though the prescribed intervention 
differed by philosophy (Costin et al., 1996; Reich, 2005).   
Traditional child rescue continued to remove children from their parents and rely 
on large institutions, largely in the spirit of protecting society from future problems 
(Nelson, 1984).  Family rehabilitation, on the other hand, was favored by professionals in 
the emerging fields of social work and child psychology because it addressed the social, 
political, and economic issues which negatively impact children and their families.  It 
focused on keeping children in their homes of origin or, if that was not an option, in a 
homelike setting (Nelson, 1984; Pelton; 2008; Pfohl, 1977; Schene, 1998; Whittaker, 
Schinke, & Gilchrist, 1986).  A system of placing children in homes with willing and 
interested families developed and is the early roots of the modern foster care model.   
Government’s role in child welfare was also changing.  The 1909 White House 
Conference on Children proclaimed that children should not be removed from their 
homes because of poverty alone, and called for service programs and financial aid to 
protect the home environment, lending credibility to the new approach of family 
rehabilitation (Pfohl, 1977; Schene, 1998).  In 1912, Congress founded the Children’s 
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Bureau to guide federal programs supporting state-level efforts at child welfare (Nelson, 
1984; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (U.S. DHHS), 2004).   
The federal government first officially ventured into child welfare legislation with 
the Social Security Act of 1935, which established the Aid to Dependent Children 
program (AFDC).  AFDC offered cash assistance to enable poor, single mothers to care 
for their children rather than lose custody of them (Schene, 1998).  In addition, the Child 
Welfare Services Program, Title IV-B of the Act, provided state grants to support 
preventive and protective services to vulnerable children and their families (Schene, 
1998; U.S. DHHS, 2004).  In fact, the largest federally funded programs supporting state 
child welfare, foster care, and adoption activities continue to be authorized under Titles 
IV-B and IV-E of the Social Security Act (Child Welfare Information Gateway (CWIG), 
2009). 
1950-1970. Cruelty to children had, to date, largely been seen as an issue of poor 
people hurting or neglecting their children.  Child abuse, as it emerged in the 1960s, was 
deliberately presented as a classless and individually-based problem (Costin et al., 1996; 
Hacking, 1999 Nelson, 1984; Pecora, 2006).  Parents who were suspected of child abuse 
were labeled deviant, sick and in need of treatment (Nelson, 1984; Pecora, 2006; Kempe, 
Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller, and Silver, 1962).   
Particular attention was given to physical abuse resulting in injury (i.e. Battered 
Child Syndrome) thanks to an influential paper in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association by Dr. Kempe et al. (1962).  Because it came to light from the medical arena, 
child abuse had broad appeal as a problem, especially cast as equally common in all 
social classes and separate from broader social issues.  Liberals and conservatives could 
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agree and act in unison to combat it (Hacking, 1999).  After seeing model legislation put 
forth by the Children’s Bureau in 1962, states acted quickly: by 1966, all 50 states had 
statutes against the caretaker’s abuse of children (Pfohl, 1977). 
Practitioners favoring child rescue began citing social learning theory during this 
period, which showed children learn aggressive behaviors by witnessing aggression 
(Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1961).  Medical professionals also theorized that most parents 
who batter children are practicing the form of childcare they experienced, but stated that 
the prevention of additional trauma was vital and children should not be returned to an 
environment where there was a risk of repeated abuse (Kempe et al., 1962).   
Concurrently, community and social psychiatry emerged, giving serious 
consideration to the impacts poverty, unemployment, poor education, and discrimination 
have on family functioning (Abramovitz & Bloom, 2003).  These positions echoed the 
beliefs of early advocates of family rehabilitation.  In addition, the burgeoning theory of 
attachment addressed links between early trauma and subsequent relationships, providing 
a strong rationale for moving children into permanent homes as quickly as possible in 
order to minimize attachment disruption (Bowlby, 1969).   
1970-1990.  Public concern grew in the 1970s over the large number of children 
being placed in out-of-home care reported to drift from foster home to foster home, 
neither returning to their family of origin nor being released for adoption through the 
termination of parental rights (TPR) (Schene, 1998).  Attachment theory continued to 
gain acceptance and suggested that lingering in temporary living arrangements, like out-
of-home care, can be very detrimental to child development (Bowlby, 1969).  This 
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contributed to the large push in the 1980s to help children in the child welfare system 
attain permanent homes.   
The federal government started to take a more active role in child welfare during 
this period with the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) of 1974 
(P.L.93-247).  The Act provided financial assistance for prevention, identification, and 
treatment of child abuse and neglect demonstration programs (CWIG, 2009b; Nelson, 
1984; Pecora, 2006).  CAPTA also encouraged states to 1) pass laws requiring 
professionals and others to identify children who needed protection and 2) establish 
public social service departments to investigate reports of maltreatment and track 
substantiated cases (Pecora, 2006; Schene, 1998; Stein, 1984).   
Six years after the enactment of CAPTA, Congress passed the Adoption 
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-272).  The Act established a program 
of adoption assistance, strengthened the program of foster care assistance for needy and 
dependent children, and improved child welfare, social services, and AFDC programs 
(CWIG, 2009b; Pecora, 2006).  The federal government implemented funding incentives 
and procedural requirements to promote in-home services and permanency planning 
(CWIG, 2009b; Pecora, 2006).  The legislation required states make reasonable efforts to 
prevent the removal of children from home and, if removal was necessary, required 
agencies to place children in the least restrictive, most family-like setting appropriate for 
the child’s needs (Allen & Bissell, 2004).  In addition, for children in out-of-home care, 
states were to periodically review each case and attempt to reunify children with their 
families or find permanent homes quickly (Schene, 1998).  It was the first time 
permanency was an explicit goal for children placed in out-of-home care. 
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1990-Present.  The primary goal of the child welfare system remains the 
protection of children from harm.  Two secondary goals have also developed: to preserve 
existing families and to promote children’s development into independent and 
contributing adults (Pecora, 2006).  It is currently accepted that children have the right to 
remain with family members and that parents have a right to care for their own children 
in the manner they see fit, so long as they are meeting the minimum standards of 
parenting and not actively endangering or neglecting their children (Wulczyn, Barth, 
Yuan, Harden, & Landsverk, 2005).  If staying at home is not an option, however, the 
state must ensure the child will be brought up by stable permanent families rather than in 
temporary out-of-home care placements (Pecora, 2006).  This expectation has been well 
established in federal law particularly by the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 
detailed below.   
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) (P.L. 105-89) was enacted 
with the purpose of promoting adoption of children in out-of-home care (CWIG, 2009b).  
ASFA attempts to accelerate permanency by requiring states to initiate termination of 
parental rights court proceedings to free a child for adoption once a child had been in out-
of-home care for 12 consecutive months or at least 15 of the most recent 22 months 
without a reasonable exception.  Three reasonable exceptions are approved under ASFA: 
1) the child is being cared for by a relative; 2) the state agency has documented in the 
case plan a compelling reason that filing such a petition would not be in the best interests 
of the child; or 3) family reunification is the goal and the state has not provided the 
family with the services in the case plan which the state deems necessary for the child’s 
safe return (CWIG, 2009b). 
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Permanency hearings, the court proceedings during which the decision is made 
about if and when a child will be returned home, a termination of parental rights petition 
filed, legal guardianship or another permanency plan pursued, are now required no later 
than 12 months after a child enters out-of-home care, six months sooner than previously 
(CWIG, 2009b; Pecora, 2006; Potter & Klein-Rothschild, 2002).  Although reasonable 
efforts toward reunification are still required, ASFA does allow exceptions and permits 
the use of concurrent planning in which family reunification and adoption planning are 
pursued simultaneously in order to minimize waiting time for children (Potter & Klein-
Rothschild, 2002). 
The ASFA legislation also established the Adoption Incentive Program (P.L. 108-
145).  Reauthorized in 2003, the Adoption Incentive Program rewards states that exceed a 
state-specific established baseline number of adoptions with incentive funds under Title 
IV-E of the Social Security Act (CWIG, 2009b; Pecora, 2006; Potter & Klein-Rothschild, 
2002).  The target number of adoptions in each state is based on FY 2002.  To receive an 
incentive payment, a state must exceed the highest number of adoptions in 2002 or later 
(Pecora, 2006).  The program is designed to encourage states to finalize adoptions of 
children in out-of-home care, particularly those with special needs.  Currently there are 
four categories of payment (see Table 1.1).   
Table 1.1: Adoption Incentive Payment per Child Adopted (Above the Baseline 
Number of Adoptions in the Respective Category) 
Type of Adoptive Incentive 
Payment 
Payment under 
Adoption Promotion Act 
of 2003 
Payment under  
Fostering Connections to 
Success and Increasing 
Adoptions Act of 2008 
Foster Child $4,000 $4,000 
Special Needs Designated* $6,000 $12,000 
Older Foster Child (over 9-y.o.)* $8,000 $16,000 
Older Foster Child (over 9-y.o.) $4,000 $8,000 
* These categories require a state has also increased the overall number of adoptions 
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More recent federal legislation, the Fostering Connections to Success and 
Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-351), was enacted to amend parts of the 
Social Security Act to support relative caregivers, improve outcomes for children in out-
of-home care, and improve adoption incentives (CWIG, 2009b).  The Act created a new 
option for states to provide assistance payments and other benefits under Title IV-E on 
behalf of children who have been in out-of-home care and for whom a relative is taking 
legal guardianship.  It also reauthorized the Adoption Incentive Program and doubled 
incentive payment amounts for special needs and older child adoptions (see Table 1.1) 
(CWIG, 2009b).   
Policy summary.  The basis for government’s intervention in child welfare has 
always been grounded in the concept of parens patriae – a legal term asserting that 
government has a role protecting the interest of children and intervening when parents 
fail to provide proper care (U.S. DHHS, 2004).  The legal framework of the parent-child 
relationship balances the rights and responsibilities among the parents, the child, and the 
state, as guided by federal statutes (CWIG, 2009b; Pecora, 2006; .U.S DHHS, 2004).  
The federal child welfare policies enacted have impacted foster care practice by the 
states.  Within the current federal legislation, there are examples of both national 
mandates, which require state officials to enact and implement a requirement (i.e. the 
timeline for termination of parental rights), and also financial incentives, which reward 
some outcomes over others (i.e. the Adoption Incentive Program).  Both are effective 
ways for national lawmakers to influence state policymaking (Karch, 2006).  So while the 
primary responsibility for child welfare services rests with the states, they must comply 
with these federal requirements and guidelines in order to be eligible for federal support. 
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Out-of-Home Care Defined  
In the current child welfare system, when children come to the attention of child 
protective services (CPS), either because an abuse or neglect allegation has been made 
against the parent or through a child’s own delinquent behavior, an assessment is done of 
the family of origin.  If it is determined necessary for safety reasons, the child in question 
is removed from the home and placed in out-of-home care.  The nationally recognized 
options for placement of these children are as follows: 
 Pre-Adoptive Home: a home in which the family intends to adopt the child.  
These families may or may not be receiving foster care payment or an adoption 
subsidy on behalf of the child; 
 Foster family home, relative:  a licensed or unlicensed home of the child’s 
relatives regarded by the state as a foster care living arrangement for the child; 
 Foster family home, non-relative:  a licensed foster family home regarded by the 
state as a foster care living arrangement; 
 Group home:  a licensed or approved home providing 24-hour care for children in 
a small group setting that generally has from seven to twelve children; 
 Institution:  a child care facility operated by a public or private agency and 
providing 24-hour care and/or treatment for children who require separation from 
their own homes and group living experience.  These facilities may include child 
care institutions, residential treatment facilities, and maternity homes. 
 Supervised independent living:  an alternative traditional living arrangement 
where the child is under the supervision of the agency but without 24-hour adult 
supervision, is receiving financial support from the child welfare agency, and is in 
a setting which provides the opportunity for increased responsibility for self-care; 
 
12 
 
 Trial home visit:  the child has been in a foster care placement but, under state 
agency supervision, has been returned to the principal caretaker for a limited and 
specified period of time; and 
 Runaway:  the child has run away from the foster care setting (NDACAN, 
2012b),  
As mentioned previously, states are required to assess the individual needs of 
each child entering out-of-home care and place them in the least-restrictive placement 
appropriate for their situation.   
Out-of-Home Care as a Social Problem   
During the 2010 federal fiscal year, CPS agencies reviewed an estimated 3.3 
million referrals, involving the alleged maltreatment of 5.9 million children.  Of these, 
approximately 60.7 percent of the referrals met the criteria for further investigation by 
CPS agencies.  Of the nearly 2 million reports screened-in for follow up, 90.3% had an 
investigation (n=1,793,724) (U.S. DHHS, 2011).  Approximately 24% of the 
investigations (n=436,321) determined at least one child to be a victim of abuse or 
neglect (U.S. DHHS, 2011).  As a result, 254,375 children who were determined to be the 
targets of abuse or neglect were placed in foster care during FY 2010 (CWIG, 2012).   
On September 30, 2010, there were an estimated 408,425 children in out-of-home 
care in the U.S. (U.S. DHHS, 2011).  Of these, 74 percent were in foster homes (48 
percent in non-relative foster family home and 26 percent in relative foster homes).  The 
remaining were in pre-adoptive homes (4%), institutions (9%), group homes (6%), 
supervised independent living (1%), on trial home visits (5%), or had run away from 
placement (2%) (CWIG, 2012).  During that same fiscal year, total child welfare 
expenditures in the U.S. exceeded $29 billion dollars, up from over $28 billion in 2008.  
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These expenditures ranged in value from a low of approximately $116 per child in the 
state of Mississippi to a high of approximately $943 per child in the state of Connecticut 
(DeVooght, Fletcher, Vaughn, & Cooper, 2012).   
Consequences of out-of-home care.  Researchers have been examining the out-
of-home care system and identifying outcomes related to youths’ participation for years.  
Outcomes that can be directly attributed to removal from home are very difficult to pin 
down due to the many confounding life experiences that also contribute to the success (or 
lack thereof) for youth involved with the child welfare system.  Families with low-
income, a single mother family structure, low educational attainment, drug/alcohol use 
and minority status are overrepresented in the child welfare population.  In fact, poverty 
is the single best predictor of placement and time spent in out-of-home care (Roberts, 
2002).  In addition, children who are removed from their homes and placed in out-of-
home care typically have a history of abuse or neglect, which also can impact their life 
outcomes.   
Childbearing.  Research indicates that placement in out-of-home care impacts 
early childbearing.  Doyle, Jr. (2007) found teen childbearing rates for girls who spent 
time in out-of-home care to be twice that of a matched sample of youth for whom 
removal from home was the only difference.  This finding is consistent with results from 
the Midwest Evaluation of the Adult Functioning of Former Foster Youth (Midwest 
Study), a survey which found young adults who had been in out-of-home care were over 
twice as likely as the 19-year-olds in the low-income general population sample to have 
at least one child.  Nearly 32% of females and 14% of males surveyed who aged out of 
care reported having children (Courtney & Dworsky, 2006; Courtney, Hook, & Lee, 
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2010; Dworsky & Courtney, 2010).  Other research supports this as well and suggests 
that youth who were in out-of-home care are more approving of unmarried women 
having children (Vinnerljung, Sundell, Lofholm, & Humlesjo, 2005; Vinnerljung, , 
Franzen, & Danielsson, 2007).  In addition, adults who spent time in care end up having 
more children than they intended (i.e. had a child after they intended to stop having 
children) when compared with adults in the general population or a matched sample 
(Buehler, Orme, Post & Patterson, 2000).   
 Educational attainment.  Educational attainment of individuals who were 
involved with the child welfare system and placed in out-of-home care has also been the 
subject of research interested in outcomes of foster care (Viner & Taylor, 2005).  Despite 
the perception that children who experienced placement in out-of-home care have low 
levels of high school completion and GED certification, Pecora and colleagues (2006a) 
found these rates to be higher (87.8%) when they looked at foster care alumni ages 25 
years and older.  This suggests that while there may be large disparities in graduation and 
GED rates, at the ages typically associated with this measure (i.e. 18-20 years old) it may 
simply take these individuals longer to complete basic schooling.   
Larger differences appear when looking at higher levels of education.  Only 18% 
of the former foster youth in the Midwest Study were enrolled in a four-year college 
compared with 62% of the 19-year-olds in the national sample (Courtney & Dworsky, 
2006).  Among the foster care alumni, college completion rates were also relatively low.  
Almost half the foster care alumni (49.3%) had at least some college (comparable to 
51.7% for the general population) but college completion rates drop off to 10.8% for 
former foster youth, 25 years of age and older (compared to the same age general 
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population group which completes college at 24.4% by that age) (Pecora et al, 2006a; 
Pecora et al., 2006b).  These differences in drop-out rates remain even when comparing 
former foster youth to low-income, first generation college students who had not been in 
foster care (Day, Dworsky, Fogarty, & Damashek, 2011).   
Incarceration/criminal behavior.  Individuals who experienced foster care have 
increased involvement with the criminal justice system, both as juveniles and adults 
(Viner & Taylor, 2005; Vinnerljung et al., 2005).  When delinquency is measured as 
multiple trips before a juvenile court judge , point estimates suggest that youth in Cook 
County, IL (Chicago) who had been placed in foster care had levels of delinquency three 
times higher than the comparison group of children who had CPS investigations and 
remained at home (Doyle, Jr, 2007).  The same is true when looking at arrest 
propensities, conviction rates and imprisonment in adults: rates are two to three times 
higher in youth who were placed in foster care when compared with similar youth who 
remained in their homes (Doyle, Jr., 2008).  The young adults surveyed as part of the 
Midwest Study sample also reported a high level of involvement with the criminal justice 
system.  Twenty-eight per cent of the young adults reported being arrested and nearly 
one-fifth reported being incarcerated since their first interview (Courtney & Dworsky, 
2006; Courtney et al., 2010).   
Employment.  Studies have found that compared to a similar group of youth who 
had a period of receiving public aid between the ages of five and fifteen, youth who spent 
all or part of that time in foster care had lower levels of employment as well as lower 
earnings as adults  (Doyle, Jr., 2007; Dworsky, 2005).  The author interprets these results 
as indicating that youth on the margin of placement would have better long-term 
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employment outcomes when they remain at home.  Another study of a group of foster 
care alumni in the U.S. found employment rates of 80.1%, which the author points out is 
substantially lower than the national average of 95% for ages 20 to 34 during 2000.  One-
third of the alumni lived in households that were at or below the poverty line, which was 
three times the national poverty rate (Pecora, et al, 2006b).   
Other researchers have not found differences in employment outcomes for 
individuals who spent time in foster care.  Buehler and colleagues (2000) compared 
various life outcomes for three samples of adults: a group who spent time as youth in 
foster care, a group randomly selected from the general population and a group purposely 
constructed to match the foster care sample on background characteristics and found no 
differences in rates of employment or satisfaction with paid work for adults currently 
employed.  Youth in the Midwest Study, who were between the ages of 23 and 24 at the 
time of follow-up, reported unemployment rates of almost 50% (Courtney et al., 2010).   
Out-of-Home Care Summary.  The long-standing tension between removing 
children from their homes or the provision of in-home services for the birth family 
continues to influence both policy and practice in child welfare.  While not common, less 
than one percent of the population under 18 years old spent time in out-of-home care 
during 2010, removing children from their homes of origin can have huge personal 
implications for the children involved.  As understanding of these consequences has 
increased, emphasis has remained on providing children with the least restrictive 
placement option and ensuring any placement in out-of-home care is both warranted and 
time-limited.   
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Summary 
The complex history and inherent tensions of child welfare in the U.S. continue to 
make interventions in this field appear muddled.  While child abuse and neglect, as a 
concept, is unanimously condemned, the specifics of what behaviors (or lack thereof) 
constitutes abuse or neglect is open to individual interpretation.  Even less clear are the 
best ways to intervene once abuse or neglect has been substantiated.  Many forces come 
into play in these decisions including state-specific policies defining abuse and neglect, 
who is required to report suspected abuse and neglect, adoptive parent eligibility, position 
towards birth families and the financial support available for the child welfare system.   
Given the detrimental outcomes seen for children who experience a removal from 
home and placement in out-of-home care, it is important to critically examine the policies 
in place surrounding this intervention.  The latitude provided by the federal government 
in regards to these policy decisions leads to a patchwork of state-level policies.  
Following a foundational review of the theoretical models of social construction and 
redistributive theory, this analysis will examine state factors that could be influencing 
state child welfare policy decisions.  Once the potential causes of child welfare policies 
are established, the analysis will turn to the more practical consideration of how policies 
enacted by the states influence outcome patterns for children in out-of-home care.   
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Chapter 2 – Theoretical Influences on Child Welfare Policy   
Framing the Discussion:  Social Construction 
 Even after such a brief overview of the U.S. child welfare system history and 
federal policies, it is apparent that much depends on definitions and classifications.  Child 
abuse and neglect, like other social problems, only exists as a social construct (Nelson, 
1984; Weisberg, 1984).  It was created in the typical way:  a number of individuals felt a 
value conflict between how things were and how they ought to be, organized to achieve 
change and gained recognition from the wider public for their efforts (Ingram, Schneider, 
& deLeon, 2007; Nelson, 1984).  Like other areas, child welfare policies designed to 
address child abuse and neglect typically follow the subjective views of the group 
defining the issue and reproduce the prevailing institutional culture.   
Groups of people also become socially defined during the process of issue 
definition, which can have important ramifications in terms of policy impact (Hacking, 
1999; Ingram et al., 2007; Nelson, 1984; Soss, Fording, & Schram, 2011).  The terms 
target group or target population are used to identify groups chosen to receive benefits 
and/or burdens through policy design.  Policies frequently reinforce existing power 
relationships and social constructions, though the introduction of change is possible and 
would serve to alter existing patterns.   
Policy construction is dependent on two aspects of a group:  its power, construed 
as votes, wealth and propensity to mobilize for action, and the positive or negative social 
construction of the group.  Social constructions, in this instance, are the stereotypes 
created by society about the particular group.  By these stereotypes, groups are 
characterized as more-or-less worthy and deserving and as contributing more-or-less to 
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society as a whole (Schneider & Ingram, 1993; Schneider & Ingram, 2005; Ingram et al., 
2007).  Based on these two criteria there are four possible classifications:  
 Advantaged – These groups have high levels of political power and are seen 
in a positive light by policymakers and society.  Advantaged groups are likely 
to receive benefits from policy design.   
 Contender – These groups also have high levels of political power but are 
negatively regarded by the public.  Because of their tainted image but 
influential nature, contender groups may receive hidden benefits as a result of 
policy (i.e. a tax loophole).   
 Dependent – These groups are characterized by low political power but are 
typically viewed positively by the public.  Due to their sympathetic nature, 
dependent groups may receive lots of attention and pity but low levels of 
tangible benefits due to their low levels of political power.   
 Deviant – These groups have low levels of political power and are seen in a 
negative light by policymakers and the public.  As a consequence, deviants 
receive a disproportionate share of policy designed burdens and sanctions 
(Schneider & Ingram, 2005; Ingram et al., 2007).   
Public policy not only defines problems to be solved and goals to be achieved, it 
also serves as the major way government impacts the social construction of groups.  
Policies identify the groups whose behavior is important to the issue and seeks to elicit 
change through incentives and/or punishments (Schneider & Ingram, 1993).  It is 
important to remember that policies are largely stable over time, which is a contributing 
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factor in the persistence of social constructions of group deservingness and entitlement 
(Schneider & Ingram, 2005).   
Benefiting advantaged populations and punishing deviant groups are both very 
beneficial options for political entities, regardless of how effective the resulting policies 
are.  Politicians, political parties and governments who advocate for the advantaged 
groups can expect to be rewarded with support from that group (Schneider & Ingram, 
1993; Schneider & Ingram, 2005; Soss et al., 2011).  Likewise, ‘get tough’ policies 
targeted at deviant groups are typically popular with advantaged groups and have very 
few negative repercussions as the deviants themselves have low political power 
(Schneider & Ingram, 1993; Schneider & Ingram, 2005, pg.  18).   
Groups receiving positive messages and benefits from public policy get stronger 
as they are institutionally reinforced.  Conversely, groups who are construed as 
undeserving or unentitled (the deviants) become even more marginalized over time, 
leading to even less political power (Hacking, 1999; Ingram et al., 2007; Schneider & 
Ingram, 1993).  These impacts on the social identity of the groups can influence their 
political involvement.  Dependent and deviant groups, who have the most to gain, often 
display the lowest levels of voting and civic participation (Hacking, 1999; Schneider & 
Ingram, 1993; Schneider & Ingram, 2005; Soss, 2005).  They have internalized the 
messages regarding how they are likely to be treated by government, which they see in 
media outlets, observation of the political system and direct, personal interaction with 
public policy (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). 
Deserving and undeserving poor.  Consistent themes emerge in the literature 
about what makes a poor person deserving or undeserving, which track closely with 
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dependent and deviant classifications from the original social construction literature.  
Deserving poor are more likely to be white, follow mainstream norms (such as graduating 
high school and not having a child out of wedlock) and perceived to be victims of 
circumstance for their economic state (i.e. were fired from a job or low earnings due to 
illness) (Appelbaum, 2001; Misra, Moller, & Karides, 2003).  People classified as 
undeserving poor are more likely to be non-white (particularly African American), not 
follow mainstream norms, and be perceived as at fault for their own poverty (i.e. quit a 
job or unwilling to work) (Appelbaum, 2001; Misra et al., 2003).   These characteristics 
operate on something of a spectrum, with individuals having both undeserving and 
deserving qualities.  How an individual is ultimately categorized would depend on the 
sum of these characteristics or on the dimension that is perceived to be relevant in that 
scenario. 
Some argue that the poor and underclass in society are perceived as threatening 
not only by political elites but also by mainstream America: middle- and working-class 
citizens who represent the dominant majority in American society (Sampson & Laub, 
1993; Sampson & Lauritsen, 1997).  This concept of the underclass appears to have gone 
from an economic meaning to a more behaviorally oriented one, which has both class and 
cultural dimensions.  It includes notions of what constitutes appropriate dress, demeanor, 
ways of speaking, and child-rearing practices (Daly & Tonry, 1997).  All of the qualities 
associated with this group put them squarely in the undeserving poor category.   
Social construction of child welfare populations.  Within the realm of child 
welfare, there are four groups whose construction has developed over the past 100 years:  
CPS involved children, CPS involved parents, foster/adoptive parents and the state 
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agency itself (see Table 2.1).  Each group is the target population for various pieces in the 
tapestry of child welfare policy and their benefits/sanctions are distributed accordingly 
(Schneider & Ingram, 1993).   
 The fact that children who enter the child welfare system have largely been 
identified as having experienced (or being at risk of experiencing) abuse or neglect 
attaches a moral weight and rationale to the subsequent characterization of the parties 
involved (Schneider & Ingram, 1993).  As seen in the earlier discussion of the child 
welfare system development, there was a time in the not so distant past when the idea of 
child abuse was novel.  This concept was socially constructed in the early 1900s and the 
idea that parents accused of engaging in child abuse were morally deficient developed 
concurrently (Hacking, 1999).   
Table 2.1: Child Welfare Group Classifications 
 Political Power 
High  Low  
S
o
ci
a
l 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
  
Positive 
  
Advantaged 
Foster/Adoptive parents 
Dependents 
CPS involved children 
 
Negative 
 
Contender 
State CPS agency 
Deviants 
CPS involved parents 
 
CPS involved children.   The view of children has changed in the past 100 years, 
from when children were viewed as property with no legal right to protection.  Since then 
the notion of childhood has evolved to include the idea that children need protection and 
support for healthy development (Nelson, 1984; Pfohl, 1977; Reich, 2005).   
Like other children, those involved with the CPS system are positively construed 
as sympathetic characters but have virtually no political power (Schneider & Ingram, 
1993).  As such, they fall into the dependent category.  Children are reliant on other 
groups to advocate for their needs in the policy arena and, while they are likely to receive 
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a fair amount of attention from policy makers, they will likely not receive many tangible 
benefits (Schneider & Ingram, 1993).  One clear example of the position at-risk children 
hold on the public agenda is the Presidential Commission on Child and Youth Deaths.  
Designated in 1988, this commission had neither convened nor been funded well into the 
Clinton presidency (Costin et al., 1996).   
Children involved with child welfare potentially receive both benefits and burdens 
through the system, though only when they are subjected to government intervention and 
relinquish power over their own choices (Schneider & Ingram, 1993).  One of the major 
burdens on children involved with child welfare, the trauma of being removed from their 
homes and separated from their families, is justified as the most effective way to protect 
the child from harm.  Even the benefit of safety and financial support come with labels 
(i.e. victim, foster child) and a fair amount of stigma (Schneider & Ingram, 1993).   
CPS involved parents.  Parents who are involved with the child welfare system 
challenge conventional social construction as either dependents or deviants (Hacking, 
1999; Schneider & Ingram, 1993).  On one hand, the vast majority of these parents have 
had major difficulties in their lives and are frequently seen with pity, much like 
dependents.  An arguably more potent view is that parents who are accused of abusing or 
neglecting their children are to be condemned as deviant and consequently receive a 
disproportionate share of system burdens and sanctions.  This tension mirrors the general 
conflict in child welfare approaches. 
Since the beginning of the child welfare system, interventions have primarily 
focused on poor families as well as orphaned, abandoned, or unsupervised children.  Poor 
families and those from racial or ethnic minority backgrounds continue to have higher 
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rates of child welfare system contact, and continue to be judged against what amounts to 
a white, middle-class definition of adequate parenting (Costin et al., 1996; Ingram et al., 
2007; Reich, 2005).  Focusing on the differences between these parents and those who do 
not become involved with the child welfare system can lead to blaming them for their 
own deficits as parents, allegedly attributable to their failure to try to be like the rest of 
society (Schram, 2005).   
 Parents also can come to view themselves differently in light of child welfare 
involvement.  Being classified as a parent who has abused or neglected their child can 
change a parents’ evaluation of their own personal and moral worth (Hacking, 1999).  
Individuals categorized as deviants are overwhelmingly given the message that they are 
bad people whose behavior is unacceptable (Schneider & Ingram, 1993).  This can be 
reinforced by their subsequent interaction with the child welfare system.  As non-
voluntary clients, parents involved with the child welfare system report that they feel they 
do not have any input into the design of their service plan and are often subjected to the 
authority of others (Estefan, Coulter, VandeWeerd, Armstrong, & Gorski, 2012; 
Schneider & Ingram, 1993).  Based on prior interaction with government officials, and 
negative experiences with the child welfare system, these parents are suspicious of any 
help offered.  Any assistance is tempered with the threat of punishment for non-
compliance and often attempts to change the person rather than the underlying issue 
(Schneider & Ingram, 1993). 
Foster and adoptive parents.  Individuals who open their homes as foster parents 
and those seeking to adopt children from the child welfare system are, in contrast, likely 
to fall into the advantaged group.  These families are perceived as providing a better life 
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for children in need, and going out of their way to do so.  Foster and adoptive parents are 
relatively powerful in the child welfare arena, as they are voluntary participants.  Child 
welfare agencies work very hard to recruit and retain these individuals (Brooks, Barth, 
Bussiere, & Patterson, 1999; Collins-Camargo, Sullivan, & Murphy, 2011).   
 Unsurprisingly, child welfare policies overwhelmingly benefit foster and adoptive 
parents.  Diligent recruitment requirements emphasize capacity building through 
community outreach and education while the adoption incentive programs provide 
financial incentives for parents to move from fostering to adoption (Schneider & Ingram, 
1993).  By and large, the messages received by foster and adoptive parents are that they 
are good, intelligent people who receive benefits from government because they are 
contributing to public welfare (Schneider & Ingram, 1993).  Burdens placed on them, 
such as licensing and training requirements, are much smaller in scale than those faced by 
biological parents.  
State CPS agency.  The state child welfare agency, while working on behalf of 
children, most closely fits the classification of a contender by the social construction 
literature.  As the most visible player in child welfare, the child welfare agency receives 
the full weight of criticism.  Birth parents blame the agency for taking away their children 
and the public blames the agency for not removing abused children from their homes fast 
enough (Costin et al., 1996; Hacking, 1999).  Even policy exists in tension with the 
agency as it attempts to balance the rights of the birth family with the rights of the child.  
No matter where the agency falls on that continuum, someone is unhappy.  Despite this, 
the state child welfare agency receives benefits in the form of adoption incentives and 
federal support.   
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Child Welfare Policy and Social Construction  
The policy implications in the child welfare system are complex.  Each policy has 
the potential to impact the various target groups in a different way.  Policies that benefit 
one group may do so at the expense of another.  For current purposes, child welfare 
policy will be viewed as holistically as possible.  The impacts on all system participants: 
birth families, foster parents, state agency staff and children in out-of-home care, will be 
discussed as appropriate.  While complex, this will allow a more comprehensive view of 
the policy impacts.  See Table 2.2 for examples of potential benefits and/or burdens to 
each group for a sample of child welfare policy characteristics.  Restrictiveness of factors 
affecting system entry refers to the inclusiveness of child abuse and neglect definitions 
and the number of mandatory reporters in a state, while flexibility and financial 
generosity are more straightforward.   
For a specific example consider the structure of the current child welfare incentive 
structure, particularly the policies surrounding adoption.  This program can be considered 
rational given the social construction of child welfare involved parties.  With benefits 
accruing to the state agency and adoptive parents through adoption subsidies, policy 
makers are supporting the portions of the involved population most likely to be politically 
active.  The push towards adoption also can be viewed as a benefit to the children 
involved, despite the fact that many, particularly older youth, might prefer to stay in their 
homes of origin.  This too is in line with what social construction theory would predict as 
a policy response to a group designated as dependents.  Birth parents, as deviants, are the 
clear losers under the current adoption incentive program.  Biological parents bear the 
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largest burden with the system, get the least amount of financial support under the current 
adoption incentive program, and have very little political organization or clout.   
Table 2.2: Predicted Impacts of Child Welfare System Policy Dimensions on 
Socially Constructed Target Groups 
 
Advantaged 
Group 
Contender Group 
Dependent 
Group 
Deviant Group 
Foster and Adoptive 
Parents 
State Child  
Welfare Agency 
Child Welfare 
involved children 
Child Welfare 
involved parents 
Restrictiveness  
of Factors 
affecting 
System Entry  
n/a + 
Increased child 
base and system 
justification 
+ Safety 
- 
More 
behavioral 
restrictions 
- 
Removal 
from family 
Flexibility 
towards 
Adoption  
+ Easier to adopt 
+ 
Increased base of 
adoptive parents   
+ 
Easier to be 
adopted if 
high 
- 
Possibly 
harder to 
reunify if high 
+ 
Increases chance 
of adoption 
incentive 
- 
Harder to be 
adopted if 
low 
Flexibility 
towards Birth 
Family  
+ 
More children 
available if 
low  
+ 
Decreased legal 
burden on state 
+ 
Easier to be 
adopted if 
low - 
Harder to 
reunify if low 
- 
More likely 
to TPR if low 
- 
Fewer children 
available if  
high  
+ 
Easier to 
reunify if 
high 
+ 
Easier to 
reunify if high 
Financial 
Generosity 
+ 
Financial 
incentives 
+ 
Financial 
incentives and  
increased 
funding 
+ 
Increased 
funding 
- 
If not 
accessible 
+ If accessible  
 
Redistributive Pressures on Social Policy 
Social welfare policy is one of the major avenues through which government 
addresses the social and economic inequities that the market generates.  Within the broad 
category of social welfare policy are two sets of activities:  provision of social services 
(benefits of cash, in-kind benefits, and personal social services) and state regulation of 
citizen behavior (Karger & Stoesz, 2010).  Policies that make resources available for 
people in lower economic strata and programs providing assistance to disadvantaged 
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groups are the primary ways in which wealth is redistributed by U.S. government 
(Jansson, 2005; Tweedie, 1994).   
Redistribution and the pressures influencing it have been the subject of much 
study, particularly in regards to the traditional cash assistance program of AFDC, now 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  States have been given a high degree 
of latitude in their management of TANF programs since the welfare reform of 1996, 
provided they adhere to broad federal guidelines.  As a result, this area has proven to be a 
fruitful laboratory for policy research.  Differences in welfare policy choices by states 
provide a useful and accessible venue to test various models of redistribution (Fellowes 
& Rowe, 2004; Fording, 1997; Hero, 1998; Hill & Leighley, 1992; Sapat, 2004; Tweedie, 
1994).  Although much of the money spent by states on welfare programs originates from 
the federal government, states are frequently responsible for determining benefit levels 
and eligibility requirements (Hero, 1998; Fording, 1997).   
While these government transfers presumably go from the better off to the poor 
this is not always the case.  Instead, government takes from the relatively unorganized 
(e.g., general taxpayers) and gives to relatively organized groups.  Research has 
demonstrated that the patterns surrounding redistribution policies are tied to the 
“pressure” exerted by various factors (Jansson, 2005; Piven & Cloward, 1993; Tullock, 
2005; Tweedie, 1994).  
Constituent pressure.  One of the most frequently studied areas impacting 
redistribution of wealth focuses on the influence a state constituency has on the policies 
enacted.  Within this broad category, three major lines of research have emerged: 1) 
public liberalism; 2) racial composition; and 3) class differentials.  The theoretical 
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implications of these constituent pressures are very straightforward.  As citizens’s 
opinions become more favorable towards redistributive programs (i.e. welfare) through 
increased liberalism or decreased racism and class bias, state policymakers should 
institute more generous redistributive policies (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004). 
 Public liberalism.  Citizen ideology is generally conceived as the mean position 
of the public on a liberal-conservative continuum (Berry, Ringquist, Fording & Hanson, 
1998; Tweedie, 1994; Wright, Erikson & McIver, 1987).  As public liberalism increases, 
state redistributive policies become more generous.  This has been shown in both 
AFDC/TANF policy and Medicaid expenditures (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Brown, 1995; 
Erickson, Wright & McIver, 1993; Fording, 1997; McIver, Erickson & Wright, 2001; 
Ringquist et al, 1997; Smith, 1997; Tweedie, 1994).  
 Racial composition.  Racial composition has also been shown to influence state 
generosity in redistributive programs.  This had been measured as both the diversity 
within the state and the proportion of program participants of minority status; both have 
consistently had a negative relationship with policy generosity in both cash assistance and 
Medicaid programs (Brown, 1995; Fording, 1997; Hero & Tolbert, 1996; Hero, 1998; 
Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien., 2001).  The relationship between racial 
composition and policy outcomes is a bit more complex.  At the aggregate level, greater 
minority diversity is related to worse policy outcomes but when disaggregated by race, 
policy outcomes for minorities are actually worse in homogenous contexts (Hero & 
Tolbert, 1996; Hero, 1998).   
 Class differences.  Class differences, particularly among voters, can influence 
policies in redistributive programs as policymakers adjust to represent the interests of the 
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voting public (Beck, 1982; Hibbs, 1997).  Studies have shown that higher degrees of 
upper-class bias in the electorate are related to more stringent redistributive policies (Hill 
& Leighley, 1992; Ringquist et al., 1997).  Conversely, higher voting rates of low-income 
voters are associated with higher levels of welfare spending.  It is the representation of 
these lower class voters that most influences the redistributive policies of the states as 
higher turnout among low-income voters should push politicians to better represent their 
grievances and needs (Hill & Leighley, 1992; Ringquist et al., 1997; Soss et al., 2001).   
Institutional Pressures.  Another group of pressures influencing redistributive 
policies come from the institutions of government itself.  The two types of institutional 
characteristics which have received the most attention are the issues of party control and 
government ideology.  Scholars have theorized that as these institutional characteristics 
change and increased pressure is exerted in favor of redistribution, the generosity of state 
redistributive programs will increase (Berry & Berry, 1992; Fellowes & Rowe, 2004).  
This could happen through either increased representation by Democrats in the state 
legislature or increased government liberalism.   
 Party control.  The first of the institutional pressures, party control, influences the 
generosity of redistributive programs in easily anticipated ways.  Generally speaking, as 
Democrats increase the number of seats in the state legislature, there is a corresponding 
increase in generosity of redistributive programs (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Barrilleaux, 
Holbrook & Langer, 2002; Brown, 1995; Smith 1997).  Alt and Lowry (1994) estimate 
that under idealized conditions and unified control, Democrats appear to want state 
spending to equal 11.06% of permanent personal income while for Republicans the ideal 
level of spending would sit at 4.36%.  It is important to remember, however, that party 
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members do not vote in lock-step so a simple majority does not ensure that a particular 
position will be enacted. Instead, each additional seat gained by a respective party 
contributes to its influence on policy outcomes (Smith, 1997). 
 Government ideology.  Like the public liberalism theory of constituent pressure, 
the government ideology of a state can impact the generosity of their redistributive 
policies and programs.  More liberal state governments have more generous policies and 
spend more on redistributive programs than less liberal governments (Berry et al., 1998; 
Brown, 1995; Erickson et al., 1993; Fording, 1997; Karch, 2006; Soss et al., 2001).  The 
restrictiveness of redistributive programs, including AFDC/TANF, also is impacted by 
the liberalism of the state policy elites.  States with more liberal governments support 
more inclusive eligibility standards than do their conservative counterparts (Soss et al., 
2001).   
Paternalism Pressure.  Paternalism, as used here, refers to social policies that 
attempt to address social problems by “directive and supervisory means” (Mead, 1997, p. 
2).  The pressure exerted by policies that pursue a moral agenda can affect the design of 
redistributive programs such that they strategically change the behavior of program 
recipients.  The theoretical influence of paternalism pressure and the related social 
problems are not as clear as those suggested by constituent and institutional pressures 
(Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Mead, 1997; Murray; 1984; Soss et al., 2001).   
 Reproductive behavior.  One factor utilized to examine the paternalism pressure 
theory of redistribution is the reproductive behavior of citizens.  This has been used 
primarily in research on the cash assistance programs of AFDC/TANF.  States may use 
the policies of this program to either discourage childbearing by single women by making 
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it less attractive though restrictive policies or to support children born out-of-wedlock by 
instituting more generous policies (Maynard, 1997; Mead, 1997; Murray, 1984; Soss et 
al., 2001).  Either way, the proportion of children born to unwed mothers has been shown 
to influence the generosity of traditional welfare programs.   
 Program utilization.  Research on redistributive programs, particularly cash 
assistance programs, has also examined the influence of program utilization rates.  As a 
state’s population becomes more dependent on welfare, policymakers may decrease 
program generosity so as to discourage participation (Soss et al., 2001).  Redistributive 
programs can become more expensive in two ways: 1) more program participants 
collecting benefits or 2) program participants collecting higher levels of benefits.  So 
states can become more generous in terms of program inclusion or benefit levels 
(Tweedie, 1994; Orr, 1976; Plotnick & Winters, 1985).  This, like reproductive behavior, 
could also have the opposite effect if policymakers respond compassionately to a higher 
level of perceived need in their state (Brown, 1995).   
Resource Pressure.  Finally, resource pressures can influence a state’s 
redistributive policies.  State government revenues, per capita income in the state and 
federal cost sharing designated specifically for redistributive program assistance can all 
impact the generosity of redistributive policies and benefit levels. 
 State financial resources.  Research has shown that a state’s financial resources 
influence welfare budgets.  This has been measured in two ways: general state resources 
(such as a GSP measure) and as per capita income level in the state. Generally, states 
with more resources have more generous redistributive policies and benefits than less 
wealthy states (Barrilleaux et al., 2002; Brown, 1995; Karch, 2006; Plotnick & Winters, 
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1985; Tweedie, 1994).  These states have more available resources to afford the increased 
availability and higher benefit levels.   
 Financial burden distribution.  Another aspect of resource pressure that deserves 
theoretical consideration is the proportion paid for by the federal government.  The 
state/federal split of the financial burden varies dramatically among the states, as does the 
source of the federal dollars.  Larger national government transfers to the states, 
explicitly for cost sharing, are expected to produce increased state efforts in redistributive 
program such as AFDC/TANF and Medicaid (Albritton, 1989; Bailey & Rom, 2004; 
Barrilleaux et al., 2002; Tweedie, 1994). 
Redistribution and Child Welfare Policy 
While the forces driving redistribution have been the subject of much study, 
particularly in regards to the cash assistance programs of AFDC/TANF, this paper 
extends the focus of the examination to see if the same patterns of redistribution pressures 
apply to state child welfare policy.  Much like cash welfare programs, states have the 
ability to set many of their own child welfare policies, within broad guidelines 
established by the federal legislation, discussed above.  This includes state-established 
definitions of child abuse and neglect, mandatory reporting requirements, adoptive parent 
guidelines, and payment rates for out-of-home care, among others.   
Child welfare, like most other redistributive policies examined in the literature 
(i.e. education, AFDC/TANF, Medicaid expenditures), disproportionately impacts 
minority populations.  Actors in the child welfare system, particularly CPS involved 
parents, are socially constructed in a manner similar to welfare recipients.  As such, we 
would expect many of the same pressures seen in welfare policy research to affect child 
welfare policy decisions.  In Chapter III, 13 individual state child welfare policies will be 
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identified and examined in relation to the pressures that impact redistributive policies.  
These 13 policies can loosely be categorized as addressing the system entry, conditions 
for exit, and generosity of the child welfare system. 
Redistribution hypotheses.  The forces driving redistribution will be examined 
in relation to the three groups of policies separately, as each could impact system entry, 
exit, and generosity in different ways (see Table 2.3).  In general, we would expect that as 
citizens become less favorable toward redistributive programs (i.e. less liberal, higher 
percentage minority, higher class-biased), state policymakers pass child welfare policies 
that would make system entry easier, exit more difficult and the system itself less 
generous.  Likewise, as institutional characteristics change (i.e. more liberal, higher 
percentage of state legislature being Democrat, or increased acceptance of other 
redistributive policies), policymakers will enact policies making system entry less likely, 
system exit more accessible and more generous.  Increased resources should manifest in 
much the same way.  Higher levels of state resources and increased federal funding 
should serve to minimize child welfare system entry and facilitate exit while being more 
generous.   
The theoretical influence of paternalism pressure and the social factors related to 
it are not as clear as those suggested by constituent, institutional and resource pressures.  
It is conceivable that state policymakers could respond to an increase in system 
utilization and unmarried birth rate in two different ways.  One possibility is to increase 
redistributive policies to take care of those perceived as less fortunate.  The other option, 
as predicted by paternalism, is to decrease redistributive policies in order to discourage 
these behaviors, which are deemed undesirable.  As such, some research that includes the 
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social factors in an attempt to examine paternalistic pressure has tested this as a two-sided 
alternative (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Murray; 1984; Soss et al., 2001).  A similar 
approach is utilized here, where we are, in essence testing for the presence of a 
paternalistic orientation.  More restrictive factors surrounding system entry, less flexible 
conditions for exit and less generosity would all provide evidence of paternalistic 
pressures in the child welfare system.   
Table 2.3: Predicted Relationships between Redistributive Theory Factors and 
Child Welfare Policy Groups 
Factor System Entry System Exit 
System 
Generosity 
Constituent Pressures 
Public Liberalism - + + 
Racial Composition + - - 
Class Bias + - - 
Institutional Pressures 
Democratic Party Control - + + 
Government Liberalism - + + 
TANF Stringency + - - 
Paternalistic Pressure 
Unmarried Birth Rate +/- -/+ -/+ 
Child Welfare System Demand +/- -/+ -/+ 
OOHC Demand +/- -/+ -/+ 
Resource Pressures 
Per Capita Personal Income - + + 
Percent Federal Funding - + + 
Adoption Incentive Funds + -/+ +/- 
 
Summary 
Because of the similarities in the target populations between child welfare 
involved populations, particularly the birth parents, and the target population of other 
cash assistance programs like TANF, it is reasonable to believe that comparable forces 
would impact policy decisions by the state.  This relationship will be examined in the 
next chapter utilizing a unique panel data set of thirteen state child welfare policies. It is 
important to remember that the following analysis focuses exclusively on the set of 
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relationships between redistributive pressures and child welfare policies.  The potential 
impacts the resulting policies might have on the respective target groups will be explored 
in the discussion as they remain primarily theoretical for the purposes of this study.   
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Chapter 3 – Redistributive Pressures and State Child Welfare Policy Environment  
Testing Redistributive Pressures on Child Welfare Policy 
State level factors commonly believed to influence redistributive policies are 
examined in relation to state child welfare policies surrounding system entry, exit and 
generosity.  These three aspects of the child welfare system are each captured by an 
independent set of policy decisions.  Analysis will cover the period 2004-2010 due to 
data availability; unfortunately data on each of the policies was not available for every 
year so each policy is modelled separately.  See Table 3.1 for the policy-year 
combinations included in the analysis.   
Data sources.  Data for this analysis has been gathered from a wide variety of 
sources.  Through consultation with staff at the Child Welfare Information Gateway and 
Child Trends, relevant policy areas and data sources were identified as they relate to child 
welfare system entry, exit and generosity.  Policy outcome data are primarily from two 
well-known child welfare datasets, while explanatory variables were gleaned from 
appropriate government and other widely used data sources.   
Child Welfare Information Gateway (CWIG).  Data for most policy variables 
was gathered from publications by the CWIG, which operates as a service of the 
Children’s Bureau, Administration of Children and Families, U.S.  Department of Health 
and Human Services.  The CWIG “promotes the safety, permanency, and well-being of 
children, youth and families by connecting child welfare, adoption, and related 
professionals as well as the general public to information, resources, and tools covering 
topics on child welfare, child abuse and neglect, out-of-home care, adoption, and more” 
(CWIG, 2013).  CWIG staff provided access to archived reports from the State Statute 
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Series on topics such as mandatory reporters, definitions of child abuse and neglect, 
parental drug use as child abuse and neglect, relative placement statutes and adoption 
guidelines for various years.   
Table 3.1: Child Welfare Policy Data Source and Availability, by Year 
Policy  
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
Source 
System Entry  
Definitions of Child Abuse and Neglect  X  X  X X CWIG 
Parental Substance Use as Child Abuse and 
Neglect 
 X  X  X X CWIG 
Exemptions for Child Abuse and Neglect  X  X  X X CWIG 
All Citizens Mandatory Reporters  X   X  X CWIG 
Categories of Mandatory Reporters  X   X  X CWIG 
System Exit  
Approved Adoptive Groups X     X X CWIG 
Adoption Restrictions X     X X CWIG 
ASFA Compliance Rate X X   X  X AFCARS Data 
Relative Preference for Placement  X   X  X CWIG 
Kinship Care Established in Statute  X   X  X CWIG 
System Generosity  
Generosity of Payment     X  X ChildTrends 
Generosity of Expenditures     X  X ChildTrends 
Generosity of Access  X X X X X X DHHS 
 
State Child Welfare Policy Database.  Child welfare finance data was assembled 
from the State Child Welfare Policy Database, a website developed and managed by 
Child Trends.  Child Trends is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research center that studies 
children at all stages of development and seeks to improve the lives of children and youth 
by conducting high-quality research and sharing it with the people and institutions whose 
decisions and actions affect children (ChildTrends, 2010).  The database is sponsored by 
Casey Family Programs, the nation's largest operating foundation focused entirely on 
foster care and improving the child welfare system.  The expressed purpose of the 
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website is to centralize and make publicly available state child welfare policies for policy 
makers, practitioners, and other stakeholders (ChildTrends, 2010; CWIG, 2009b).  The 
State Child Welfare Policy Database contains detailed financing information from FY 
2008 and FY 2010 which was gathered through Casey Child Welfare Financing Survey.  
Operationalization of dependent variables.  The gathered information on state 
policies guiding child welfare was then converted to quantitative measures of the policies 
over time.  Converting data from text form to a numerical representation of each policy 
produces measures that are useful for comparing states and examining changes in these 
policies (De Jong, Graefe, Irving & St. Pierre, 2006).  For most policies the conversion 
was a straightforward 1/0 indication of whether each state had the policy in place.  See 
Table 3.2 for an overview of outcome variables.   
For this analysis, the primary focus is “on the books” child welfare statutes 
developed by state legislatures and child welfare agencies, rather than “on the ground” 
policy implementation by local agencies and individual caseworkers.  It can be argued 
that stated policies provide the most valid indicators of state policymakers’ intentions, 
and the most reliable basis for constructing a comparable metric across states (De Jong et 
al., 2006).  These differences in state policy, and the flexibility afforded them by the 
federal government, allow policymakers to address the particular needs of children in 
their state and to adjust for specific local problems (Avery, 1998).  This can however 
create a question of equity for the children and families involved.    
 Initial analysis of the thirteen policy variables was conducted to test for 
underlying factors, such as restrictiveness or flexibility.  Policies fall into three fairly 
clear categories:  1) those which impact a child’s entry to the system, 2) those impacting 
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the conditions surrounding a child’s exit from the system and 3) system generosity.  
Attempts to create indices for the three dimensions, however, did not yield strong results 
(see Table 3.2).  This suggests that policies are not organized around any underlying 
concepts such as restrictiveness, flexibility or generosity.  Based on these results, the use 
of indices in later models would be inappropriate.   
Table 3.2: Operationalization of Policy Variables and Index Results 
Variable Operationalization 
Chronbach’s 
Alpha of 
Index 
Policy variables 
System Entry “Restrictiveness” Index 
0.3215 
Definitions of child 
abuse/neglect  
Count variable of six policy choices regarding 
definitions of CAN 
Parental substance abuse as 
child abuse/neglect 
Count variable of eight policy choices regarding 
parental substance abuse as CAN 
Exemptions to child 
abuse/neglect  
Count variable of three policy choices allowing 
exemptions to charges of CAN 
All citizens mandatory 
reporters  
0/1 for if all citizens are mandatory reporters of CAN 
Professions as mandatory 
reporters 
Count variable of 27 professional categories states 
could designate as mandatory reporters 
System Exit “Flexibility” Index 
0.3240 
Number of groups approved as 
adoptive parents by statute 
Count variable of five policy choices regarding 
adoptive parent groups 
Number of restrictions on who 
is eligible to be an adoptive 
parent 
Count variable of five policy choices regarding 
restrictions of who is eligible to adopt 
Compliance rate with ASFA 
timeline for TPR 
State compliance rate for children who are in care 21 
straight months and have parental TPR in place  
State preference for placing 
children in OOHC with 
relatives 
0: no relative preference in placement;   
1: officials “may consider” relatives;   
2: explicit preference for relatives in placement 
Kinship Care Program in 
statute 
0/1 for if Kinship Care program established in state 
statute  
System Generosity “Generosity” Index 
0.4534 
Child welfare system benefits 
Avg. annual Title IV-E foster care maintenance 
payment per Title IV-E eligible foster child  
Child welfare system 
expenditures 
Avg. child welfare expenditures per child in the 
general population 
Child welfare system access 
Placement in OOHC rate per 100 substantiated 
victim of CAN 
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  A subsequent principle component factor analysis revealed six significant 
underlying factors.  See Table 3.3 for factor details.  While these factors do make some 
intuitive sense, the component pieces still do not index very well.  Implications of these 
results will be discussed further in chapter six.  For the purposes of this analysis, each 
policy variable will be examined independently.   
Table 3.3: Factor Analysis of Child Welfare Policy Components 
Factor 
Eigen 
Value 
Proportion  
of  Variance 
Explained 
Policy components 
(w/factor loadings) 
Index Name 
(Chronbach’s 
Alpha) 
Factor 1 2.12 0.163 Mandatory reporter categories (0.90) Reporting  
Factor 2 2.00 0.154 
Child welfare payments (0.79)  
Child welfare expenditures (0.85) 
Financial (0.661) 
Factor 3 1.54 0.119 
Approved adoptive groups (0.86) 
Relative preference in placement (0.62) 
Flexibility (0.429) 
Factor 4 1.38 0.106 Kinship care (0.84) Kinship Care 
Factor 5 1.32 0.101 Exemptions to abuse and neglect (0.87) Exemptions 
Factor 6 1.27 0.098 
Abuse and neglect definitions (0.88) 
Parental substance abuse (0.55) 
Restrictiveness 
(0.342) 
Total Variance 
Explained: 
0.742  
 
System entry.  The first broad category are policies that impact a child’s entry to 
the child welfare system.  For this analysis, we will look at five policy decisions 
addressing the front end of child welfare intervention: 1) definitions of child abuse and 
neglect; 2) parental substance abuse as child abuse and neglect; 3) exemptions to alleged 
child abuse and neglect; 4) whether all citizens are mandatory reporters of child abuse 
and neglect and 5) how many professional categories are designated mandatory reporters.  
These are, in essence, the rules that govern a child’s initial eligibility for intervention by 
the child welfare system.    
Definitions of child abuse and neglect.  Each state has the ability to set its own 
definition of child abuse and neglect, provided it is at least as stringent as the minimum 
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definition provided by the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA).   
This Act (amended in 2003) defines “child abuse and neglect” as “any recent act or 
failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which results in death, serious physical 
or emotional harm, sexual abuse or exploitation, or an act or failure to act which presents 
an imminent risk of serious harm” (U.S. DHHS, 2004).   
Policy reports on various aspects of state definitions for child abuse and neglect 
were available for the years 2007, 2009 and 2010 (CWIG, 2007; CWIG, 2009a; CWIG, 
2011).  Within the reports were data on six policy choices available to states.   For each 
element included in their policy, states are assigned a 1 if the rule is in place and a 0 if it 
is not.  Totals for each state were calculated, where higher numbers indicate a stricter 
approach to defining child abuse and neglect.  See Table 3.4 for an overview of the policy 
dynamics in the states.    
Table 3.4: State Statues Defining Child Abuse and Neglect  
Policy 2007  2009  2010  
Physical abuse definition includes threats or risk of harm 36 38 38 
Neglect definition includes failure to educate the child 21 24 24 
Medical neglect defined as:  
Infants only 7 4 4 
All children  0 7 7 
Emotional maltreatment included in abuse and neglect definition 49 49 49 
Specific definition of emotional abuse / mental injury in statute 22 32 32 
Abandonment included:  
In separate statute 13 18 18 
In child abuse and neglect statute 18 17 17 
Percentage of possible state/policy combinations in place 52.3% 60.6% 60.6% 
State Minimum Score 0 0 0 
State Maximum Score 6 7 7 
Number of states with an increase in overall policy restrictiveness  23 0 
Number of states with a decrease in overall policy restrictiveness   1 0 
 
Generally policy choices surrounding definitions of child abuse and neglect 
remained steady over time though there was some variation between 2007 and 2009.  
Two states added threats or risk of harm to their definitions of physical abuse between 
2007 and 2009 (KS and NV).  Three states began including failure to educate a child to 
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their definition of child neglect during that time period (ME, MS and UT).  In terms of 
medical neglect, four states added definitions of medical neglect to their statutes between 
2007 and 2009 (IN, KS, MN, and MT) while seven others expanded their definition from 
covering infants only to include children of all ages (MS, ND, OH, OK, TN, TX and 
WV).  Additionally, ten states added a specific definition of emotional abuse/mental 
injury to their statutes between 2007 and 2009 (DE, HI, IA, KS, MA, NH, NC, OR, SD 
and TX).   
Parental Substance abuse as child abuse and neglect.  Some states also choose to 
explicitly define parental substance abuse as child abuse or neglect.  Policy reports on the 
various aspects of parental substance abuse included in state definitions of child abuse 
and neglect were available for the years 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2010 (National 
Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information (NCCANI), 2003; NCCANI, 
2005a; CWIG, 2007; CWIG, 2009c; CWIG, 2011; citation).  Within the reports were data 
for eight policy choices utilized by the states (see Table 3.5).  While still relatively 
uncommon, only around fifteen percent of all possible policies are in place with no state 
utilizing more than three substance abuse specific statutes, the trend has been toward 
more clarity on the types of parental substance use considered child abuse and neglect.   
The most common aspect of parental substance abuse included in state definitions 
of child abuse or neglect is the child’s exposure to harm prenatally due to the mother’s 
use of illicit substances, though the number of states with this established in statute has 
decreased since 2003.  By 2007, fifteen states had removed this from their statute (AZ, 
CA, FL, HI, IN, KY, NI, MO, OK, SC, TN, TX, UT, VA, and WA), while one had added 
it (LA).  Two years later however, four states had reinstituted the statue (AZ, IN, OK, and 
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OR).  Between 2005 and 2007, three states began including the manufacture of a 
controlled substance in a child’s presence or on premises with a child to their definition 
of child neglect (OH, OR, and WA).  One state began including using/storing 
manufacturing chemicals or equipment in a child’s presence to the definition of child 
abuse or neglect between 2005 and 2007 (WA), while two changed this policy between 
2007 and 2009 (AR added it and NM removed it from the definition).  In terms of selling, 
distributing or giving drugs/alcohol to a child, two states added this to the definition of 
child abuse or neglect between 2005 and 2007 (AR and OH).  Three other states added a 
caregiver’s use of controlled substances that impair his or her ability to adequately care 
for the child to their definition of child abuse or neglect between 2007 and 2009 (CA, DE 
and MN).   
Table 3.5: Statues Defining Parental Substance Abuse as Child Abuse and Neglect  
Policy 2003 2005  2007  2009  2010  
Includes child’s exposure to harm prenatally due to 
mothers use of drugs/illegal substance 
23 23 10 14 14 
Includes manufacture of controlled substance in child’s 
presence or on premises with child 
7 7 10 10 10 
Includes using/storing manufacturing 
chemicals/equipment in child’s presence 
2 2 3 3 3 
Includes selling, distributing, or giving drugs/alcohol to 
child 
5 5 7 7 7 
Includes caregivers use of controlled substance that 
impairs his/her ability to adequately care for child 
4 4 4 7 7 
Percentage of possible state/policy combinations in 
place 
16.4% 16.4% 13.6% 16.4% 16.4% 
State Minimum Score 0 0 0 0 0 
State Maximum Score 3 2 2 3 3 
Number of states with an increase in policy 
restrictiveness 
 
0 5 7 0 
Number of states with a decrease in policy 
restrictiveness  
3 12 1 0 
 
Exemptions to child abuse and neglect definitions.  Also impacting a child’s entry 
to the child welfare system are the state sanctioned exemptions to their definitions of 
child abuse and neglect.  In these situations, despite meeting the technical criteria for 
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abuse or neglect, there is an extenuating circumstance protecting the parents from 
substantiation and/or prosecution.  Policy reports on exemptions were available for the 
years 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2010 (NCCANI, 2005a; CWIG, 2007; CWIG, 2009a; CWIG, 
2011).  In this category, states with higher scores actually have a less restrictive approach 
to child welfare.  As such exemptions were reverse coded for the analysis to conform to 
other measures.   
Table 3.6: Exemptions in State Statues for Child Abuse and Neglect  
Policy 2005  2007  2009  2010  
Exemption for financial inability to provide for child 6 11 12 12 
Exemption for reasonable physical discipline causing no bodily 
injury 
14 14 16 16 
Exemption for withholding of medical treatment due to religious 
beliefs (including Christian Scientist views)  
32 33 31 34 
Percentage of possible state/policy combinations in place 34.7% 38.7% 39.3% 41.3% 
State Minimum Score 0 0 0 0 
State Maximum Score 3 3 3 3 
Number of states with an increase in policy restrictiveness 
 
6 4 2 
Number of states with a decrease in policy restrictiveness  0 3 0 
 
Within the reports was data for three exemptions granted by states (see Table 3.6 
for overall trends).  Five states added an exemption for parents experiencing a financial 
inability to provide for the child between 2205 and 2007 (KS, NH, ND, TX, and WA) 
with another joining by 2009 (MA).  Two states began exempting reasonable physical 
discipline causing no bodily injury between 2007 and 2009 (CA and UT).  The final 
exemption, for withholding medical treatment due to religious beliefs, experienced the 
most fluctuation during this period.  One state began honoring this exemption between 
2005 and 2007 (VA), while between 2007 and 2009 one state began honoring and three 
states repealed the religious exemption (UT and AZ, CT, WA, respectively).  By 2010, 
however, both Connecticut and Washington had reinstated the religious exemption.   
 
46 
 
Mandatory Reporters.  State policy governing who is required to report suspected 
child abuse and neglect is also considered to be a policy impacting a child’s entry to the 
child welfare system.  Data from the years 2005, 2008 and 2010 indicates that eighteen 
states require all citizens to report suspected abuse/neglect while others designate only 
certain professional categories (CWIG, 2005; CWIG, 2008a; CWIG, 2010a).  The states 
with a blanket requirement for reporting child abuse and neglect remained constant 
between 2005 and 2010.    
During this period there was some fluctuation in the number of professional 
categories designated as mandatory reporters.  Twenty seven distinct professional 
categories were identified in the state statutes and include such diverse groups as health 
care workers, film photograph processors, clergy, firefighters, veterinarians, coroners and 
internet service providers (see Appendix A).  Seven states increased the number of 
professional categories required to report child abuse and neglect between 2005 and 2008 
with an additional ten increasing the size of this group between 2008 and 2010.  Two 
states decreased the number of professional categories designated as mandatory reporters 
between 2005 and 2008 and two others between 2008 and 2010 (see Table 3.7).   
Table 3.7:  Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect  
State 
Professional Categories All 
Citizens 2005 2008 2010  
Alabama 7 7 7 No 
Alaska 7 7 7 No 
Arizona 9 9 9 No 
Arkansas 12 12 14 No 
California 15 16 17 No 
Colorado 11 13 13 No 
Connecticut 11 11 12 No 
Delaware 5 5 5 Yes 
Florida 10 10 10 Yes 
Georgia 7 7 7 No 
Hawaii 9 9 9 No 
Idaho 5 5 5 Yes 
Illinois 15 14 14 No 
Indiana 2 2 2 Yes 
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Table 3.7 (continued) 
Iowa 11 11 11 No 
Kansas 9 10 10 No 
Kentucky 7 6 6 Yes 
Louisiana 12 12 13 No 
Maine 14 14 15 No 
Maryland 4 4 4 Yes 
Massachusetts 13 13 14 No 
Michigan 7 7 8 No 
Minnesota 6 7 7 No 
Mississippi 8 8 8 Yes 
Missouri 12 12 12 No 
Montana 11 11 11 No 
Nebraska 3 3 3 Yes 
Nevada 13 13 13 No 
New Hampshire 8 8 8 Yes 
New Jersey 0 0 0 Yes 
New Mexico 6 6 6 Yes 
New York 10 10 10 No 
North Carolina 0 0 0 Yes 
North Dakota 9 12 12 No 
Ohio 11 11 11 No 
Oklahoma 3 3 2 Yes 
Oregon 13 13 12 No 
Pennsylvania 9 9 9 No 
Rhode Island 1 1 1 Yes 
South Carolina 14 14 14 No 
South Dakota 11 11 11 No 
Tennessee 10 10 10 Yes 
Texas 4 4 4 Yes 
Utah 1 1 1 Yes 
Vermont 9 9 9 No 
Virginia 10 10 11 No 
Washington 10 10 11 No 
West Virginia 9 10 10 No 
Wisconsin 11 11 11 No 
Wyoming 0 0 0 Yes 
 
System exit.  The second child welfare policy dimension examined are the 
policies which impact a child’s experience relating to discharge from out-of-home care.  
For the purposes of this analysis, exit policies are captured by five separate indicators: 1) 
groups approved as adoptive parents; 2) restrictions on who is eligible as an adoptive 
parent; 3) state ASFA compliance rate for termination of parental rights timeline; 4) 
explicit relative preference in placement; and 5) statute establishing a kinship care 
program.  These five policies demonstrate the position the state takes regarding family, 
both biological and adoptive.  Having fewer restrictions, more groups explicitly approved 
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to be adoptive parents and an openness to placing children with relatives indicates a more 
flexible approach to family which can impact a child's exit from care. 
Adoptive parent groups.  State guidelines surrounding who is and is not eligible to 
be an adoptive parent were available for 2004, 2009 and 2010 (NCCANI, 2004; CWIG 
2009d; CWIG, 2010).  While all states allow single adults and married couples to adopt 
children, there is some variation in other categories.  Twenty five percent of states 
allowed married persons to adopt children without spousal consent under some 
circumstances in 2010, down from 28% in 2009 and 2004 (Missouri stopped allowing 
this).  Thirty two percent of states approved legally separated adults to be adoptive 
parents in 2010 and 14% had statutes establishing that adoptions by minors were legal 
with court approval, both of which had remained steady since 2004.   
State established restrictions on who is eligible to adopt children were also fairly 
stable over the years.  The most common restriction, a state residency requirement, is 
present in one third of the states, and has been consistent since 2004.  The age of 
potential adoptive parents is grounds for denial in some states as well.  This can occur in 
two ways.  Twenty two percent of states have a restriction based on flat age where a 
potential adoptive parent must be of a certain age to be eligible to adopt.  In 14% of states 
the restriction surrounding age is more dynamic:  an adoptive parent must be a certain 
number of years older than child he or she is seeking to adopt.  Like the state residency 
requirement, these restrictions have remained unchanged since 2004.  The final group of 
restrictions, based on cohabitation and sexual orientation, is the smallest.  One state 
(Utah) had an explicit restriction against cohabitating couples that has not changed in the 
years this analysis will cover.  In 2009 and 2010, six percent of states allow the sexual 
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orientation of potential adoptive parents to be taken into consideration when making 
placement decisions.  This has increased from four percent in 2004 with the addition of 
Connecticut. 
Relative preference language.  Policy language surrounding placement of children 
in out-of-home care with relatives takes one of three forms.  States either ignore the issue, 
permit “consideration” of relatives for placement or establish an explicit preference for 
placing children with relatives whenever feasible.  Information on this policy preference 
was available for the years 2005, 2008 and 2010 (NCCANI, 2005b; CWIG 2008b; 
CWIG, 2010b).  There is a clear trend towards a preference for relative placement since 
2005, with 16 states amending their policy language in this manner (see Table 3.8). 
Between 2005 and 2008, fourteen states had increased their explicit preference for 
placing children in out-of-home care with relatives (AZ, DE, FL, IL, IN, MA, MI, NJ, 
NY, OK, RI, SC, TX, and VA) while four had removed this language from their statutes 
(OH, SD, VT, and WV).  Four more states had established a relative preference in 
placement by 2010 (HI, ID, IA, and NM).   
Table 3.8: Placement of Children in OOHC with Relatives  
Policy language regarding relative preference 2005 2008 2010 
No preference for relative placement 4 6 4 
States “may consider” placement with relatives 22 8 6 
States have explicit preference for placing children with relatives 24 36 40 
Number of states with an increase in relative preference 
 
14 4 
Number of states with a decrease in relative preference 4 0 
Kinship Care program established in statute 
Percentage of states with Kinship Care established in statute 22% 28% 30% 
Number of states with newly established Kinship Care program 
 
4 2 
Number of states with disbanded Kinship Care program 1 1 
 
Kinship care in statute.  Kinship care programs provide a concrete way for 
relatives to receive benefits which help offset the cost of caring for children in out-of-
home care.  Not all states, however have established Kinship care programs in their 
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statutes.  Information on this program was available for 2005, 2008 and 2010 (NCCANI, 
2005b; CWIG 2008b; CWIG, 2010b). This program has been growing in recognition and 
support over the years as it provides tangible benefits for what are frequently considered 
preferred caregivers (see Table 3.8).  Between 2005 and 2008, four states had newly 
established kinship care programs (AZ, MI, OK, and TX) while South Carolina had gone 
the opposite direction.  By 2010, however, South Carolina had reinstated their kinship 
care program, as had Maryland.  Arkansas stopped recognizing the program between 
2008 and 2010.    
 State ASFA adherence.  The federal ASFA guidelines mandate that children who 
have been in out-of-home care for 15 of the most recent 22 months should have 
termination of parental rights proceedings initiated, unless extenuating circumstances are 
noted by state officials.  Delays in this process can be granted if officials feel there is 
good cause or if it is determined to be in the best interest of the child.  The compliance 
rate in 2004, 2005, 2008, and 2010 were calculated for children in care 21 consecutive 
months, so as to allow for time required to initiate court proceedings (NDACAN, 2004; 
NDACAN, 2005; NDACAN, 2008; NDACAN, 2010).  See Table 3.9 for state 
compliance rates by year.  With this variable, which is a behavioral indicator, we would 
consider a lower compliance rate to indicate a more flexible approach with birth families.  
Strict adherence to the federally mandated timeline for termination of parental rights, on 
the other hand, would indicate a low level of flexibility with birth parents. 
Table 3.9: State Compliance Rate with ASFA TPR Timeline, by Year  
State  2004 2005 2008 2010 
Alabama 0.168 0.287 0.286 0.369 
Alaska 0.225 0.225 0.290 0.442 
Arizona 0.195 0.388 0.386 0.578 
Arkansas 0.180 0.369 0.320 0.392 
California 0.153 0.226 0.265 0.243 
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Table 3.9 (continued) 
Colorado 0.144 0.259 0.274 0.240 
Connecticut 0.130 0.235 0.298 0.362 
Delaware 0.168 0.327 0.307 0.405 
Florida 0.168 0.315 0.416 0.456 
Georgia 0.134 0.241 0.304 0.314 
Hawaii 0.292 0.553 0.567 0.541 
Idaho 0.176 0.324 0.477 0.646 
Illinois 0.232 0.276 0.288 0.293 
Indiana 0.157 0.319 0.287 0.516 
Iowa 0.213 0.333 0.278 0.285 
Kansas 0.268 0.391 0.383 0.608 
Kentucky 0.008 0.369 0.406 0.515 
Louisiana 0.206 0.356 0.315 0.408 
Maine 0.285 0.422 0.124 0.707 
Maryland 0.151 0.182 0.135 0.072 
Massachusetts 0.115 0.231 0.276 0.367 
Michigan 0.334 0.486 0.478 0.644 
Minnesota 0.189 0.369 0.379 0.409 
Mississippi 0.164 0.239 0.306 0.407 
Missouri 0.205 0.289 0.293 0.311 
Montana 0.322 0.475 0.483 0.434 
Nebraska 0.114 0.167 0.222 0.286 
Nevada 0.157 0.301 0.310 0.534 
New Hampshire 0.101 0.124 0.278 0.161 
New Jersey 0.237 0.334 0.310 0.244 
New Mexico 0.230 0.403 0.480 0.649 
New York 0.235 0.306 0.279 0.289 
North Carolina 0.208 0.319 0.329 0.335 
North Dakota 0.133 0.242 0.285 0.282 
Ohio 0.228 0.365 0.401 0.582 
Oklahoma 0.222 0.404 0.412 0.571 
Oregon 0.182 0.279 0.308 0.292 
Pennsylvania 0.083 0.187 0.207 0.222 
Rhode Island 0.120 0.184 0.224 0.277 
South Carolina 0.134 0.321 0.560 0.381 
South Dakota 0.259 0.418 0.433 0.484 
Tennessee 0.077 0.188 0.306 0.345 
Texas 0.314 0.530 0.569 0.697 
Utah 0.143 0.174 0.256 0.279 
Vermont 0.231 0.275 0.274 0.317 
Virginia 0.066 0.245 0.309 0.292 
Washington 0.237 0.336 0.355 0.379 
West Virginia 0.237 0.382 0.458 0.622 
Wisconsin 0.144 0.214 0.198 0.210 
Wyoming 0.061 0.130 0.133 0.145 
Minimum Compliance Rate 0.008 0.121 0.063 0.023 
Maximum Compliance Rate 0.334 0.553 0.569 0.707 
Number of states with increase in compliance 
 
50 35 39 
Number of states with decrease in compliance 1 16 12 
 
System generosity.  The generosity of the state child welfare system will be 
conceptualized in three distinct ways: benefits, expenditures and access (Bailey & Rom, 
 
52 
 
2004).  In the first two instances, benefits and expenditures, are measured as the amount 
spent: more generous states have higher benefits and expenditures while less generous 
states have lower rates.  See Table 3.10 for complete information on state benefit and 
expenditure data for 2008 and 2010. 
Benefits.  The concept of benefit generosity is defined as the annual average Title 
IV-E expenditures designated as maintenance payments per Title IV-E foster care eligible 
child during FY 2010 in each state (ChildTrends, 2010).  To account for differences in 
the cost of living across the states, expenditure data have been transformed from nominal 
to real terms based on state-level cost measures (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Carrillo, Early & 
Olsen, 2012).  Annual average Title IV-E expenditures used for maintenance payments 
are used because the structural complexity of payment schedules for out-of-home care is 
such that an interstate comparison of maintenance payments themselves is not possible.    
In general, Title IV-E maintenance payments increased per Title IV-E eligible child 
between 2008 and 2010 (39 of 50 reporting states).  Of the 13 states with a sizeable 
change in the average maintenance payment (+/- $2500), four states had large increases 
in the amount of money spent on maintenance payments (DC, KS, SD, and WV), one had 
a large drop in the number of Title IV-E eligible children (TN), six had more money for 
Title IV-E payment and fewer eligible children (IL, NE, ND, VT, VA, WI), one had a 
large decrease in the amount spent on Title IV-E maintenance payments (MD) and one 
had a notable increase in the number of Title IV-E eligible children (MO).  Title IV-E 
maintenance payment information was not available for the state of Florida so they will 
be excluded from this analysis.   
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Table 3.10: State Levels of Benefit and Expenditure Generosity, by Year 
 
Average annual IV-E payment 
per IV-E eligible child 
Average annual CW 
expenditures per child 
State 2008 2010 2008 2010 
Alabama 4723.69 2988.90 284.47 273.38 
Alaska 1998.66 2146.06 1176.37 1174.50 
Arizona 7786.58 8213.36 362.84 334.00 
Arkansas 4099.53 6108.49 152.06 178.91 
California 5317.15 6589.06 563.90 633.40 
Colorado 8924.21 8220.02 370.33 353.00 
Connecticut 13022.24 11799.16 1179.77 1222.18 
Delaware 7097.39 7159.86 291.36 256.82 
Florida* Not available Not available 306.10 286.26 
Georgia 7490.73 9505.75 235.33 201.30 
Hawaii 4220.29 5496.77 712.53 700.44 
Idaho 3610.44 3078.44 126.55 111.05 
Illinois 8390.63 11495.52 391.11 380.45 
Indiana 7958.00 9094.96 97.97 331.01 
Iowa 4712.79 5488.31 356.21 354.84 
Kansas 4305.45 7876.30 318.68 306.73 
Kentucky 5795.31 7641.05 428.51 439.10 
Louisiana 9280.99 10923.35 219.15 304.78 
Maine 8204.59 8448.57 497.78 508.49 
Maryland 35075.20 18711.30 553.13 512.86 
Massachusetts 9170.27 9862.06 668.12 639.45 
Michigan 7088.52 7241.94 254.17 285.44 
Minnesota 6459.25 6103.87 453.92 390.81 
Mississippi 5209.80 7054.65 66.32 106.90 
Missouri 8023.00 5076.09 293.70 296.25 
Montana 7311.85 6727.62 311.47 304.23 
Nebraska 4693.92 7854.54 502.36 531.34 
Nevada 3503.22 5111.01 242.17 277.73 
New Hampshire 4209.83 3622.55 432.61 381.78 
New Jersey 5240.23 7361.78 566.50 562.97 
New Mexico 3176.39 4446.90 195.44 189.55 
New York 17071.59 14907.33 938.30 1081.68 
North Carolina 7556.05 7605.79 206.87 209.08 
North Dakota 11132.58 20544.15 361.41 399.56 
Ohio 4573.53 5345.19 276.28 278.94 
Oklahoma 2577.24 2860.99 250.78 237.84 
Oregon 4271.95 6052.43 498.40 532.44 
Pennsylvania 11099.20 12574.44 683.18 686.30 
Rhode Island 7137.80 8772.71 998.59 1074.21 
South Carolina 5752.90 6750.11 222.07 228.96 
South Dakota 3831.16 7010.01 249.93 275.77 
Tennessee 4854.48 7738.83 292.01 296.11 
Texas 7644.72 9328.22 166.73 180.36 
Utah 3868.74 3990.74 202.56 184.53 
Vermont 11824.74 15383.76 755.38 779.39 
Virginia 8772.76 11352.65 379.29 326.29 
Washington 6368.68 5369.84 390.95 381.63 
West Virginia 11468.06 16070.49 705.49 752.39 
Wisconsin 4888.60 7626.95 284.97 302.44 
Wyoming 801.97 1860.48 357.12 358.26 
Average 7262.64 8205.68 557.34 550.14 
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Table 3.10 (continued) 
Minimum 801.97 1860.48 66.32 106.90 
Maximum 35075.20 20544.15 4320.80 3827.23 
* Florida does not report any expenditures on maintenance payments despite receiving $505,911 in Title IV-E funds in 2008 and 
$11,938,146 in Title IV-E funds in 2010.   
 
 Expenditures.  Child welfare expenditures capture the cost per child in the state to 
provide all child welfare services.  Expenditures are defined as the annual child welfare 
expenditure per child in the state, again adjusted for differences in cost of living (Carrillo 
et al., 2012).  Total child welfare expenditures, in this case, include both federal and state 
funds which are used to achieve the goals of the child welfare system.  This includes all 
expenditures for the programs, case management, administration, and operation of the 
state's child welfare services system, including all funds for services contracted to another 
agency that meet the definition of child welfare.  Child welfare includes services for 
children and families to prevent abuse and neglect; family preservation services; CPS; in-
home services; out-of-home placements; and adoption services (ChildTrends, 2010). 
Access.  The access component of generosity represents the number of children placed in 
out-of-home care per substantiated victim of child abuse and neglect.  With access, states 
that have a higher rate of placing children in out-of-home care per substantiated victim of 
child abuse and neglect are considered more generous while those with lower placement 
rates are considered less generous (Bailey & Rom, 2004).  This is viewed as a measure of 
generosity because placement in out-of-home care, rather than the provision of in-home 
services, requires a much higher monetary investment by the child welfare agency.   
Table 3.11: Generosity of Access, Placement Rate per 100 Substantiated Victim of 
Child Abuse and Neglect, by Year 
State 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Alabama 43 40 43 40 38 33 
Alaska 31 26 29 22 25 32 
Arizona 123 167 184 235 198 131 
Arkansas 43 43 42 43 42 80 
California 43 46 47 47 48 44 
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Table 3.11 (continued) 
Colorado 81 65 61 63 54 52 
Connecticut 26 32 27 30 27 25 
Delaware 47 53 53 28 22 19 
Florida 17 16 36 33 31 29 
Georgia 23 25 25 26 25 27 
Hawaii 69 82 70 76 66 59 
Idaho 90 94 99 77 77 86 
Illinois 20 18 16 21 19 20 
Indiana 40 35 43 46 43 43 
Iowa 48 39 37 45 41 39 
Kansas 112 133 180 216 261 237 
Kentucky 31 32 31 34 33 32 
Louisiana 27 32 38 36 40 40 
Maine 21 21 21 24 20 23 
Maryland 23 21 21 21 18 21 
Massachusetts 17 18 17 18 18 23 
Michigan 38 33 31 32 26 25 
Minnesota 94 105 113 131 129 127 
Mississippi 33 31 33 28 29 35 
Missouri 72 81 73 85 101 112 
Montana 68 65 57 66 64 69 
Nebraska 60 62 87 80 73 74 
Nevada 70 74 68 73 66 62 
New Hampshire 58 68 63 54 55 61 
New Jersey 59 54 76 61 90 52 
New Mexico 31 36 37 41 41 33 
New York 16 17 16 19 17 16 
North Carolina 20 23 23 23 22 22 
North Dakota 71 66 70 70 70 73 
Ohio 29 29 29 31 28 30 
Oklahoma 51 51 51 58 66 60 
Oregon 50 41 40 44 44 44 
Pennsylvania* 337 340 346 521 285 300 
Rhode Island 46 46 44 54 52 45 
South Carolina 30 32 30 32 30 29 
South Dakota 85 89 94 101 100 107 
Tennessee 38 35 40 56 68 72 
Texas 27 25 21 20 19 25 
Utah 17 17 16 17 16 17 
Vermont 71 81 71 101 79 101 
Virginia 54 60 57 56 44 43 
Washington 88 92 57 103 97 95 
West Virginia 30 34 44 62 60 75 
Wisconsin 60 63 69 92 98 99 
Wyoming 142 151 137 163 164 137 
Minimum 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Maximum 337 340 346 521 285 300 
Average  56.0 58.0 59.4 68.2 62.7 62.0 
* Pennsylvania does not substantiate when a child has experienced neglect but may still remove the child from home, 
which explains the much higher placement rate per substantiated victim. 
 
 Placement rates vary widely between states, with rates ranging from 15 to over 
500 children placed in out-of-home care per 100 victims of child abuse and neglect.   
 
56 
 
With an average placement rate of between 56 and 68 per 100 substantiated victims, the 
most notable outliers are Pennsylvania, which has rates almost five times the average, 
and Utah, with rates that are one-fourth of the average.   See Table 3.11 for measures of 
access generosity by state for the years 2005-2010 (U.S. DHHS, 2007; U.S. DHHS, 
2008; U.S. DHHS, 2009; U.S. DHHS, 2010a; U.S. DHHS, 2010b; U.S. DHHS, 2011).    
Explanatory Variables.  Forces commonly believed to drive redistribution will 
be examined in relation to state child welfare policy to see if the patterns seen in other 
literatures extend to the child welfare system.  See Appendix B for a full description of 
explanatory variables utilized in the analysis of state child welfare policy choices. 
Constituent pressure.    
Public liberalism.  Public liberalism in a state is captured by the ideological score 
for state citizens in a given year.  The measure was developed in such a way that higher 
scores indicate a more liberal populace (Berry et al., 1998).    
Racial composition.  Racial composition is considered in two ways: percentage in 
the general population and the percentage of children in OOHC.  Percentages of both 
African American and Hispanics will be accounted for in the analysis (AFCARS, 2010; 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).  With each calculation, a higher number indicates a larger 
proportion of the population is part of the respective minority group.   
Class differences. The measure of class bias is based on the measure developed by 
Hill and Leighley (1992).  It reflects the relative voter turnout of upper- and lower-
income citizens, while controlling for their respective proportions in the potential 
electorate.  The calculations utilize the November Voter Supplement of the Current 
Population Survey to capture the income and voting behavior of citizens in each state 
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(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012).  The representation of each group is calculated 
by dividing the percentage of a state’s voters in each group by the percentage of the 
state’s adult population in that group.  A measure of class bias is obtained by dividing the 
representation of the upper income individuals (households with incomes of $50,000+) 
by the representation of the lower income individuals (households with annual incomes 
of $12,500 or less) and then multiplying by 100.  The measure of class bias will then fall 
into one of three categories:  a score of exactly 100 would indicate equal representation 
between groups, a score higher than 100 indicates increasing bias towards a upper-
income electorate, and a score less than 100 indicates increasing bias favoring the low-
income electorate (Hill & Leighley, 1992).    
Institutional pressure.    
Party control.  Measures of party control utilized in the analysis will view the 
state government as a whole.  Framed as an ordinal indicator, measures will capture 
control of the House, Senate and governor.  Higher numbers indicate a higher degree of 
Democratic control (0: unified Republican; 1: Democrats control one; 2: Democrats 
control two; and 3: unified Democrat) (Barrilleaux et al., 2002; Smith, 1997; National 
Conference of State Legislatures, 2013).    
Government ideology.  Government liberalism in a state is captured by the 
ideological score for state government in a given year.  The measure was developed in 
such a way that higher scores indicate a more liberal government (Berry et al., 1998). 
TANF orientation.  State orientation towards the cash assistance program, TANF, 
is operationalized by a state’s position on TANF policy choices.  Historical policy data 
were gathered from the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database on sanctions, work 
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requirements, time limits and family caps (Urban Institute, 2013).  These four policies 
were chosen because prior research determined they adequately cover the major areas of 
welfare reform and represent the main policy choices widely considered and publicly 
debated (Soss et al., 2001).  Composite scores were constructed for each state in each 
year based on whether the state policies are the same or more restrictive than the 
minimum federal guideline and the strength of the sanctions.  Higher numbers indicate a 
more strict approach to TANF policy within a state.    
Paternalistic pressure. 
Unmarried birthrate.  The proportion of all births in a state which occur to 
unmarried women will be captured based on national health statistics (U.S. Center for 
Disease Control, 2013).  A higher number indicates that more children are born to unwed 
parents within that state.     
Program utilization.  Two aspects of child welfare utilization will be taken into 
consideration for the analysis.  First is the demand for CPS, generally speaking.  This is 
defined as the rate at which children are referred as suspected victims of child abuse and 
neglect per 1,000 children in the population (U.S. DHHS, 2013).  More referrals indicate 
a higher demand for child welfare services.  The second aspect of demand is for out-of-
home care placement.  This is captured as the proportion of the state’s child population 
that actually receives this child welfare intervention each year (AFCARS, 2010).    
Resource Pressure.   
State financial resources.  The state financial capacity for provision of social 
welfare services is captured with each state’s annual per capita personal income (U.S. 
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Department of Commerce, 2013).  This serves as a standardized measure of state wealth 
per citizen.    
Financial burden distribution.  Child welfare funding in each state is provided 
through a combination of state and federal funds.  The proportion of child welfare 
financing provided by the federal government varies between states and is captured by 
this measure (Child Trends, 2010).  Higher numbers indicate that a state is less self-
sufficient in their child welfare funding.    
Adoption incentive funds.  Adoption incentive funds awarded to the states under 
the Adoption Incentive Program are captured on an annual basis and considered during 
analysis (U.S. DHHS, 2013).  Larger awards indicate that a state has increased the 
number of adoptions performed in their state during the prior fiscal year.  While these 
adoption incentive funds could also be considered a performance measure, the financial 
incentive could actually influence a state’s policy choices and consequently necessitates 
inclusion.    
Analytics 
See Appendix C for summary statistics of the policy variables of interest and the 
factors shown to impact redistributive policy. 
Panel analysis of policy change.  Using multiple years of policy data allows for a 
cross-sectional time series analysis, as policy information for each state was observed at 
multiple points in time.  As such we can take advantage of policy differences both 
between states and policy changes which occurred within states during the time period 
studied.    
Analysis will examine the relationship between state level factors which have 
proven to be influential in other realms of redistributive policy and state child welfare 
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policy.  The following random effects model will be used for each of the child welfare 
policies, in which constituent, institutional, paternalistic, and resource pressure 
explanatory variables are included: 
Yit = βXit-1 + α + υit + εit 
Where: 
 Yit:  Policy choice for state i at time t; 
 β:  variable coefficient; 
 Xit:  explanatory variables for state i at time t-1; 
o Constituent Pressures:  public liberalism, percentage African American, 
percentage Hispanic, high income representation bias; 
o Institutional Pressures:  Democratic legislative composition, government 
ideology, TANF orientation; 
o Paternalistic Pressures:  unmarried birth rate, CPS utilization, OOHC 
demand; 
o Resource Pressures:  per capita personal income, percentage of child 
welfare financing provided by the federal government; adoption incentive 
funds 
 α:  intercept; 
 υit:  between-state error; and  
 εit:  within-state error. 
As suggested by the literature, the explanatory variables in the model are lagged 
one year in order to account for the delay in political response, which can be caused by 
electoral and budget cycles (Fording, 1997; Tweedie, 1994).  A random effects model 
was chosen as there is the potential for omitted variables that differ both between states 
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and over time within states.  This model provides a weighted average of fixed and 
between effects, and accounts for both types of omitted variables.    
 System entry results.  We begin our analysis by examining child welfare policy 
choices on the front end of involvement.  As discussed earlier, these policy choices 
cannot be treated as indicators of a single underlying construct, and so each policy is 
modelled individually.  This allows us to find that, as specified, the model does not 
significantly address whether or not a state designates all citizens as mandatory reporters 
of child abuse and neglect.  See Table 3.12 for complete results.    
On the whole, relatively few of the classic redistributive pressures appear to be 
impacting the policies guiding child welfare system entry.  As the only constituent 
pressure with any influence, states with higher percentage of African Americans in the 
population have slightly less restrictive definitions of both child abuse and neglect and 
parental substance abuse. Class bias, public liberalism and the composition of the child 
welfare population do not appear to significantly influence any of these policies.  
Likewise, institutional pressures do not appear to be impacting child welfare policies 
surrounding system entry at all.    
 Resource and paternalism pressures seem to have slightly more influence on this 
set of state child welfare policies.  States with higher percentage of births to unwed 
mothers, for instance, have significantly more restrictive definitions of child abuse and 
neglect.  In addition, all three resource pressures have slight but consistent positive 
impacts on the policies surrounding entry to the child welfare system states.    
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Table 3.12: Redistributive Pressures and Child Welfare Policies Impacting System Entry 
 CAN Definitions 
Parental 
Substance Abuse 
as CAN 
Exemptions 
All Citizens as 
Mandatory 
Reporters 
Mandatory 
Reporter 
Categories  
Variable  
Coefficient 
(Robust Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Robust Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Robust Std. Error) 
Coefficient  
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Robust Std. Error) 
Constituent Pressures  
Public Liberalism (t-1) -0.003 0.007  0.003 0.005  0.007 0.004  -0.241 0.219  0.006 0.016  
Pct. Population African American (t-1) -0.033 0.012 ** -0.024 0.010 ** -0.006 0.006  0.100 0.474  -0.018 0.030  
Pct. Population Hispanic (t-1) 0.008 0.059  0.065 0.044  -0.004 0.034  0.176 0.925  -0.091 0.114  
Pct. OOHC African American (t-1) <-0.001 0.010  0.004 0.004  <0.001 0.003  0.008 0.106  -0.006 0.010  
Pct. OOHC Hispanic (t-1) 0.008 0.030  -0.024 0.020  -0.003 0.015  0.042 0.453  0.035 0.055  
Class Bias (t-1) -0.004 0.003  <0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001  -0.002 0.078  0.003 0.003  
Institutional Pressures 
Democratic Party Control (t-1) 0.061 0.130  0.044 0.051  -0.065 0.060  0.833 2.947  -0.036 0.164  
Government Liberalism (t-1) -0.002 0.006  0.005 0.003  0.002 0.003  -0.070 0.242  0.012 0.011  
TANF Orientation (t-1) 0.116 0.122  0.161 0.104  0.028 0.061  0.442 2.252  0.325 0.324  
Paternalism Pressure 
Pct. Of Births to Unwed Mothers (t-1) 7.256 3.203 ** -0.967 1.712  -1.535 1.034  13.859 39.275  2.743 5.845  
Pct. of state children in OOHC (t-1) -0.365 0.509  -0.097 0.272  0.038 0.157  3.554 5.370  -1.110 0.682  
CPS referral rate (per 1,000) (t-1) 0.012 0.009  0.006 0.006  <-0.001 0.003  0.037 0.192  0.010 0.012  
Resource Pressures 
Per capita personal income (t-1) <0.001 <0.001 ** <-0.001 <0.001  <-0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 ** 
Pct. federally funded (t-1) 0.028 1.120  0.005 0.704  -0.297 0.474  -12.986 17.741  6.124 3.680 * 
Adoption Incentive Funds (t-1) <-0.001 <0.001  <-0.001 <0.001  <-0.001 <0.001 * <0.001 <0.001  <-0.001 <0.001  
_cons -1.306 1.939  0.504 0.918  2.516 0.591 *** -1.407 25.426  -1.220 1.966  
sigma_u 1.620 0.825 0.691 
 
3.909 
sigma_e 0.476 0.451 0.283 1.040 
rho (fraction of variance due to u_i) 0.921 0.770 0.857 0.934 
Wald chi 2(15) 36.86** 28.41 ** 27.42 ** 5.72 252.33 *** 
Number of Observations 150 250 200 200 200 
Years of Policy Included  ’07, ’09, ‘10 ’03, ’05, ’07, ’09, ‘10 ’05, ’07, ’09, ‘10 ’03, ’05, ’08, ‘10 ’03, ’05, ’08, ‘10 
Model Specification Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel  Logit Panel regression 
* significant at 0.10 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; ***significant at <0.001 level 
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 Broadly speaking, redistributive pressures do not display much explanatory power 
for child welfare policies impacting system entry, with only 16-17% of variables 
displaying significance in the models.  Of the policies examined, child abuse and neglect 
definitions appear most susceptible to these pressures.  In addition, it seems that the 
policies are most frequently influenced by resource pressures. 
 System exit results.  As with the policies surrounding the entry of children to the 
child welfare system, the policies addressing avenues of exit will also be examined 
individually.  These include policies addressing groups approved to adopt children, 
restrictions on who is eligible to adopt, state compliance rate with the federal AFSA 
timeline for termination of parental rights, relative preference in placement and whether 
the state has a kinship care program established in statute.  Of these, the models of 
adoption restrictions and kinship care are not significant.  See Table 3.13 for complete 
model results.    
 As with the policies regarding system entry, constituent pressures have small and 
inconsistent impacts on the policies guiding exits from out-of-home care.  In terms of 
adoption, for instance, states with higher percentages of African Americans have fewer 
groups approved as potential adoptive parents, while states with a voting bias towards 
higher income households actually have more groups eligible to be adoptive parents.  
States with higher percentages of African American also see a lower compliance rate 
with the ASFA timeline for termination of parental rights.    
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Table 3.13: Impact of Redistributive Pressures on Child Welfare Policy Influencing System Exit 
 
Groups Approved 
to Adopt 
Restrictions on 
Who can Adopt 
Relative Preference 
in Placement 
Kinship Care 
Program in 
Statute 
ASFA Compliance 
Rate 
Variable  
Coefficient  
(Robust Std. Error) 
Coefficient  
(Robust Std. Error) 
Coefficient  
(Robust Std. Error) 
Coefficient  
(Robust Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error)  
Constituent Pressures  
Public Liberalism -0.007 0.005  0.001 0.002  0.006 0.006  -0.147 0.099  0.001 0.001  
Pct. of Population African American -0.018 0.011 * 0.002 0.003  0.012 0.011  -0.022 0.164  -0.007 0.002 *** 
Pct. of Population Hispanic -0.003 0.029  0.019 0.017  0.009 0.018  -0.275 0.376  -0.004 0.003  
Pct. of OOHC African American -0.001 0.001  <-0.001 <0.001  <-0.001 0.002  0.212 0.150  <-0.001 <0.001  
Pct. of OOHC Hispanic -0.005 0.017  -0.002 0.006  0.003 0.010  0.227 0.207  0.001 0.001  
Class Bias 0.005 0.003 * <-0.001 <0.001  <-0.001 0.001  0.016 0.028  <0.001 <0.001  
Institutional Pressures  
Democratic Party Control 0.046 0.117  -0.016 0.021  -0.106 0.069  -0.077 1.231  0.006 0.013  
Government Liberalism 0.009 0.006  <0.001 0.001  0.009 0.004 ** -0.068 0.070  -0.002 0.001 * 
TANF Orientation 0.035 0.098  <0.001 0.016  -0.016 0.068  -0.167 0.980  0.019 0.009 ** 
Paternalism Pressure  
Pct. Of Births to Unwed Mothers 1.937 1.332  <0.001 0.330  -1.987 0.994 ** 39.774 20.722 * 1.144 0.157 *** 
Pct. of state children in OOHC -0.486 0.297  -0.050 0.045  -0.281 0.253  -1.384 3.222  -0.050 0.035  
CPS referral rate (per 1,000) 0.009 0.005  -0.001 0.002  <-0.001 0.004  0.068 0.072  <0.001 0.001  
Resource Pressures 
Per capita personal income <0.001 <0.001 *** <0.001 <0.001  <-0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 ** 
Pct. federally funded 1.029 0.739  0.077 0.226  -0.067 0.492  -6.178 8.242  0.257 0.099 ** 
Adoption Incentive Funds <-0.001 <0.001  <-0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 ** 
_cons -1.604 0.880 * 0.651 0.222 ** 2.335 0.907 ** -17.229 11.543  -0.372 0.100 *** 
sigma_u 0.561 0.786 0.308 
 
0.060 
sigma_e 0.515 0.085 0.442 0.082 
rho (fraction of variance due to u_i) 0.542 0.988 0.327 0.350 
Wald chi 2(15) 81.54 *** 10.63 35.98 ** 8.12 200.53 *** 
Number of Observations 150 150 150 150 200 
Years of Policy Included  ’04, ’09, ‘10 ’04, ’09, ‘10 ’05, ’08, ‘10 ’05, ’08, ‘10 ’04, ’05, ’08, ‘10 
Model Specification Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel Logit Panel regression 
* significant at 0.10 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; ***significant at <0.001 level 
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 The percent of births in a state which occur to unwed mothers is associated with a 
significantly higher compliance rate with the ASFA termination of parental rights 
timeline, higher likelihood of a statute-established program for kinship care and a lower 
preference for placing children with biological relatives.  Resource pressures consistently 
show small, positive impacts on the policies which influence the conditions under which 
children exit out-of-home care.  Increases in per capita income, federal support and 
adoption incentive funds all are associated with higher compliance with the termination 
of parental rights timelines established by ASFA.  This indicates less flexibility with birth 
parents.  Likewise, in states with higher per capita income more groups are approved to 
be adoptive parents. 
Redistributive pressures show higher levels of influence on this set of policies, 
particularly the state ASFA compliance rate.  Almost half of the redistributive pressures 
show significantly results in the predicted direction related to the compliance rate.  
Paternalistic and resource pressures appear to be major drivers of policies related to 
family, both adoptive and biological.   
 Generosity results.  The final dimension of the child welfare system to be 
examined is the level of generosity.  For the reasons mentioned previously, the various 
definitions of child welfare system generosity:  payments, expenditures and access, are 
analyzed separately utilizing the time-series data.  See Table 3.14 for complete model 
results. 
 In terms of payment generosity, defined as the average Title IV-E maintenance 
payment per Title IV-E eligible child in out-of-home care, more generous payment rates 
are found in states with higher per capita income and adoption incentive funds.  
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Constituent, institutional and paternalistic pressures seem to have no impact on the 
generosity of maintenance payments to children in out-of-home care.  Similar patterns are 
seen with generosity of access, higher per capita income is associated with a higher 
placement rate per substantiated victim of child abuse and neglect.   
Table 3.14: Impact of Redistributive Pressures on Child Welfare System Generosity  
 Payment Generosity 
Expenditure 
Generosity 
Generosity of 
Access 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Robust Std.  Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Robust Std.  Err.) 
Coefficient 
(Robust Std.  Err.) 
Constituent Pressures  
Public Liberalism (t-1) 43.21 35.522  2.65 0.819 ** -0.002 0.003  
Pct. pop African American (t-1) 137.61 173.151  -2.98 1.697 * -0.006 0.004 * 
Pct. pop Hispanic (t-1) -47.78 222.469  -7.51 5.297  -0.009 0.009  
Pct. of OOHC African American (t-1) -11.12 13.294  -0.03 0.380  <0.001 0.001  
Pct. of OOHC Hispanic (t-1) -20.02 101.616  2.63 2.558  <-0.001 0.005  
Class Bias (t-1) -7.72 11.409  -0.26 0.133 ** -0.001 <0.001  
Institutional Pressures  
Democratic Party Control  163.52 649.819  7.42 14.355  -0.007 0.016  
Government Liberalism -14.36 26.410  0.46 0.600  -0.001 0.001  
TANF Orientation -337.13 431.309  9.06 17.314  -0.033 0.036  
Paternalistic Pressures  
Pct. Of Births to Unwed Mothers 7735.79 12084.63  512.72 273.111 * 1.084 0.702  
Pct. of state children in OOHC -1187.98 1455.465  99.98 35.804 ** 0.231 0.119 * 
CPS referral rate (per 1,000) 37.52 42.951  1.10 1.222  -0.002 0.002  
Resource Pressures  
Per capita personal income 0.384 0.145 ** 0.007 0.004 ** <0..001 <0.001 * 
Pct. federally funded 5513.15 5007.091  -111.46 121.543  -0.701 0.550  
Adoption Incentive Funds <0.001 <0.001 ** <0.001 <0.001 ** <-0.001 <0.001  
_cons -13168.59 5807.38 ** -439.48 241.46 * 0.398 0.294  
sigma_u 3466.58 99.578 0.497 
sigma_e 2412.88 40.052 0.176 
rho (fraction of variance due to u_i 0.674 0.861 0.889 
Wald chi 2(15) 57.89 *** 66.12 *** 27.32 ** 
Number of Observations 98 100 300 
Years of Policy Included ’08, ‘10 ’08, ‘10 ’05 - ‘10 
Model Specification Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression 
* significant at 0.10 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; ***significant at <0.001 level 
 
 Average expenditures on child welfare per child in the general population shows a 
different pattern of influence.  While still not impacted by institutional pressures, states 
with higher public liberalism, lower percentage of African Americans in the population 
and lower class bias in the electorate all display higher levels of per capita expenditures 
on child welfare.  States with higher rates of births to unwed mothers and out-of-home 
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care program utilization also see significantly higher expenditure rates per child.  In 
addition, child welfare expenditures per capita are influenced by resource pressures.  
Higher state per capita income and adoption incentive funds are associated with increased 
average expenditures, though a state with higher levels of federal funding do not have 
significantly different child welfare expenditures per child in the population. 
 Generosity, broadly defined, is only moderately well explained by the classic 
redistributive pressures.  Interestingly, child welfare system generosity does not seem to 
be impacted at all by institutional pressures.  Of the three generosity measures, child 
welfare expenditures shows the highest level of responsiveness to these pressures, 
particularly paternalistic.    
Summary 
 Taken as a whole, the results provide very little confidence that redistributive 
pressures are the primary forces driving state variance in child welfare policy decisions.  
Only 20% of the possible relationships reached significance in this analysis, though there 
are some noteworthy patterns.  Within the four categories of explanatory variables, it 
would seem that child welfare policies are much more sensitive to changes in the social 
factors associated with a paternalistic response (unmarried birth rate and program 
utilization) and resource pressures than to constituent or institutional characteristics.  This 
suggests that child welfare policies are influenced by societal values and resource 
availability more than classic political pressures.  
 From here we turn to the more pressing question for policy makers and child 
welfare officials:  Do the policy decisions made by states actually impact outcomes for 
children in out-of-home care and, if so, how?  After a foundational overview of the 
existing literature on child permanency, analysis will utilize eight of the policies relating 
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to system generosity and exit in an examination of case-level outcomes for children in 
out-of-home care during fiscal year 2010.   
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Chapter 4 – Factors Influencing Child Welfare Outcomes 
Permanency Defined   
Placements in out-of-home care are intended to be temporary, with an explicit 
goal of moving the children as quickly as possible into a permanent living arrangement, 
either reunification with their birth family or, in cases where reunification is not feasible, 
into an adoptive home.  Work in this field since the 1970s has documented the 
detrimental impact of children remaining in out-of-home care without a plan for 
permanence and/or bouncing between temporary placements (Gauthier, Fortin & Jeliu, 
2004; Maluccio, 1994). This research has reinforced the importance of permanent 
attachments and relationships for healthy child development and provided strong 
evidence in support of efforts to achieve permanency for children in out-of-home care.   
The paths to permanency that state child welfare agencies can offer children are 
as follows:  
 Reunification - During the reunification process, the child welfare agency works 
with a child’s family to provide necessary supports and services, such as 
substance abuse treatment or mental health counseling. The child may be removed 
and placed in foster care until successful completion of a parental court- or 
agency-ordered treatment plan, at which time the family is reunified unless there 
is further court or agency determination or assessment of risk.  
 Adoption - Adoption is the permanency option used to create a new legal parent-
child relationship. Often, this option is chosen when reunification has been 
attempted but after efforts to reunify, it is determined that reunification is not 
possible because a biological parent is not able to provide a safe environment for 
the children.  
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 Permanent Placement with Relatives - States offer the goal of permanent 
placement with a relative when the goal of reunification, adoption or legal 
guardianship by the relative is not in the child’s best interests. In addition, a child 
may be placed with a relative but retain a permanency goal of reunification with 
the parent, legal guardianship, adoption or emancipation.  
 Legal Guardianship - While constituting a relatively small percentage of 
permanent placements, legal guardianship is a court-approved placement with a 
relative or non-relative caregiver that does not terminate parental rights and does 
allow a child to remain with a family member and live in or have access to 
familiar friends, neighborhoods and schools. Generally, reunification and 
adoption have to be ruled out as permanency options for the child before 
guardianship is used.  
 OPPLA - Other Planned Permanent Living Arrangement is a term created by the 
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) to designate the least preferred 
permanency option for children for whom there is no goal for a legal, permanent 
family. These are children who age-out of the foster care system. They have not 
been reunified with their biological families, placed under legal guardianship or 
with a relative or adopted (Courtney 2005). 
Factors affecting permanency  
Even with the goal of federal legislation being so clearly focused on permanent 
placements for children who enter out-of-home care, there is considerable variation in 
both the rate and speed with which children move through the child welfare system.  Of 
the estimated 254,114 children who exited out-of-home care during FY 2010, 51% were 
reunified with their primary caregiver (n=129,598 children), 21% were adopted 
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(n=53,364 children), 11% were emancipated or aged out (n=27,953), 14% went to live 
with another relative or guardian (n=35,576) and 3% had other outcomes (n=7623) 
(CWIG, 2012).  
Despite the stringent timelines, there are still children who linger in these 
temporary placements without being reunified with their birth family or achieving 
permanency through adoption.  This section will examine empirical literature on the topic 
of permanency and specific factors which may affect the likelihood and speed of 
achieving permanency for children in out-of-home care.  Factors will be categorized at 
each of the following levels: child, biological family and system.   
Child factors.  Children of all types enter the child welfare system and the largest 
body of research in the field has focused on the impact child level characteristics have on 
the likelihood of a child achieving permanency.  Glisson, Bailey and Post (2000) found 
that child characteristics, as a group, provided stronger predictors of time in out-of-home 
care than family or system characteristics.  While most studies of permanency include 
some subset of the following child characteristics, none have been able to account for the 
entire set of variables due to data limitations.   
Age.  One of the most consistent predictors of achieving a permanent outcome is a 
child’s age at initial placement in out-of-home care.  Studies typically group children into 
age categories (commonly infants, toddlers, school-age children and teens) and then 
evaluate the various outcomes by group.   The general finding is that children who were 
younger at the time of placement are more likely to achieve timely permanence, though 
the patterns of adoption versus reunification vary by age category (Becker, Jordan & 
Larsen, 2007; Courtney & Yin-Ling, 1996; McMurtry & Lie, 1992; Potter & Klein-
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Rothschild, 2002; Testa, 2004; U.S. DHHS, 2008).  Wulczyn, Chen and Hislop (2006) 
found age to have a different yet significant impact on permanency outcomes for various 
age groups.  In this research, it seems that for older children, exits to family (reunification 
or relative placement) happen faster than adoption, while for younger children, 
particularly infants, the opposite is true. 
Race.  Race may be the most frequently discussed factor in the literature on 
permanency for children in out-of-home care.  There are conflicting estimates of the 
magnitude of the so-called “race effect,” though Wulczyn (2003) believes it is getting 
smaller based on the ten-year span his study covered.  There does seem to be agreement 
that minority children take longer to achieve permanency, though this varies based on 
which type of permanency is being referenced (Eamon, 2002; McMurtry & Lie , 1992; 
Potter & Klein-Rothschild, 2002; Schwartz, Ortega, Guo & Fishman, 1994; Wulczyn, 
2003).  The literature consistently demonstrates that African American children have 
lower rates of reunification than their Caucasian counterparts (Barth, 1997; Connell, 
Katz, Saunders & Tebes, 2006; Courtney, 1994; Courtney & Yin-Ling, 1996; Hayward & 
DePanfilis, 2007; McMurtry & Lie, 1992; Ryan, Garnier, Zyphur, & Zhai, 2006; 
Wulczyn, 2003), while the estimates of the effect of race on adoption rates are not 
conclusive.  Some studies have shown lower rates of permanency through adoption for 
children of minority status (Barth, 1997; Courtney & Yin-Ling, 1996; Testa, 2004), 
others have shown a recent tendency for African American children to be adopted at 
higher rates than Caucasian children (Wulczyn, 2003; Wulczyn et al., 2006), while still 
others find no race effect on adoption (Connell et al., 2006; McMurtry & Lie, 1992). A 
third outcome which seems to be affected by the race of the child in question is the 
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failure to achieve any permanent placement after entering out-of-home care:  non-white 
children are less likely than white children to successfully exit foster care (Becker et al., 
2007; Connell et al., 2006; Courtney & Yin-Ling, 1996; Glisson et al., 2000; McMurtry 
& Lie, 1992; Wulczyn, 2003).  
Gender.  Though gender is often included in empirical studies on permanency, it 
generally does not have a significant relationship with the permanency outcome for 
children in out-of-home care (Barth, Courtney & Berry, 1994; Becker et al., 2007; 
Connell et al., 2006; Courtney, 1994; Hayward & DePanfilis, 2007).  Vogel, however, 
used an administrative database to examine factors affecting length of time in OOHC and 
found that male children spent more time in care than their female counterparts (1999).  
Disability status.  It is estimated that between 20 and 60 percent of children in 
foster care have some sort of diagnosed disability (Leslie et al., 2003).  This can have an 
impact on the likelihood of a child achieving permanency once they arrive in out-of-
home care.  Studies focusing on children with medical conditions find encouraging 
results of lower disruption and increased permanency (Connell et al., 2006; McMurtry & 
Lie, 1992; Potter & Klein-Rothschild, 2002), though others have less encouraging results.  
Glisson et al. (2000) estimated that children with any kind of disability were 9% less 
likely to ever leave out-of-home care.  Children with a developmental disability 
diagnosis, specifically, were 3.5 times less likely to have a successful exit to a permanent 
situation than children without such a diagnosis (Becker et al., 2007).  Others have found 
that a child with an indicated disability of any type are less likely to be reunified with 
their family of origin (Connell et al., 2006; Courtney & Yin-Ling, 1996; Hayward & 
DePanfilis, 2007) and do so at a slower rate than their non-disabled peers (Courtney, 
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1994; McMurtry & Lie, 1992).  Early studies also indicated that an identified disability 
decreased the likelihood and speed of discharge to adoption (Courtney & Yin-Ling, 1996; 
McMurtry & Lie, 1992).   
Child mental health and substance abuse.  The literature largely agrees that 
children in foster care who struggle with mental health and/or substance abuse have 
lower rates of permanency than  children who do not have these particular treatment 
issues; the process of achieving permanency also takes significantly longer for those 
children diagnosed with such mental illness or substance abuse (Potter & Klein-
Rothschild, 2002).  A designation of having mental health problems frequently includes 
emotional and behavioral problems as well as true psychiatric and substance abuse 
diagnoses.  The presence of a diagnosed emotional or behavioral disorder significantly 
decreases the likelihood and timeliness of both reunification and adoption (by 38% and 
55%, respectively) (Becker et al., 2007; Connell et al., 2006; Glisson et al., 2000; 
Hayward & DePanfilis, 2007; Potter & Klein-Rothschild, 2002).   
Reason for placement.  Early empirical work established that more severe levels 
of abuse are associated with not achieving permanency and increases the odds of staying 
in long-term placement in out-of-home care (Barth et al., 1994; Barth et al., 1986).  Being 
removed due to sexual abuse has been associated with a 33% lower likelihood of leaving 
care at all though for those who do achieve permanency, reunification is more likely than 
adoption (Connell et al., 2006; Courtney, 1994; Glisson et al., 2000).  Courtney & Yin-
Ling (1996) found that children placed because of neglect had the highest rates of family 
reunification compared to all other reasons for placement; placement because of physical 
abuse decreased the likelihood of adoption relative to all other reasons, including neglect.  
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Connell and colleagues (2006), on the other hand, determined in their analysis that 
removals due to physical abuse did not differ from neglect in terms of adoption rates.  
Becker, Jordan and Larsen (2007) found that the type of abuse or neglect was not 
significantly related to having a successful exit from foster care.   
 Outcomes for children in out-of-home care due to their own delinquent behavior 
also appear to be mixed based on the empirical work done thus far.  Initially it appeared 
that children who entered care because of their own problems returned home or achieved 
other forms of permanency, such as adoption, less than half as fast as their counterparts 
(McMurtry & Lie, 1992).  Other researchers found that both the speed and rates of 
permanency were different between the groups, with children in out-of-home care for 
their own behavior actually having a higher likelihood of achieving permanency than 
those in custody for abuse and neglect (Glisson et al., 2000).  Most recently, Connell and 
colleagues (2006), found that the adoption rates for removals resulting from child 
behavior problems did not significantly differ from those removed for neglect.   
Location.  Some studies have shown a trend of children from urban areas being 
more likely to exit out-of-home care than children from rural counties, both to 
reunification and adoption (Glisson et al., 2000; Wulczyn & Hislop 2002).  In addition, 
Wulczyn, Chen and Hislop (2006) found in their analysis that counties with high 
placement rates report slower adoption rates than counties with average or below average 
placement rates. This finding could be indicative of the fact that counties with relatively 
high placement rates will produce fewer adoptions than counties with lower rates, 
because children in counties with high placement rates are more readily returned home 
than children in counties with lower rates (Wulczyn et al., 2006).   
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Placement number and type.  Both the placement type and the number of 
placements have been shown to impact the rate at which children in out-of-home care 
achieve permanency.  Generally, being in less-restrictive placements and having fewer 
total placements are both favorable in terms of the odds of being reunified with biological 
family and/or adopted.  The literature consistently demonstrates that the more distinct 
placements a child has while they are in out-of-home care the less likely they are to 
achieve permanency (Barth et al., 1994; Hayward & DePanfilis, 2007; Potter & Klein-
Rothschild, 2002).   
 Family factors.  Except in the most extreme cases, the initial goal when a child 
enters the foster care system is to be reunified with their birth parents.  This is largely 
dependent on the parents making progress on the family case plan, which is developed to 
address the issues specific to that family and the removal of the children from the home.  
These plans can include everything from parenting classes to substance abuse counseling 
or changing living arrangements.  Generally speaking, children whose mothers have a 
greater number of problematic parental characteristics were more likely to achieve timely 
permanence and children who had an adverse parental background according to their 
caseworker had their adoptions legalized more quickly (Barth et al., 1994; Potter & 
Klein-Rothschild, 2002).   
 Family structure.  The structure of the biological family and household has been 
shown to have an impact on the permanency rates of children who come from the home.  
Children from married couples and those who were living with both parents prior to 
removal are the most likely to be reunified with their biological parents and these 
reunifications typically occur faster than with other household structures (Courtney, 
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1994; Glisson et al., 2000; Hayward & DePanfilis, 2007).  Children who come from 
homes of unmarried couples and single mothers have less likelihood of reunification than 
married couples living together (Glisson et al., 2000; Hayward & DePanfilis, 2007).   
Unsurprisingly, children who have been legally separated from their parents, through a 
termination of parental rights, are the least likely to reunify, as that is one of the last steps 
before a child is released for adoption (Hayward & DePanfilis, 2007).   
Poverty.  Coming from a family in poverty also impacts a child’s chances of 
permanency, especially by way of reunification with their birth parents.  When assessing 
the risk for the child to remain in or return home, workers consistently score lower 
income families as at higher risk than those with higher incomes (Johnson-Reid, Drake, 
& Kohl, 2009; Rivaux et al., 2008). Children from these lower income homes are more 
likely to find themselves in permanent out-of-home care than comparable children from 
higher income groups (Barth et al., 1986; Becker et al., 2007; Courtney, 1994; Courtney 
& Yin-Ling, 1996; Potter & Klein-Rothschild, 2002).  
Parent mental health or substance abuse.  When a biological parent has a mental 
disorder or problem related to substance abuse, their ability to successfully parent their 
children can be compromised.  Potter & Klein-Rothschild (2002) found that children 
whose mothers have a developmental disability were less likely to achieve timely 
permanence.  Substance abuse is a difficult issue for the child welfare field to grapple 
with because the time required for a substance-affected parent to achieve stable sobriety 
is often longer than the timeline set forth by ASFA (15 of 22 months) (Karoll & Poertner, 
2002).  Some work has shown that children from situations in which parental substance 
abuse is an issue were significantly more likely to achieve permanency than children with 
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non-substance abusing parents (Potter & Klein-Rothschild, 2002), while others have 
shown no effect on reunification (Hayward & DePanfilis, 2007) and still more indicate 
that when children without mental health issues are in care due to parental substance 
abuse, their time spent in out-of-home care was significantly longer (Glisson et al., 2000). 
Prison.  The shift of focus to the achievement of timely permanency for children 
in foster care has particularly serious implications for parents who are incarcerated.  
States are instructed by legislation to initiate the termination of parental rights process if a 
child has been in out-of-home care for 15 of the past 22 months, and with rising 
incarceration rates for women, the number of children with parents in prison has 
increased.  Consequently, a large portion of these families will not be able to be reunified 
within this timeline (Halperin & Harris, 2004; Johnson & Waldfogel, 2002).  Even 
without prison being taken into account, for each year a child spends in care, the odds of 
being reunified with their birth parents can decrease by as much as 11% (Hayward & 
DePanfilis, 2007). While only 26% of incarcerated mothers have been convicted of 
violent offenses, their mean maximum sentence length is 7.8 years.  Fifty-five percent 
reported that they expect to serve two years or more on their current sentences (Halperin 
& Harris, 2004).  This fact alone decreases the odds of reunification by 22% and falls 
outside the federally mandated timeline for initiating termination of parental rights 
proceedings.   
System factors. At the opposite end of the spectrum from child level factors 
which impact permanency for a specific child and family, we find the broad systemic 
factors that can affect the entire pattern of permanency for children involved with the 
child welfare system.  Differences in court proceedings as well as regional variation in 
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the implementation of policies could result in location dependent differences in the 
process by which parents and children involved with the child welfare experience the 
permanency planning process (Barth et al., 1994; Becker et al., 2007; Courtney and 
Hook, 2012).  For instance, Barth, Courtney and Berry (1994) found that after controlling 
for other potential predictors of successful exit from foster care, logistic regression results 
showed that district of residence was the strongest demographic characteristic predicting 
successful exit.   
These findings hint at the fact that there may be something unique happening at 
the child welfare system or state level that can override even the strongest individual or 
family level characteristics.  Adding to these differences is the fact that federal legislation 
allows states some leeway in decision making and implementation of various policies 
impacting child welfare.  Many of the features of federal programs, for instance the 
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, are voluntary for the states.  Under 
this federal legislation, every state currently operates a federally assisted adoption 
program but the eligibility criteria and scope of benefits vary noticeably between states 
(Avery, 1998).  States are also allowed to choose the administrative structure of their 
child welfare systems (Courtney and Hook, 2012).  Most opt for a state-administered and 
state-supervised county-administered systems, though a few have “mixed” systems, 
where rural areas are state-administered and urban areas are permitted to administer 
themselves.   
Consequences of not reaching permanency.   
Much like the outcomes seen in the wider population of children who experience 
out-of-home care placement, children who do not achieve permanency have, on average, 
poor life outcomes in terms of childbearing, educational attainment, involvement with the 
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justice system and employment.  The Midwest Study, a survey following youth in 
Illinois, Iowa and Wisconsin as they ‘age out’ of the child welfare system and transition 
into adulthood indicates that at age 19 more than one third of youth who ‘aged out’ of 
foster care did not have a high school degree or equivalency (Courtney & Dworsky, 
2006).  Employment for these young adults was sporadic, with only 40 % being 
employed at the time of the follow up interview and these young adults are significantly 
more likely to report annual earnings of $10,000 or less than the same-age comparison 
group (Courtney & Dworsky, 2006).  Even by age 24, a group of representative youth 
who aged out of the foster care system did not fare well on a variety of employment 
outcomes. Compared to youth nationally, and even youth from low-income families, they 
are more likely to be unemployed or, if working, they are likely to be underemployed and 
earning low wages (Goerge 2002; U.S. DHHS, 2008).  
Summary 
The body of literature exploring factors affecting permanency for children and 
youth shows some consistent themes.  As the most readily accessible and direct factors 
influencing child placement decisions, there has been a wealth of studies on child 
characteristics and their impact on permanency.  Children who are older, of minority 
racial/ethnic descent, and with some type of disability/mental health/substance abuse 
issue tend to take longer in achieving permanency.  Being part of a sibling group, having 
prior contact with CPS or a long placement history also decreases the likelihood of 
achieving timely permanency.   
 Biological family factors, particularly important when discussing permanency 
through reunification, follow expected patterns as well.  Generally speaking, children 
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whose mothers have a greater number of problematic parental characteristics were less 
likely to achieve timely permanence and those who had an adverse parental background 
according to their caseworker had their adoptions legalized more quickly (Barth et al., 
1994; Potter & Klein-Rothschild, 2002).  Issues surrounding substance abuse treatment 
and visitation, especially with incarcerated parents, are beginning to be explored as the 
permanency implications for these children are likely more pronounced than currently 
realized.   
 Unfortunately we have the least insight into the pieces of this puzzle that we, in 
theory, have the most control over: systemic factors.  Very little can be done to impact 
the personal characteristics of the children and families involved with the child welfare 
system, but with a greater understanding of how child welfare policy and the state 
environment support or thwart permanency for children in out-of-home care, policy 
makers and state agency decision makers can begin to make progress on this very 
important issue.  The following analysis will take an initial step towards unpacking the 
impacts of both policy and state level factors.   
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Chapter 5 – Policy and State Impacts on Child Welfare Outcomes 
Examining the Impact of State Policy Choices on Child Outcomes 
Using child level data, the variance in state policy can be examined in relation to 
children’s length of stay in out-of-home care and permanency outcomes.  In the following 
examination, four groups of explanatory variables are included as children in the child 
welfare system are impacted at multiple levels.  Of primary interest are the state level 
factors, which impact all children in the state, and the child welfare policy factors, which 
impact all children who become involved with the out-of-home care system.  These 
broader categories will be combined with the traditionally considered family and child 
factors.   
Adoption and foster care analysis and reporting system (AFCARS).  The 
primary data source for child outcomes, the AFCARS foster care datasets, contain case 
specific information on all children in out-of-home care for whom the state child welfare 
agency had responsibility for placement, care or supervision.  The child outcomes of 
interest, length of stay in out-of-home care and discharge reason, come from this dataset, 
as do all child- and case-level explanatory variables.   
This analysis is based on the 2010 foster care file, which provides case-level 
information for children served by the foster care system from October 1, 2009 to 
September 30, 2010.  The two annual reporting periods (October 1 through March 31 and 
April 1 through September 30) are combined in this file.  Records are updated using the 
most recent case file and duplicate records are removed by NDACAN prior to release.  
No adjustments are necessary to assure the confidentiality of the foster care file data 
because NDACAN recodes each child’s county FIPS codes if there are less than 1,000 
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records from that respective county and the date of birth to the 15th of the month 
(NDACAN, 2012). 
Operationalization of dependent variables.  This analysis will consider the 
impact that child welfare policies, state characteristics and other commonly included 
factors have on child outcomes.  This will focus on two of the most widely discussed and 
measured indicators of child welfare system quality: child length of stay in out-of-home 
care and discharge outcome (see Table 5.1).   
Table 5.1: Operationalization of Dependent Variables 
Variable Operationalization 
Child length of stay 
(LOS) 
Length (in days) since latest removal from home. If a child is still in care this is 
the last day of the fiscal year, if a child exited this is the date of discharge.  
Child discharge to 
permanency 
0/1 for if child discharged to “permanency” as defined by federal guidelines. 
Child discharge 
outcome 
Four 0/1 categories capturing reason for discharge: reunification, adoption, 
guardianship or non-permanent outcome 
 
Length of Stay.  The measure of time for a child’s involvement in out-of-home 
care is referred to as the length of stay.  These periods are the time during which children 
are eligible for discharge from care.  In this dataset length of stay was defined in days for 
each person.  Each length of stay begins the day the child is removed from home and 
placed into out-of-home care.  As the NDACAN data is structured, each case contributes 
one length of stay to the analysis.  Even if a child was discharged from and readmitted to 
out-of-home care during FY 2010, the length of stay only refers to the most recent stint.  
This ensures that each child has only one record in the foster care dataset.   
While the average length of stay for children in out-of-home care during FY 2010 
was just under two years (720 days), a full half had length of stays of under 14 months.  
The average length of stay is skewed by the large number of children (n=222,378) who 
remained in care the full length of FY 2010.  See Figure 5.1 for a graphic depiction 
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of Length of Stay Prior to Discharge, FY 2010 
 
 
*The red line indicates the mean of 720 days. 
 
of the distribution for child length of stays.  Average and median length of stays also vary 
markedly by state as you can see from Table 5.2.  Full length of stay summary statistics 
by state can be seen in Appendix D.   
Table 5.2: State Length of Stay (in days) 
Average Length of Stay Median Length of Stay 
Shortest Five Longest Five Shortest Five Longest Five 
Tennessee 410 California 878 Minnesota 224 Virginia 544 
Wyoming 428 New York 968 Arkansas 241 New York 607 
Arkansas 443 Maryland 1146 Wyoming 259 Maryland 682 
Idaho 470 DC 1329 Tennessee 260 DC 875 
Arizona 478 Illinois 1332 South Dakota 268 Illinois 878 
 
Discharge outcome.  The other child outcome event under study is the 
achievement of permanency, which can only occur for children who are discharged from 
out-of-home care.  Of the 656,963 children served by the out-of-home care system during 
FY 2010, 39% (n=255,703) were discharged.  See Figure 5.2 for the overall breakdown 
of discharge reasons.  Eighty-six percent of discharged children (n=219,323) were 
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considered to have achieved permanency, leaving 14% of discharges in which children 
were not discharged to a permanent setting.  This percentage varied between states, from 
a low of 71% in North Dakota and Virginia to a high of 95% in West Virginia.   
Figure 5.2: Prevalence of Discharge Reasons, FY 2010 
 
 
Within the broad category of permanency, there are several placement options.  
As discussed earlier, the types of permanency recognized by the federal government are 
reunification (with parent or birth family members), adoption and guardianship.  In FY 
2010, 68% of discharges to permanency (n=150,130) were cases in which children were 
reunified with their birth families.  As with permanency, there is a large gap in 
reunification rates by state: 49% in Florida up to 86% in Wyoming.  Adoption is the 
second most frequent permanency outcome and comprised 24% of permanent discharges 
in FY 2010 (n=52,438).  Adoption rates ranged from a low of 8% in Wyoming to 39% in 
Texas and Alaska.  The least common discharge reason for a permanency outcome is 
legal guardianship at 8% (n=16,595).  Some states do not recognize this option and others 
view it as less desirable than other types of permanency.  Others, like Florida, have 
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guardianship rates at or above their rates for adoption (27% vs.  25%, respectively).  
Please see Appendix E for full table of discharge rates by state.   
Explanatory Variables.  See Appendix F for full details and summary statistics 
for the following explanatory variables utilized in the analysis of child outcomes. 
State-level variables.  To examine the factors influencing child welfare outcomes 
and control for state heterogeneity in child outcomes, a variety of state-level 
characteristics will be used during the course of the analysis.  Data on these factors were 
gathered from numerous sources.   
Unemployment.  Annual unemployment rates capture the percentage of working 
aged adults in the population unable to find work in each state.  Individuals are included 
in this measure if they do not have a job, have actively looked for work in the prior 
month, and are currently available for employment (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2013).   
Urbaness.  To capture the urban nature of the state, the percent of the population 
which live in urban areas in 2010 is considered in the analysis of child outcomes.  For the 
2010 Census, urban areas include all census tracts and/or census blocks that have more 
than 2,500 residents (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013).  Higher numbers indicate a higher 
percentage of state residents live in an urban area.   
Poverty rate.  The percentage of the state population living in poverty is captured 
using the annual poverty estimates provided by the Census Bureau.  A higher number 
indicates a higher proportion of citizens in the state are living below the poverty level 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). 
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Child welfare “flow”.  Child welfare flow is defined as the number of children 
entering out-of-home care in each state each year per 1,000 children in the state.  The 
number of children entering care has been shown to be associated with the timing of exits 
from care and, as such, needs to be considered in the analysis (AFCARS, 2010; Courtney 
and Hook, 2012).   
Child welfare administrative structure.  The administrative structure of state child 
welfare systems is also accounted for.  State systems have one of three possible 
structures: state-, county-, or mixed-level administration.  State-administered child 
welfare systems directly administer services and operate with varying levels of 
decentralization.  County-administered systems, while still state supervised, have a more 
decentralized structure which allows for more localized decision-making regarding child 
outcomes.   
Policy variables.  Policies addressing system restrictiveness will not be included 
in this analysis because, while these policy choices might impact the chances a child will 
enter out-of-home care, this analysis focuses on children already in placement and the 
impact policies have on their subsequent likelihood of achieving permanency. 
Adoptive parent groups.  State child welfare policy surrounding who is (and is 
not) eligible to adopt children could impact both the length of time children are in out-of-
home care and the permanency outcomes they experience.  As such, both adoption 
eligibility and adoption restriction statutes for FY 2010 will be included (CWIG, 2010).   
Biological family statutes.  The orientation states take with biological relatives 
could influence the experiences children have once placed in out-of-home care, both in 
terms of length of time spent away from home and likelihood of various discharge 
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outcomes.  To that end, the state compliance rate with the termination of parental rights 
timeline established by ASFA, the statutory preference for placement with relatives and 
whether the state had an established kinship care program in FY 2010 will all be taken 
into consideration in relation to child outcomes (CWIG, 2010b).   
System generosity.  Measures of child welfare system generosity are also 
examined for influence on the outcomes experienced by children in out-of-home care.  
Direct benefits to recipients, expenditures per child in the state, and generosity of out-of-
home care access to substantiated victims of child abuse and neglect are each included in 
the models for length of stay and discharge outcomes (ChildTrends, 2010).   
Family-level factors.  Commonly included family level factors were collected 
from the AFCARS FY 2010 Foster Care data file for inclusion in the analysis.  Parental 
characteristics indicated as impacting a child’s reason for placement in out-of-home care 
were captured here.  Approximately 30% of children in out-of-home care during FY 2010 
had parental drug and/or alcohol use as a contributing factor for placement and for 6% of 
children, a caretaker or parent being incarcerated was a contributing factor for placement. 
Family structure.  The family structure of the adult caretaker (parents or others) 
from whom the child was removed for the current out-of-home care episode is 
considered.  Seventeen percent of children in out-of-home care during FY 2010 came 
from a home with two married adults while another 16% had two unmarried adults in the 
household.  Almost half of the children (47%) came from the home of a single mother 
and another 5% were removed from a single father home.  Fifteen percent of children 
were missing this information from the AFCARS Foster Care file.   
 
89 
Child–level factors.  As mentioned previously, all child-level factors are from the 
AFCARS FY 2010 Foster Care file maintained by NDACAN at Cornell.  In addition to 
basic demographic information (age and gender) the following child-level characteristics 
were included in the analysis of child outcomes.  Inclusion of these characteristics allows 
for cleaner interpretation of the policy level influence on child outcomes.   
Race.  Racial classification was simplified from the original AFCARS record.  
Social workers could select multiple races for children, which were consolidated so that 
each child has one racial classification: African American (28%), Caucasian (42%), 
American Indian / Alaskan Native (2%), Asian (1%), Hawaiian / Pacific Islander (<1%), 
and Hispanic (6%).  Children with more than one race selected were coded as 
‘multiracial.’  This accounts for an additional 19% of children in OOHC when so broadly 
defined.   
High-utilization county.  The FIPS codes for children who were placed in out-of-
home care from a high-utilization county were available.  A high-utilization county is 
defined in the dataset as a county which places 1,000 or more children in out-of-home 
care annually and includes 110 urban counties.  This was consolidated into a 
dichotomous variable and included as a proxy for placement from a highly urban area. 
Disability status.  The dataset captures whether a child has been clinically 
diagnosed by a qualified professional as having a disability, and if so, which type.  
Twenty-seven percent of the children in out-of-home care during FY 2010 had at least 
one type of disability.  Of that group 14% were diagnosed with mental retardation, 3% 
were vision and/or hearing impaired, 1% had a physical disability, 16% had an emotional 
disturbance and 14% had another significant medical condition requiring special care. 
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Removal manner.  The type of removal from home is controlled for in the 
analysis, as it can dictate the relationship a case has with the court system.  By far the 
most common type of removal is one which is court-ordered (> 99%), though there are 
some cases of voluntary removal from home in which an official voluntary placement 
agreement is executed between the caretaker and the agency.   
Number of removals from home.  The number of times a child has been removed 
from home was also captured.  This includes the current removal and higher numbers 
indicate a more extensive history of contact with the child welfare system.   
Removal reason.  The reason a child was removed from home is also considered 
with regards to child outcomes.  Multiples reasons are often indicated and the options are, 
in order of prevalence:  neglect (56%), parent issue (19%), physical abuse (16%), 
followed by child behavior only (8%) and sexual abuse (5%).   
Number of placements during current spell.  The number of distinct placements a 
child has experienced during the current spell in out-of-home care is included in analysis 
as a proxy for placement stability.   
Type of placement.  Children in out-of-home care live in a variety of placement 
types.  The current living situation is captured in the AFCARS data and is included in the 
analysis.  Most children in out-of-home care are living in home-like settings which 
include non-relative foster care (40%), relative foster care (23%), and home prior to 
official discharge (19%).  Less frequent placements are congregate care (14%), 
supervised independent living programs (1%) and being AWOL from care (2%).   
Outcomes hypotheses.  This analysis will expand the traditional scope of child 
welfare outcome research by including state level and policy variables.  Child level 
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characteristics are expected to impact permanency outcomes in well documented ways 
while the influence of a state’s policy choices and characteristics are a novel application 
and consequently have less clear predicted relationships.  See Table 5.3 for predicted 
relationships between specific policies and the various child level outcomes.   
Table 5.3: Predicted Relationships between macro-level variables and child-level 
outcomes 
Variable LOS Reunification Adoption Guardianship 
Non-
permanent 
outcome 
Policy-level Variables 
More groups eligible to adopt - - + - - 
Fewer restrictions on adoption 
eligibility 
- - + - - 
ASFA TPR compliance rate - - + + + 
Relative preference in placement - + - - - 
Kinship Care program in statute - + - - - 
Child welfare system benefits +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- 
Child welfare system 
expenditures 
+/- +/- +/- +/- +/- 
Child welfare system access +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- 
State-level Variables 
State administrative structure  +/- +/- +/- +/- +/- 
State child welfare "flow" + - - + + 
State poverty rate + - + + + 
State urbaness - + + - - 
State unemployment rate + - + + + 
 
Analytics 
In this analysis full population counts for children in out-of-home care for FY 
2010 were utilized.  No sampled data were used, keeping concerns about sampling error 
low and external validity high.  Full summary statistics can be found in Appendix F.  
Child Length of Stay.  When turning to the outcomes realized by children in out-
of-home care during fiscal year 2010, there are several model options.  The simplest of 
these is a standard OLS regression predicting a child’s length of stay in out-of-home care.   
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Child LOS = β0 + β1 state factors + β2 policy indicators + β3 family characteristics  
+ β4 child characteristics + ε 
Where: 
 State factors:  poverty rate, unemployment rate, administrative structure, child 
welfare “flow”, urbaness;  
 Policy indicators: adoptive parent statute flexibility, ASFA termination of parental 
rights compliance rate, relative preference in placement, Kinship Care program 
established in statute,  Title IV-E foster care maintenance payment per Title IV-E 
eligible child, child welfare expenditures per child in the population, placement 
rate per substantiated victim; 
 Family characteristics:  parental substance abuse, parental incarceration, family 
structure;  
 Child characteristics:  age, race, location, gender, disability, number of removals, 
number of placements, type of removal, removal reasons, placement type; 
Length of Stay results.  Table 5.4 presents the regression estimates for factors 
affecting length of stay.  An analysis of this type is limited by the fact that children who 
are still in out-of-home care at the end of FY 2010 will end their spell with a longer 
length of stay than captured by this data.  Because of this, the results presented in Table 
5.4 are likely an under-estimate of impacts.  It would appear that more flexible state 
policies surrounding adoption serve to increase the average length of stay for children in 
out-of-home care, whereas higher state compliance with the ASFA timeline decreases 
length of stay.  Adoption is a more time-consuming outcome than reunification which 
makes these results appear contradictory.  Being in a state with a statute-established 
Kinship Care program also significantly decreases average length of stay for children in 
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out-of-home care by just over a month.  System generosity, defined financially, has only 
a slight delaying effect on length of stay based on this analysis, whereas generosity of 
access actually increases the speed at which children move through the system.   
Table 5.4:  Regression analysis results - Impact of Policy and State-level factors 
on Child Length of Stay (in days), FY 2010 
Variable Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. Error 
Policy-level factors 
More groups approved to adopt 9.025 1.260 ** 
Fewer restrictions on who can adopt 35.236 1.381 ** 
ASFA compliance rate -95.335 8.682 ** 
Relative preference in placement 4.219 2.563  
Kinship Care designated in statute -30.337 2.510 ** 
IVE maintenance payment per IVE child 0.020 0.000 ** 
CW expenditure per child in population 0.013 0.006 * 
Placement rate per substantiated victim -39.854 1.790 ** 
State-level factors 
Unemployment 26.061 0.635 ** 
Poverty Rate -12.893 0.479 ** 
Percent Urban -1.267 0.104 ** 
CW administrative structure 20.378 1.521 ** 
CW "flow" -29.823 0.667 ** 
_cons 290.167 15.436 ** 
N = 576,795; F-test:  F(53,576741) = 2608.90; Prob > F <0.0001 
Significance levels: ** <0.001; * <0.05 
Analysis controls for family and child level factors in addition to child state of residence.  
 
State-level factors also show moderate impacts on the length of stay children 
experience in out-of-home care.  For instance, a one percentage point increase in a state’s 
unemployment rate would have a corresponding increase in child length of stay by 
approximately 26 days.  Poverty rate, on the other hand, seems to have the opposite 
effect.  A one percentage point increase in state poverty rate leads to an almost two week 
shorter length of stay for children in that state, which is unexpected.  As can be seen in 
the following analysis, this impact is particularly strong in cases where children are 
reunified with their birth families.   
The state child welfare factors, administrative structure and “flow,” also have 
conflicting impacts.  As the administrative structure of a state is devolved from state, to 
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mixed to county-level administration, each step increases the time children will spend in 
out-of-home care by approximately 20 days.  So for children in county-administered 
child welfare systems, we would expect their length of stays to be just over a month 
longer than children in state-administered systems, all else being equal.  An increase in 
the flow of children though the state child welfare system, however, actually decreases 
the estimate of a child’s length of stay by almost a month.  This is likely because the 
majority of discharges are children being reunified with their families, which typically 
takes less time. 
In general, the child level factors impacted length of stay in expected ways and 
are consistent with the literature.  For example, children of African American and 
American Indian/Native Alaskan descent spend significantly longer in out-of-home care 
compared to their Caucasian counterparts (+144 and +127 days, respectively), though 
Hispanic children have shorter length of stays (-16 days).  Children from high utilization 
counties have length of stays that are significantly longer (+75 days) than children in 
counties with less than 1000 children in out-of-home care during the year.  Please see 
Appendix G for full results of the length of stay analysis.   
Child Permanency Outcomes.  As mentioned in the previous analysis of child 
length of stay, many children who experienced a placement in out-of-home care during 
FY 2010 were in care the entire period (n = 222,378) or entered during the year and were 
not discharged (n = 181,571).  These children did not yet experience an outcome, as 
defined in this analysis.   
With a hazard model the entire population in out-of-home care can be accounted 
for, even those who otherwise would be right-censored due to not yet exiting care.  The 
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analysis will take into account the right-censored cases and correct estimates for them 
(Albert, King & Iaci, 2007).  Utilizing a hazard model allows for the impact of passing 
time on the likelihood of an outcome occurring to be accounted for.  This method 
typically investigates the time between entry to a study and a subsequent event of interest 
(Albert et al., 2007; Karch, 2006).  The event of interest in this case is a child being 
discharged after entering out-of-home care.  The outcome time is the number of days it 
takes the child to exit care. 
This analysis will provide a more nuanced and informative picture.  As the most 
frequently used form of survival analysis, Cox’s hazard rate measures how fast the 
fraction of those exiting out-of-home care is increasing out of the fraction of those still in 
care.  Symbolically, the Cox’s hazard rate model λ(t) appears as: 
λ(t) = 
d 
dt 
 
P(T ≤ t) 
S(t) 
 Where:  
 S(t) = P(T > t), t ≥ 0; survival function 
 T:  time in days from foster care entry to exit 
 (d/dt)(P(T≤t)): instantaneous rate of change with respect to time of one minus the 
survival function; 
 λ(t): the chance per day that a child in foster care will exit care during day t. 
Another benefit of this model is that no assumptions are necessary concerning the 
nature or shape of the underlying survival distribution.  The model assumes that the 
underlying hazard rate (rather than survival time) is a function of the case-specific 
covariates (Albert, King and Iaci, 2007).  The “hazard,” or instantaneous risk, of exiting 
care for children in foster care is what is modeled. 
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λ(t | X) = λ0(t)e
βX 
Where: 
 β: a constant vector;  
 (t | X): instantaneous hazard rate, with covariate vector, X, at time t;   
 λ0(t):  baseline hazard rate for an average individual with all covariates equaling 
zero.   
The Weibull distribution was utilized for this analysis which allows odds of 
exiting out-of-home care to partially depend on time.  The influence of time can decrease 
(<1), not affect (=1) or increase (>1) the odds of a particular discharge outcome.  See 
Figures 5.3 thru 5.6 for graphic illustrations of the hazard estimates for discharge to 
adoption, reunification, guardianship and non-permanent outcomes.   
Hazard model results.  A hazard model was conducted for each possible 
outcome, including the overall category of permanency achievement.  The Wald tests for 
each model was significant and allows us to reject that the hazard rate is constant over 
time.  Time itself has a decreasing effect on the odds of a child achieving permanency or 
being reunified with their family of origin (-5% and -26%, respectively).  As expected, 
however, the passage of time while a child is in out-of-home care actually doubles the 
odds of a child being adopted (+111%), increases the odds of discharge to guardianship 
by 34%, and increases the likelihood of an unsuccessful discharge by 95%.  See Table 5.5 
for policy and state level results (full results for hazard models can be seen in Appendix 
H).  These rates represent the likelihood of each respected discharge outcome; the 
passage of time (defined in days, similar to the previous length of stay analysis) will be 
addressed in the following section. 
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Figure 5.3: Hazard Function for Child Discharge to Reunification 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Hazard Function for Child Discharge to Adoption 
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Figure 5.5: Hazard Function for Child Discharge to Guardianship 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Hazard Function for Child Discharge to Non-Permanent Outcome   
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Policy-level results.  Of primary interest are the policy level variables, as these 
could impact the permanency outcomes for large groups of children.  Policies 
surrounding the flexibility of adoption within a state such as having more groups 
explicitly approved to be adoptive parents, increases the odds of children being 
discharged to permanency (+1.7%), reunification (+2.8%) and adoption (+3.5%) while 
decreasing the likelihood of discharge to guardianship.  Surprisingly, having fewer 
restrictions on groups eligible to adopt children actually appears to significantly lower the 
odds of all outcomes, including non-permanency.   
Policy approaches to birth families appear to have powerful impacts on the 
permanency outcomes for children in out-of-home care.  Children in states that have 
higher. adherence to the ASFA mandated timeline for termination of parental rights have 
9% lower likelihood of achieving permanency and over 20% lower odds of reunification 
with their birth families.  These children, conversely, have a 73% higher likelihood of 
discharge through adoption, a 32% higher likelihood of guardianship and, unfortunately, 
almost three times the likelihood of discharge to a non-permanent outcome (+284%).  
Surprisingly, having policy language that explicitly prefers relatives as placement options 
for children in out-of-home care significantly lowers the odds of achieving permanency 
by approximately 12%.  In addition, each potential discharge outcome is also decreased 
between eight and fifteen percent. 
Generosity of the child welfare system also significantly impacts outcomes for 
children in out-of-home care.  Financial generosity, by either definition, slightly but 
significantly decreases the likelihood of children in out-of-home care achieving 
permanency.  The same is true regardless of which specific discharge outcome is being  
 
 
1
0
0 
Table 5.5: Policy and State-level hazard ratios for various discharge outcomes, FY 2010 
 General 
Permanency 
Model 
Specific Discharge Outcomes 
Reunification 
Model 
Adoption Model 
Guardianship 
Model 
Non-Permanency 
_t HR Std. Error HR Std. Error HR Std. Error HR Std. Error HR Std Error 
Policy-level variables 
More groups approved to adopt 1.017 0.003 ** 1.028 0.004 ** 1.035 0.007 ** 0.845 0.011 ** 0.984 0.008 *  
Fewer restrictions on who can adopt 0.823 0.003 ** 0.810 0.004 ** 0.864 0.007 ** 0.782 0.012 ** 0.792 0.008 ** 
ASFA compliance rate 0.907 0.021 ** 0.787 0.023 ** 1.731 0.080 ** 1.323 0.119 * 3.838 0.234 ** 
Relative preference in placement 0.875 0.006 ** 0.888 0.007 ** 0.918 0.014 ** 0.843 0.021 ** 0.853 0.014 ** 
Kinship Care designated in statute 1.074 0.007 ** 1.060 0.008 ** 1.016 0.013   0.948 0.023 * 1.393 0.024 ** 
IVE maintenance payment per IVE child 
(in $1,000 increments) 
0.959 0.001 ** 0.975 0.001 ** 0.963 0.002 ** 0.799 0.003 ** 0.986 0.003 ** 
CW expenditure per child in population 
(in $100 increments) 
0.989 0.001 ** 0.982 0.002 ** 0.986 0.002 ** 1.059 0.005 ** 0.977 0.003 ** 
Placement rate per substantiated victim 1.169 0.006 ** 1.131 0.007 ** 1.374 0.013 ** 1.184 0.020 ** 0.957 0.011  ** 
State-level factors 
Unemployment 0.957 0.002 ** 0.952 0.002 ** 0.973 0.003 **  0.892 0.006 ** 0.927 0.004 ** 
Poverty Rate 1.042 0.001 ** 1.051 0.002 ** 1.011 0.003 ** 1.051 0.005 ** 1.010 0.003 * 
Percent Urban 1.006 0.000 ** 1.002 0.000 ** 1.008 0.001 ** 1.018 0.001 ** 1.011 0.001 ** 
CW administrative structure 1.030 0.004 ** 1.044 0.005 ** 0.920 0.007 ** 1.106 0.016 ** 1.219 0.011 ** 
CW "flow" 1.073 0.002 ** 1.078 0.002 ** 1.057 0.004 ** 1.145 0.008 ** 1.102 0.005 ** 
/ln, p -0.054 0.002 ** -0.301 0.002 ** 0.746 0.003 ** 0.295 0.006 ** 0.670 0.004 ** 
p 0.947 0.002 
 
0.740 0.002 
 
2.109 0.006 
 
1.343 0.007 
 
1.954 0.008 
 
1/p 1.056 0.002 1.351 0.003 0.474 0.001 0.744 0.004 0.512 0.002 
LR chi2(52) 172810 ** 117201 ** 122361 ** 38919 ** 77582 ** 
** <0.001; *<0.05 
Results control for state, race unknown, sex unknown, disability missing, removal reason unknown, removal type unknown, missing from placement  
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discussed:  children in more financially generous states have lower odds of reunification, 
adoption, guardianship and non-permanent outcomes.  This could be indicative that 
children in these states are simply staying in care for longer periods of time, which aligns 
with the current structure of child welfare finance.  States can receive financial support 
from the federal government for children currently in care and those who were adopted 
during the prior fiscal year.  Generosity of access, on the other hand, significantly 
increases the likelihood of permanency (+17%).  Likewise, the odds of reunification are 
13% higher, the odds of adoption are 37% higher and the odds of guardianship are 18% 
higher.  Generosity of access actually decreases the likelihood of an unsuccessful 
discharge. 
State level results.  State-level factors, while mostly included as controls, did 
show some interesting patterns.  The administrative structure of the child welfare system 
being mixed or county-administered significantly increases the odds of children 
achieving permanency.  This does play out differently for the various outcomes and has 
an unfortunately strong impact on non-permanent outcomes.  Children in a county-
administered child welfare structure have a 8% higher likelihood of reunification, a 19% 
lower likelihood of adoption, a 21% higher likelihood of discharge to guardianship and 
odds of an unsuccessful discharge that are 44% higher than comparable children in state-
administered child welfare systems.  The flow of children through the state child welfare 
system has a consistent positive impact on permanency and each specific discharge 
outcome.   
 Other, less child welfare specific, state-level factors also show consistent effects 
on outcomes for children in out-of-home care.  The urbaness of a state, has a small but 
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significant positive impact on the hazard of permanency, as well as each of the specific 
discharge outcomes.  State unemployment rates appear to have a slight and significantly 
negative relationship with child permanency (4% lower).  Higher unemployment is also 
associated with lower likelihoods of reunification, guardianship and non-permanent 
outcomes (-5%, -11% and -7%, respectively).  Higher state poverty rate, conversely, is 
associated with a slightly higher likelihood of permanency and each potential discharge 
outcome.  
Family level results.  Family structure within the home also appears to impact 
permanency outcomes for children in out-of-home care.  Compared to children from a 
home with married parents, all others have an approximately 30% higher likelihood of 
being adopted from care.  In addition, being voluntarily placed in out-of-home care by a 
caregiver significantly impacts all outcomes.  In this situation children have a 34% higher 
likelihood of achieving permanency, 47% higher odds of reunification, 19% higher odds 
of exiting through adoption, and 15% higher likelihood of being discharged to a non-
permanent outcome.   
Child level results.  Generally, the results for child level factors are as expected.  
For example, older children have increased likelihoods for all outcomes except adoption: 
every year of age raises the odds of reunification and guardianship by 6%, and the odds 
of a non-permanent outcome by a staggering 50%.  Each additional year of age actually 
decreases the hazard of adoption by 8%.  Race also impacts child outcomes in predictable 
ways.  Children of all racial categories have lower likelihoods of being adopted than 
white children, even after controlling for all other factors in the model.  African 
American children, in particular, do not appear to fare well: 13% lower odds of achieving 
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permanency, 8% lower odds of being reunified with their birth family, 42% lower odds of 
being adopted, and 16% lower odds of discharge to guardianship.   
 Children from high utilization counties, which are typically in urban areas, have 
lower likelihood of all outcomes, including non-permanent outcomes.  This is indicative 
of their slower transition to discharge.  Likewise, male children have significantly lower 
odds of all outcomes except reunification.  Having a documented disability raises the 
odds of adoption by 28% but decreases the overall likelihood of achieving permanency 
by 10% and of being reunified by 22%.  Also consistent with the literature are the results 
regarding the total number of placements a child has experienced during their time in out-
of-home care.  Each additional placement a child experiences significantly lowers their 
odds for all possible outcomes: by 25% for permanency, 30% for reunification, 18% for 
adoption, 23% for guardianship and 3% for a non-permanent outcome.  Being in a non-
homelike setting (i.e. congregate care, independent living or being AWOL) decreases the 
likelihood of a positive discharge outcome and increases the odds of not achieving 
permanency.  Full hazard model results can be seen in Appendix H. 
Elasticities results.  To examine the magnitude of these impacts on the predicted 
time a child spends in out-of-home care prior to discharge more concretely, elasticities (in 
the form of ∂ logy/∂ logx) were calculated for each hazard model.  These allow for 1:1 
interpretation of the percent change in length of stay for a 1% change from the mean of 
the explanatory variable.  For the sake of discussion, Table 5.6 shows the impact a 10% 
change in select explanatory variables would have on the predicted median length of stay 
for permanency as well as the specific discharge outcomes of reunification, adoption and 
non-permanency.  See Appendix I for full results. 
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Table 5.6: Change in predicted LOS for a 10% increase in explanatory variable 
 
Time to 
Permanency 
Time to Specific Discharge 
Outcomes 
Reunification Adoption 
Non-
Permanent 
Outcome 
Policy-level factors 
More groups approved to adopt -7 ** -33 ** -20 ** 16 * 
Fewer restrictions on who can adopt 139 ** 430 ** 141 ** 380 ** 
ASFA compliance rate 6 ** 45 ** -49 ** -204 ** 
IV-E maintenance payment / IV-E child 45 ** 77 ** 54 ** 35 ** 
CW expenditures / child in population 8 ** 37 ** 14 ** 38 ** 
Placement rate per substantiated victim -16 ** -36 ** -44 ** 10 ** 
State-level factors 
Unemployment 72 ** 230 ** 61 ** 282 ** 
Poverty Rate -102 ** -355 ** -38 * -57 * 
Percent Urban -73 ** -85 ** -143 ** -341 ** 
CW “flow” -45 ** -137 ** -47 ** -142 ** 
Selected child-level factors 
Age at placement -35 ** -194 ** 138 ** -1154 * 
Number of placements 143 ** 505 ** 137 ** 33 * 
y = Predicted median _t (in days) 1582 3532 4771 7470 
** <0.001; * <0.05 
 
Again, the policy and state-level factors are of primary interest.  Even after 
controlling for family and child-level characteristics some interesting patterns emerge.  
The policies which denote flexibility of the adoptive system: having more groups 
approved to be adoptive parents and fewer restrictions on who is eligible to adopt have 
opposite effects on the predicted length of stay for children in out-of-home care.  
Increasing the number of groups eligible to adopt by 10% decreases the predicted length 
of stay for children reunified with their families and those adopted (by 33 and 20 days, 
respectively).  Increasing state compliance rate with the ASFA timeline for termination of 
parental rights by 10%, indicating a less flexible approach with birth families, slows 
reunification by almost a month and a half.  This result is predictable, as termination of 
parental rights severs a child’s legal ties to their birth family.  Likewise, this increase is 
associated with a child transitioning to adoption over a month faster.  The most 
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concerning result is that this 10% increase in ASFA compliance, speeds a child in 
OOHCs transition to unsuccessful discharge by almost seven months.   
 Both financial measures of child welfare system generosity, Title IV-E 
maintenance payments per Title IV-E eligible child and child welfare expenditures per 
child in the population, show a moderate slowing impact on permanency and the specific 
discharge outcomes.  A 10% increase in either of these factors would lead to a predicted 
delay in discharge of between one and eleven weeks.  Generosity of access has the 
opposite effect.  A 10% increase in placement rate per substantiated victim of child abuse 
or neglect, leads to a predicted length of stay of between two and six weeks shorter for 
permanent outcomes and does not significantly impact the predicted speed at which 
children in out-of-home care transition to non-permanent discharges.   
 The magnitude of impact attributable to state-level factors varies widely.  
Unemployment is the only state level factors which consistently lengthens a child’s 
predicted length of stay, particularly in regards to reunification and non-permanent 
outcome.  A 10% increase in unemployment would be associated with a predicted length 
of stay increase of almost seven months for each of these outcomes.  State poverty rate 
and urbaness, on the other hand, shows the opposite impact.  A 10% increase in either of 
these factors would result in significantly shorter predicted length of stay for children in 
out-of-home care, regardless of discharge outcome.  Like generosity of access, child 
welfare flow significantly decreases the predicted length of stay for all outcomes.  A 10% 
increase in the number of children entering the child welfare system within a state would 
lead to a predicted discharge to reunification approximately four months sooner, 
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discharge to adoption six weeks sooner and to a non-permanent outcome three months 
sooner.   
State speed of transition results.  In order to examine how states are doing in a 
relative sense, residuals were calculated and regressed against state dummies.  The 
resulting coefficients, while non-linear, do have sign properties and allow for the states to 
be ranked in terms of speed with which children in out-of-home care exit to the various 
outcomes.  In addition, it is possible to tell which states are transitioning children from 
out-of-home care to respective outcomes either significantly faster or slower than 
predicted. 
Figure 5.7: Speed of Transition to Permanency, by state (FY 2010)  
 
 
The first map (Figure 5.7) presents the geographic variation in speed with which 
the states transition children from out-of-home care to a permanent placement.  This is 
the overarching goal for children and encompasses reunification with birth family, 
adoption and guardianship as possible outcomes.  Wyoming, South Dakota, New Jersey, 
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than predicted 
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Idaho and New York had comparatively fast transitions for children to permanent 
placements in FY 2010, significantly faster than would have been predicted based on the 
state characteristics included in the preceding analysis.  By comparison, 26 states were 
taking significantly longer than predicted to transition children into permanent 
placements. 
Figure 5.8: Speed of Transition to Reunification, by state (FY 2010)  
 
 
The results for reunification, seen in Figure 5.8, are remarkably similar to those 
for permanency as a whole.  This suggests that the speed of permanency is very heavily 
influenced by reunification, which is intuitive since reunification comprises the bulk of 
discharges to permanency.  The same five states (Wyoming, New York, South Dakota, 
New Jersey and Idaho) are the only ones that reunified children with their birth families 
significantly faster than predicted, while 17 states lagged significantly behind the 
predicted speed.  
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The speed at which children transition into adoptive homes, shown in Figure 5.9, 
does not follow the same pattern seen in reunification or permanency as a whole.  
Washington, Idaho, New Mexico, Alaska and Nevada are leading the nation in the speed 
with which children in the state experience permanency through adoption, though 22 
states achieve adoptions significantly faster than predicted by state and client 
characteristics.   
Figure 5.9: Speed of Transition to Adoption, by state (FY 2010) 
 
 
The final map, seen in Figure 5.10, details the speed to non-permanent outcomes 
for children in out-of-home care.  Led by Arizona, North Dakota, Minnesota, Kentucky 
and Tennessee, 31 states discharged children to non-permanent outcomes significantly 
faster than anticipated.  This is the largest group of states who are acting significantly 
faster than predicted based on state and client characteristics.   
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Figure 5.10: Speed of Transition to Non-Permanent Outcome, by state (FY2010)  
 
 
These maps provide visual evidence of state variation in the speed with which 
children transition to permanency, as well as the specific discharge outcomes.  What we 
see is an interesting picture.  While some states simply seem to be reaching all outcomes 
significantly faster (Idaho and South Dakota) or slower (Illinois, Massachusetts, and 
Missouri) than predicted, there are other patterns hinted at within these state results.  The 
three largest groups of states all have faster transitions to non-permanent outcomes.  
Seven states have significantly faster discharges to adoption and non-permanency with no 
impact on reunification (Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, and 
Tennessee).  Six states discharge significantly slower to adoption but faster to non-
permanent settings while reunification is not impacted (North Dakota, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia).  The third largest group of states is 
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significantly slower to all outcomes except non-permanency (California, Colorado, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, and Utah).  Please see Appendix J for complete state rankings by 
outcome.   
Summary 
 The sequence of analysis presented above allows for an overview of the influence 
state level factors and child welfare policies have on outcomes for children in out-of-
home care.  Overall, there were several child, family, state and policy level factors that 
were found to significantly influence the likelihood of various child outcomes.  Appendix 
K presents a summary table of the significant predictors as they relate to the likelihood of 
a child achieving permanency, being reunified with their birth family, experiencing 
permanency through adoption, being discharged to legal guardianship or having an 
unsuccessful discharge due to aging out of care.   
 When examined by group, several patterns emerged.  Each of the policy-level 
predictors included in the analysis proved to significantly impact the likelihood of at least 
one child outcome.  The general effects for policy-level predictors were in accordance 
with the hypotheses, and primarily had negative impacts on discharge outcomes for 
children.  Exceptions include better outcomes for states with higher generosity of access, 
increased rates of adoption and aging out in states with higher ASFA compliance on 
termination of parental rights and more discharges to reunification and adoption when 
states have more flexibility surrounding adoption.  State level factors, which consistently 
showed the strongest influence on child discharge outcomes in the analysis, acted in 
surprising ways.  While an increase in unemployment was associated with worse child 
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outcomes, all other state level factors were associated with positive discharge outcomes 
for children in out-of-home care. 
Significant child-level predictors included child age, child race/ethnicity, child 
sex, child disability status, type of maltreatment, as well as placement history and type.  
Many of these child-related characteristics were statistically significant across all 
discharge outcomes, though the patterns of influence varied based on the type of 
discharge.  Likewise family-level predictors demonstrated consistently significant results.   
The next and final chapter will discuss how these results answer both of the 
research questions addressed in this study as well as discuss where these findings fit in 
the existing literature on child welfare.  Additionally, the final chapter will discuss the 
theoretical implications and relevance of these findings to social policy decisions.  Lastly, 
it will close with a discussion of strengths and weaknesses of this study and offer 
recommendations for future research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Dana Dean Connelly 2014  
 
112 
 Chapter 6 – Discussion 
Dissertation Summary 
State child welfare policy, both the forces driving policy decisions and the impact 
on child outcomes, is an understudied topic in the field of child welfare research.  As 
such, the analyses and results presented here sought to answer two specific research 
questions: (1) Does redistributive theory explain the child welfare policy choices made by 
states? and (2) Do state policy decisions in child welfare impact case-level outcomes for 
children in out-of-home care?  This chapter reviews how these questions were answered 
and begins to explore the implications for future child welfare research.  
State child welfare policies are not created in a vacuum.  The specific aim of the 
first research question was to begin examining the forces behind these decisions.  The 
hypothesis was that due to similarities of target populations, the redistributive pressures 
shown to impact other types of social welfare programs would exert comparable 
influence on state child welfare policy.  Based on the results presented in chapter three, 
however, the relationship between redistributive pressures and state child welfare policy 
choices is not that straightforward.  Of the 13 policies examined, only ten of the models 
reached significance and the individual explanatory variables showed an interesting 
pattern.  As a group, factors associated with resource pressures (particularly income per 
capita) showed the highest level of influence on child welfare policy decisions, with over 
half reaching significance. State factors related to program utilization and reproductive 
behavior, which have been shown to elicit a paternalistic policy response, also exhibited 
some support.  Constituent and institutional characteristics of the states, while classically 
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associated with redistributive pressures and shown to influence social policy decisions, 
did not appear to be influencing child welfare policy decisions in any substantive manner.   
The primary aim of the second research question was to determine how state child 
welfare policy decisions on eight factors surrounding system generosity and exit impact 
outcomes for children in out-of-home care.  The hypothesis was that differences in policy 
decisions will have differential effects on child length of stay, achievement of 
permanency and discharge outcome.  More flexible adoption policies were associated 
with longer length of stays while having more groups explicitly approved as adoptive 
parents was associated with significantly higher likelihood of discharge to permanency, 
through either reunification or adoption.  States with higher compliance rates on the 
federal ASFA mandated timeline for termination of parental rights initiation showed 
expected results.  Children in these states experienced shorter length of stays, lower 
likelihood of reunification and higher likelihood of adoption but also a higher chance of 
not achieving permanency and aging out of care.  Financial generosity was generally 
associated with less positive discharge outcomes while increased system access for 
children substantiated as victims of abuse or neglect is associated with shorter length of 
stay and increased likelihood of discharge to a permanent living situation.   
Implications  
There are many implications of the study presented in this dissertation, both 
theoretical and practical.  The theoretical implications are those related to the forces 
driving policy decision at the state level while the practical implications are those directly 
related to child welfare policy and practice.  Both theoretical and practical implications 
will be discussed in this section.  
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Theoretical implications.  As discussed in chapter two, both social construction 
and redistributive theory need consideration when discussing child welfare policy, as they 
are so closely intertwined.  Redistributive theory, as previously described, primarily 
addresses the forces influencing policy changes in a broad manner.  When thought of in 
the context of social construction, however, the picture gets more complex.  Social 
construction allows us to theorize about specific impacts on the various target groups, 
which would result from a change in the underlying factors influencing redistribution.  As 
seen in Table 6.1 we would generally expect increases in factors favoring redistribution 
such as public liberalism, Democratic Party control, and per capita personal income to 
positively impact all groups.  When there is a conflict between groups on policy goals, 
social construction helps us predict that policymakers will defer to the goals of 
advantaged populations over dependents and/or deviant groups.   
Table 6.1: Predicted Relationships between Redistributive Pressures and Socially 
Constructed Groups 
 
Advantaged 
Group 
Foster and 
Adoptive Parents 
Contender 
Groups 
State Child 
Welfare Agency 
Dependent 
Groups 
Child Welfare 
involved Kids 
Deviant 
Groups 
Child Welfare 
involved Parents 
Constituent Pressures 
Public Liberalism + - + + 
Racial Composition + - + + 
Class Bias + + + - 
Institutional Pressures 
Democratic Party Control + - + + 
Government Liberalism + - + + 
TANF Stringency + + - - 
Paternalistic Pressure 
Unmarried Birth Rate + - +/- +/- 
Program Utilization + - +/- +/- 
Resource Pressures 
Per Capita Personal Income + + + + 
Percent Federal Funding + + + + 
Adoption Incentive Funds + + +/- - 
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Given this complex set of predicted relationships, we can examine the chapter 
three results in a new light.  The pattern of results actually lend support to the different 
social constructions of the target populations and suggest that policies may not be 
primarily targeted at child welfare involved parents.  If they had been, we would have 
expected results more in line with the patterns established in the cash assistance literature.  
Instead, the relationships between state level factors and child welfare policy decisions 
more closely resemble those we’d expect if policies were being directed at the dependent 
group, followed by the advantaged group (child welfare involved children and 
foster/adoptive parents, respectively).   
Interestingly, the only pattern which fits the results expected if these policies were 
directed at birth parents is the generosity of the child welfare system in terms of access.  
This is not surprising, given that the measure is operationalized as the rate at which 
children are removed from home once they have been substantiated as having 
experienced some type of maltreatment.  This is the most intrusive and, arguably, 
punitive measure available to child protection officials and it stands to reason that these 
decisions would be made based on a value–judgment of the family of origin. 
Policy and practice implications.  An initial implication for both policy and 
practice is that definitions are extremely important and influence the measures of 
incidence (Hacking, 1999).  Beyond that, several conclusions can be drawn regarding the 
policies surrounding child welfare involvement with out-of-home care.  Of primary 
interest are the policy level variables, as these could impact the permanency outcomes for 
large groups of children and are malleable by state officials and policymakers. 
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Based on the results presented above, child welfare policies do not appear to be 
organized around the broad concepts of restrictiveness, flexibility or resources.  While 
this suggests a lack of coherence, the factor analysis results hint that there may simply be 
a different underlying structure to child welfare policy.  This initial analysis revealed six 
dimensions which may be at work in the child welfare policy structure:  reporting, 
financial, flexibility, kinship care, exemptions and restrictiveness.  As mentioned before, 
these categories make intuitive sense and correspond nicely with the theoretical 
implication that different pieces of the child welfare policy puzzle are directed at 
different target populations.   
Very pertinent in current child welfare work is the issue of finance reform.  In the 
past five years there has been a fair amount of discussion about the need to restructure the 
child welfare finance arrangement in order to address what are seen as the negative 
unintended incentives created by the current finance structure.  While this analysis does 
not offer a prescriptive solution, the results do indicate that the current finance structure 
is not effective at achieving the expressed goals of decreasing child length of stay in out-
of-home care and increasing permanency.  The evidence presented here indicates that 
increased spending on child welfare, defined either as average Title IV-E funds per Title 
IV-E eligible child or child welfare expenditures per child in the general population, 
actually decreases the likelihood of permanency and slows the transition of children to 
reunification, adoption and guardianship.  In any finance reform efforts, it will be 
important to create incentives for the state to prevent child removal from home and 
reward permanency in all its forms.   
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It is anticipated that identifying the factors and policies associated with whether or 
not children achieve permanency will aid CPS in decision making and improving their 
policy environment.  While some factors may be uncontrollable, such as type of abuse, 
race or gender of the child, the hope is that when actionable policies are studied, such as 
the guidelines surrounding adoptive parent eligibility and orientation towards biological 
families, it will provide some guidance for state agencies and legislatures.  Identifying 
policies that increase the likelihood of children achieving permanency can contribute to 
an evidence base in support of more effective policy tools available for use by state 
legislatures.   
Limitations of the Study  
There were a few limitation of this study that warrant attention.  The primary 
limitation of the current work is the fact that analysis employed a blunt dichotomous 
measure of state legislation to capture child welfare policies ‘on the books.’  The 
implementation of government intervention is, in fact, considerably more complex than 
captured by this type of indicator.  While the inclusion of policy is an important step in 
the right direction, this analysis was unable to account for actual practices or 
interpretation by street level bureaucrats.   
Secondly, the parallels between the child welfare and cash welfare populations 
have some obvious limitations.  While child welfare involved birth parents bear a striking 
resemblance to parents receiving TANF, child welfare involved parents are involuntary 
participants, unlike parents receiving cash welfare assistance.  In addition, the child 
welfare system is more complex and has more participants, including the voluntary status 
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of foster and adoptive parents and the fact that the most tangible benefits (foster care 
payments) are made to foster parents on behalf of the children in their care.   
Additional limitations regarding data are also present.  First, the lack of an 
existing database containing historical child welfare policies proved to be a large 
challenge.  It limited data in the analysis to the thirteen state policies for which multiple 
years of reports were available.  These thirteen policies may or may not be the most 
appropriate measures of the state child welfare systems.  While a broader policy may, in 
fact, be more restrictive there is no data available capturing this so the analysis starts with 
the cleanest policy data available and future work will have to go from there.   
Future Research 
Future research on the influence of child welfare policy on outcomes for children 
in out-of-home care is important.  Of primary importance in future work will be gathering 
more data regarding state child welfare policies, both more years and more policies.  
Examples of other policies which warrant attention include those related to child abuse 
and neglect prevention, domestic violence, differential response and diversion programs, 
actual foster care reimbursement rates, and extension of out-of-home care placement for 
youth beyond 18 years old. 
Beyond that two follow-up studies warrant immediate attention.  First, a similar 
analysis needs to be conducted utilizing the policies addressing system entry (i.e. 
definitions of child abuse and neglect, reporting laws) to examine how they affect out-of-
home care placement rates.  Secondly, a competing risks model should be conducted with 
the exiting data, as discharge reasons are mutually exclusive and state policies and 
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characteristics may actually be driving the pattern of discharge reasons, not just the 
likelihood of the various outcomes. 
Future research should also include a more narrow definition of an individual’s 
environment.  While FIPS codes were utilized in this study to classify children as living 
in a high utilization county, they could provide an avenue for a more nuanced analysis.  
Utilizing this classification, more locally-specific factors such as poverty rate and 
unemployment could be considered as they change over time.  This would provide more 
precise estimates of how community level (versus state level) factors influence child 
outcomes.   
Patterns of the initial results presented above when examining how redistributive 
pressures influence policy decisions suggest that there are multiple target populations of 
child welfare policy.  The future work regarding the theoretical underpinnings of child 
welfare policy will need to focus more on the idea of target populations, specifically to 
determine whose interests are actually the focus of state policymakers (i.e. birth parents, 
foster/adoptive parents, child welfare involved children or state agency).  The next logical 
step is to examine the influence these policy changes have on the various groups 
involved.  
Summary 
Children and families do not exist in a vacuum.  Every family is influenced, either 
positively or negatively, by the environment in which they live and the relationships in 
which they surround themselves.  Social work and public policy, as fields, have known 
for years that systems impact individual outcomes.  However, the models of child level 
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outcomes in out-of-home care have, to date, primarily been based on individual-level 
factors.   
The discussion above examining the impact policy and state level factors have on 
child outcomes illuminates the need for an approach which can account for the multiple 
layers of influence.  It is now evident that children in out-of-home care are influenced by 
the larger society in which they reside.  Permanency for children in out-of-home care is 
not an individual level problem and should not be examined or analyzed as if it were.  
This fact is beginning to be realized by politicians and service providers, although there is 
much more work to be done in the area of state level child welfare outcomes, both to 
develop a uniform definition of child maltreatment as well as to implement a coherent 
policy structure that supports permanency. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Professional Categories Designated as Mandatory Reporters 
Table A.1:  Professional Categories Designated as Mandatory Reporters 
Professional Categories 2005 2008 2010 
Health Care Workers 48 48 47 
Mental Health Workers 37 37 38 
Social Work Professionals 40 41 41 
Education/Child Care Workers 46 46 45 
Law Enforcement Professionals 39 40 40 
Domestic Violence And Sexual Assault Program Workers 7 8 9 
Drug and Alcohol Treatment Program Workers 13 12 13 
Commercial or Private Film Photograph Processors 11 11 11 
Members of a State Child Fatality Review Team Workers 1 1 1 
Clergy/Christian Science Practitioners Workers 27 27 27 
Religious Healers 8 7 7 
Parents/Foster Parents 19 20 21 
Legal Professionals 13 15 17 
Guardian Ad Litem / Casa Workers 7 7 10 
Firefighters 6 6 6 
Animal Control Officers / Humane Officers Workers 3 5 7 
Veterinarians 1 1 1 
Employees of Recreation or Sports Activities 5 6 6 
Homemakers 2 3 3 
Funeral Home Directors / Medical Examiners / Coroner Workers 30 29 29 
Juvenile Intake and Assessment Workers 7 7 6 
Mediators 4 4 4 
Probation and Parole Officers 12 15 15 
Persons with Responsibility for the Care of Children 27 26 26 
Internet Service Providers or Computer Technicians  2 2 3 
Camp Administrators and Counselors  5 5 5 
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Appendix B:  Operationalization and Source of Explanatory Variables in Child 
Welfare Policy Panel 
  
Table B.1:  Operationalization and Source of Explanatory Variables in Child Welfare 
Policy Panel 
State-level Variables 
(1) Public Liberalism – Measure: The ideological score for state citizens in a given year; 
Interpretation: Higher numbers indicate a more liberal populace; Source: “Revised 1960-2010 
citizen ideology series” Berry, William D., Evan J.  Ringquist, Richard C.  Fording and Russell L.  
Hanson.  1998.  “Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-93.” 
American Journal of Political Science 42:327-48.   (Range = 8.45-95.97; Mean = 53.11; S.D.  = 
16.16). 
(2) Population African American – Measure: The percentage of the state population which is 
African American; Interpretation: High numbers indicate a higher proportion of the state 
population is African American; Source: 2002-2010.  U.S.  Census Bureau (Range = 0.27-40.85; 
Mean = 9.98; S.D.  = 9.82). 
(3) Population Hispanic – Measure:  The percentage of the state population which is Hispanic; 
Interpretation: High numbers indicate a higher proportion of the state population is Hispanic; 
Source: 2002-2010.   U.S.  Census Bureau.  (Range = 0.60-31.87; Mean = 6.19; S.D.  = 6.25). 
(4) OOHC African American – Measure: The annual proportion of African American children in 
OOHC to all children in OOHC, for each state; Interpretation: High numbers indicate a higher 
proportion of African American children make up the average number of recipients of OOHC 
placement; Source: 2002-2010.  AFCARS data (Range = 1.71-95.65; Mean = 29.75; S.D.  = 
21.27).   
(5) OOHC Hispanic – Measure: The annual proportion of Hispanic children in OOHC to all children 
in OOHC, for each state; Interpretation: High numbers indicate a higher proportion of Hispanic 
children make up the average number of recipients of OOHC placement; Source: 2002-2010.  
AFCARS data (Range = 0.70-78.57; Mean = 12.20; S.D.  = 12.76).   
(6) High Income Representation Bias – Measure: The proportion of high income citizens who voted 
in the most recent election divided by the proportion of low income citizens who voted in the same 
election (based on Hill & Leighley, 1992).  Interpretation: High numbers indicate that low income 
voters have less representation at the polls than high income voters.  Source: U.S.  Dept.  of 
Commerce, Census Bureau:  Current Population Survey, November Supplement.  (Range = 6.83-
365.62; Mean: 155.19; S.D.  = 32.91).   
(7) Democratic Party Control – Measure: The distribution of party control for each state government 
in a given year; Interpretation: Higher numbers indicate more Democrat control in the state House, 
Senate and governor position.  Source: The Council of State Governments, The National 
Governors’ Association and Elections Research Center.  (Range = 0-3; Mean = 1.64; S.D.  = 1.11). 
(8) Government Ideology – Measure: The ideological score for each state government in a given 
year; Interpretation: High numbers indicate a more liberal government.  Source: “Revised 1960-
2010 citizen ideology series” Berry, William D., Evan J.  Ringquist, Richard C.  Fording and 
Russell L.  Hanson.  1998.  “Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 
1960-93.” American Journal of Political Science 42:327-48.   (Range = 6.77-91.03; Mean = 50.61; 
S.D.  = 16.10). 
(9) TANF Stringency – Measure:  Composite score based on four optional TANF policies: sanction 
strength, early work requirement, shortened time limit on benefits and family cap for each state for 
each year (based on measures used by Soss, Schram, Vartanian & O’Brien, 2001); Interpretation: 
High numbers indicate a more strict approach to TANF policy; Source: Welfare Rules Database.  
Urban Institute.  (Range = 2-6; Mean = 3.61; S.D.  = 1.16). 
(10) Unmarried Birth Rate – Measure: The proportion of all births to unwed women; Interpretation: 
High numbers indicate that more of a state’s births were to unwed women; Source: Analysis of 
2000-2010 Natality Micro-Data files from Centers for Disease Control, National Center for Health 
Statistics.  (Range = 0.17-0.59; Mean = 0.37; S.D.  = 0.07). 
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Table B.1 (continued) 
(11) Child Welfare System Demand – Measure: Rate of referral to the CPS agency of suspected child 
abuse or neglect per 1,000 children in the population; Interpretation:  High numbers indicate that 
more referrals are made to the state CPS agency; Source: Annual Child Maltreatment Report.  
Dept. of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families.  (Range = 12.86-
130.49; Mean = 47.16; S.D.  = 18.48). 
(12) OOHC Demand – Measure:  The proportion of a state’s child population that is placed in OOHC 
during the year; Interpretation:  High numbers indicate that more children are placed in OOHC 
within the state; Source: Annual AFCARS data.  (Range = 0.10-3.33; Mean = 1.15; S.D.  = 0.46). 
(13) Per Capita Personal Income – Measure: The per capita personal income for each state in a given 
year; Interpretation: High numbers indicate larger state economies as measured by personal 
income; Source:  U.S.  Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis.   (Range = 
23,131.07 – 70,652.99; Mean = 36,002.94; S.D.  = 6,973.03).   
(14) Percent Federal Funding – Measure: The proportion of child welfare funding in each state that is 
provided by the federal government; Interpretation:  High numbers indicate that the federal 
government is paying more for that state’s child welfare services; Source:  State Child Welfare 
Policy Database.  (Range = 0-0.89; Mean = 0.46; S.D.  = 0.15). 
(15) Adoption Incentive Funds – Measure: The annual amount each state has been awarded by the 
federal government under the Adoption Incentive Program for increasing adoptions; Interpretation: 
High numbers indicate a larger award for adoptions in that state; Source: Dept.  of Health and 
Human Services; Administration for Children and Families.  (Range = 0-9,755,040; Mean = 
428,972; S.D.  = 1,003,842).   
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Appendix C:  Summary Statistics for Child Welfare Policy Panel 
Table C.1:  Summary Statistics for Child Welfare Policy Panel 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Observations 
System Entry Policies 
Child Abuse 
and Neglect 
Definitions 
overall 4.047 1.586 0 7 N = 150 
between  1.525 0 6.667 n =   50 
within  0.468 2.047 5.047 T =     3 
Parental 
Substance 
Abuse  
overall 0.804 0.872 0 3 N = 250 
between  0.774 0 2.4 n =   50 
within  0.415 -0.796 2.204 T =     5 
Exemptions  
overall 1.845 0.771 0 3 N = 200 
between  0.735 0 3 n =   50 
within  0.248 0.845 2.845 T =     4 
All Citizens 
Mandatory 
Reporters 
overall 0.360 0.481 0 1 N = 200 
between  0.485 0 1 n =   50 
within  0.000 0.360 0.360 T =     4 
Mandatory 
Reporter 
Categories 
overall 8.000 3.989 0 17 N = 200 
between  3.864 0 14.5 n =   50 
within  1.096 3.5 10.5 T =     4 
System Exit Policies 
Approved 
Adoptive 
Groups 
overall 2.487 0.833 2 5 N = 150 
between  0.618 2 4 n =   50 
within  0.564 0.487 3.82 T =     3 
Restrictions 
of Adoptive 
Groups 
overall 0.773 0..812 0 3 N = 150 
between  0.815 0 3 n =   50 
within  0.067 0.107 1.107 T =     3 
Relative 
Preference in 
Placement 
overall 1.147 0.560 0 2 N = 150 
between  0.405 0 2 n =   50 
within  0.390 -0.187 2.48 T =     3 
Kinship Care 
Program in 
Statute 
overall 0.267 0.444 0 1 N = 150 
between  0.410 0 1 n =   50 
within  0.177 -0.4 0.933 T =     3 
ASFA 
Compliance 
Rate 
overall 0.304 0.134 0.008 0.707 N = 200 
between  0.093 0.117 0.527 n =   50 
within  0.098 -0.013 0.627 T =     4 
System Generosity  
Payment per 
Recipient 
overall 7593.78 4587.58 801.97 35075.2 N = 98 
between  4306.85 1331.23 26893.25 n =   49 
within  1639.56 -588.17 15775.73 T =     2 
Expenditures 
per child 
overall 306.91 149.11 64.18 761.69 N = 100 
between  145.97 76.57 691.88 n =   50 
within  33.78 197.48 416.34 T =     2 
Generosity 
of Access 
overall 0.617 0.586 0.156 5.210 N = 300 
between  0.568 0.165 3.548 n =   50 
within  0.163 -0.156 2.280 T =     6 
Constituent  
Public 
Liberalism 
overall 53.11 16.157 8.450 95.972 N = 450 
between  14.896 26.573 87.751 n =   50 
within  6.565 23.545 75.183 T =     9 
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Table C.1 (continued) 
% of Pop – 
African 
American 
overall 9.375 8.931 0.268 36.860 N = 450 
between  8.870 0.451 34.074 n =   50 
within  1.578 0.811 12.161 T =     9 
% of 
Population – 
Hispanic 
overall 6.180 6.316 0.595 31.873 N = 450 
between  6.349 0.733 30.244 n =   50 
within  0.547 4.407 8.054 T =     9 
% of OOHC 
– African 
American 
overall 28.374 18.994 1.706 75.625 N = 450 
between  19.037 2.413 72.940 n =   50 
within  2.199 6.771 37.802 T =     9 
% of OOHC 
– Hispanic  
overall 12.351 12.842 0.703 78.571 N = 450 
between  12.307 0.933 54.099 n =   50 
within  4.019 3.652 74.736 T =     9 
Class Bias 
overall 154.775 32.805 6.833 365.624 N = 450 
between  15.939 116.440 196.374 n =   50 
within  28.752 19.622 328.116 T =     9 
Institutional 
Democratic 
Control  
overall 1.64 1.112 0 3 N = 450 
between  0.957 0 3 n =   50 
within  0.581 -0.471 4.084 T =     9 
Government 
Liberalism 
overall 50.610 16.265 6.773 91.035 N = 450 
between  13.530 24.714 69.489 n =   50 
within  9.206 22.624 85.756 T =     9 
TANF 
Stringency 
overall 3.573 1.144 2 6 N = 450 
between  1.097 2 6 n =   50 
within  0.359 2.018 4.907 T =     9 
Paternalistic 
Unmarried 
Birthrate 
overall 0.371 0.067 0.172 0.55 N = 450 
between  0.062 0.185 0.515 n =   50 
within  0.026 0.310 0.425 T =     9 
Percent of 
Children in 
OOHC 
overall 1.110 0.381 0.099 2.187 N = 450 
between  0.357 0.544 1.989 n =   50 
within  0.141 0.176 1.482 T =     9 
CPS referrals 
(per 1,000 
children) 
overall 46.969 18.590 12.861 130.485 N = 450 
between  17.333 12.861 95.616 n =   50 
within  7.108 17.478 112.234 T =     9 
Resource  
Per Capita 
Personal 
Income 
overall 35526.82 6038.44 23131.07 56903.84 N = 450 
between  4982.24 27607.04 50518.23 n =   50 
within  3475.96 26652.88 43985.14 T =     9 
Federal 
portion of 
Expenditures 
overall 0.465 0.144 0 0.89 N = 450 
between  0.145 0.195 0.86 n =   50 
within  0.019 0.255 0.675 T =     9 
Adoption 
Incentive 
Funds 
overall 435169.2 1011761 0 9755040 N = 450 
between  657474.8 16186.67 3473084 n =   50 
within  774008.2 -2969915 6900760 T =     9 
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Appendix D:  Length of Stay Statistics, by state (FY 2010) 
Table D.1:  Length of Stay Statistics, by State (FY 2010) 
State Obs. Mean S.D. Median Min Max 
Alabama 8118 750.52 896.60 445.5 0 6562 
Alaska 2722 698.64 696.91 506 0 5570 
Arizona 17110 477.82 536.80 343 0 6479 
Arkansas 7481 442.55 607.42 241 0 6243 
California 91202 878.47 1180.09 452 0 7088 
Colorado 12865 595.88 817.72 325 0 7565 
Connecticut 7113 841.49 1047.03 496 0 6747 
Delaware 1194 707.82 784.92 463.5 0 5356 
District of Columbia 2833 1328.64 1370.57 875 0 7519 
Florida 33287 551.67 719.40 327 0 6574 
Georgia 13328 611.98 748.26 364 0 6478 
Hawaii 2463 595.97 743.69 359 0 6117 
Idaho 2797 469.94 564.77 281 0 5462 
Illinois 22492 1332.19 1417.51 878 0 7670 
Indiana 21150 507.83 572.73 337 0 6574 
Iowa 11036 534.26 642.78 346 0 6573 
Kansas 9149 607.17 670.91 405 0 5526 
Kentucky 12114 531.53 632.30 331 0 5961 
Louisiana 8092 582.47 722.97 357 0 6432 
Maine 2387 803.46 932.58 517 0 6377 
Maryland 9745 1146.40 1285.10 682 0 7033 
Massachusetts 14918 699.29 831.90 427 0 6528 
Michigan 25706 754.89 829.09 508 0 6937 
Minnesota 10721 491.25 750.63 224 0 6688 
Mississippi 5886 569.75 689.21 348 0 7172 
Missouri 14909 724.93 929.63 414 0 7604 
Montana 2614 782.72 959.49 467.5 0 6508 
Nebraska 8552 546.61 563.23 384 0 4980 
Nevada 7639 643.80 681.32 453 0 6573 
New Hampshire 1368 831.77 1094.07 455 1 7632 
New Jersey 12076 678.73 816.45 423 0 6561 
New Mexico 3716 487.07 570.20 345 0 6454 
New York 40023 968.11 1113.76 607 0 7664 
North Carolina 13607 677.84 743.98 454 0 7510 
North Dakota 1909 535.60 621.32 348 0 5478 
Ohio 20873 598.05 751.57 345 0 6449 
Oklahoma 13066 745.04 782.36 516 0 6269 
Oregon 13263 805.82 1014.86 457 0 7434 
Pennsylvania 26099 678.43 812.59 426 0 7469 
Rhode Island 3465 647.55 813.48 358 0 6515 
South Carolina 8288 655.78 827.14 372 0 6566 
South Dakota 2892 528.14 747.57 267.5 0 6139 
Tennessee 12774 409.95 461.02 260 0 5761 
Texas 42655 704.14 807.68 421 0 6574 
Utah 4928 521.23 652.41 316 0 5651 
Vermont 1579 701.41 722.54 514 0 5218 
Virginia 8570 804.32 876.97 544 0 6700 
Washington 16077 683.05 744.65 492 0 7088 
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Table D.1 (continued) 
West Virginia 7066 527.12 586.96 350.5 0 6392 
Wisconsin 11038 663.82 839.62 396 0 7338 
Wyoming 2008 428.22 576.58 259 0 6027 
Minimum  409.95  224  
Maximum 1332.19 878 
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Appendix E:  Discharge reasons, by state (FY 2010) 
Table E.1:  Discharge reasons, by state (FY 2010) 
State 
Total 
Served 
in 2010 
Number 
Discharged 
Percent 
Reunified 
Percent 
Adopted 
Percent 
Guardianship 
Percent 
Non-
Permanent  
Alabama 8,120 2,776 66% 19% 0% 14% 
Alaska 2,722 922 52% 37% 4% 7% 
Arizona 17,110 7,194 50% 28% 8% 13% 
Arkansas 7,481 3,971 74% 15% 3% 8% 
California 91,221 33,749 57% 18% 7% 18% 
Colorado 12,866 5,902 66% 15% 4% 15% 
Connecticut 7,114 2,674 45% 21% 9% 24% 
Delaware 1,194 455 45% 15% 18% 22% 
DC 2,834 773 48% 17% 9% 26% 
Florida 33,289 15,658 44% 22% 24% 10% 
Georgia 13,333 6,439 63% 18% 7% 11% 
Hawaii 2,463 1,258 64% 17% 7% 13% 
Idaho 2,797 1,341 61% 23% 7% 9% 
Illinois 22,525 4,801 47% 26% 7% 20% 
Indiana 21,159 8,893 61% 16% 10% 13% 
Iowa 11,036 4,522 66% 17% 6% 11% 
Kansas 9,152 3,174 54% 22% 8% 17% 
Kentucky 12,115 5,139 69% 15% 1% 17% 
Louisiana 8,101 3,690 74% 17% 1% 8% 
Maine 2,387 841 44% 33% 8% 16% 
Maryland 9,747 3,649 55% 20% 1% 23% 
Massachusetts 14,918 5,963 65% 12% 4% 18% 
Michigan 25,716 9,338 54% 28% 4% 15% 
Minnesota 10,747 5,711 66% 11% 9% 14% 
Mississippi 5,887 2,338 74% 15% 4% 6% 
Missouri 14,914 5,186 62% 22% 5% 12% 
Montana 2,614 894 61% 21% 4% 14% 
Nebraska 8,552 3,204 64% 13% 9% 14% 
Nevada 7,639 2,833 64% 23% 3% 11% 
New Hampshire 1,368 538 48% 30% 5% 17% 
New Jersey 12,121 4,916 61% 26% 5% 9% 
New Mexico 3,716 1,849 68% 23% 1% 8% 
New York 40,026 13,437 67% 16% 0% 16% 
North Carolina 13,607 4,795 47% 27% 13% 13% 
North Dakota 1,913 833 53% 15% 4% 29% 
Ohio 20,873 8,991 63% 15% 3% 19% 
Oklahoma 13,067 5,227 52% 30% 8% 11% 
Oregon 13,263 4,269 64% 18% 5% 13% 
Pennsylvania 26,101 10,759 56% 22% 9% 13% 
Rhode Island 3,466 1,395 64% 13% 7% 16% 
South Carolina 8,288 3,814 74% 14% 2% 10% 
South Dakota 2,892 1,407 61% 9% 6% 24% 
Tennessee 12,775 6,013 71% 15% 2% 12% 
Texas 42,656 13,732 51% 34% 2% 12% 
Utah 4,928 2,048 49% 27% 8% 15% 
Vermont 1,586 648 56% 24% 3% 17% 
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Table E.1 (continued) 
Virginia 8,578 3,317 47% 23% 0% 29% 
Washington 16,077 5,946 54% 27% 9% 10% 
West Virginia 7,068 2,982 67% 22% 5% 5% 
Wisconsin 11,042 4,473 62% 16% 9% 13% 
Wyoming 2,008 1,026 76% 7% 5% 12% 
Total 657,172 255,703 59% 21% 6% 14% 
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Appendix F:  Operationalization, Source and Summary Statistics for Child 
Outcome Analysis Explanatory Variables 
Table F.1:  Operationalization, Source and Summary Statistics for Child Outcome Analysis 
Exploratory Variables 
State-level Variables 
(1) Unemployment Rate – Measure: The percentage of adults in a state who are unemployed; 
Interpretation:  Higher numbers indicate a higher proportion of adults are without work; Source: 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2002-2010. (Range = 2.5 – 14.9; Mean = 5.82; S.D. = 2.05). 
(2) Poverty Rate – Measure: Percentage of the state population living in poverty; Interpretation:  Higher 
numbers indicate a higher proportion of citizens are living below the poverty level; Source:  U.S. 
Census Bureau, Housing and Household Economic Statistics Division. 2002-2010. (Range = 5.4-23.1; 
Mean = 12.44; S.D. = 3.25). 
(3) Urbaness – Measure: Percent of state population living in urban areas, as defined by the Census 
Bureau. Interpretation:  Higher numbers indicate a higher percentage of state residents live in urban 
areas; Source: 2013. U.S. Census Bureau. (Range = 38.66-100%; Mean = 80.39; S.D. = 12.24). 
(4) State Child Welfare System Administrative Structure – Measure: Type of administrative structure 
utilized by the state. Interpretation:  0: state-level; 1: mixed-level; 2: county-level; Source: 2010 Child 
Maltreatment Report. Department of Health and Human Service: Administration of Children and 
Families. (Range = 0-2; Mean = 0.39; S.D. = 0.77). 
(5) Child Welfare “flow” – Measure: Rate (per thousand) of children entering out-of-home placement. 
Interpretation:  Higher numbers indicate a higher rate of children in the state entering OOHC during 
the year. Source:  2005-2010. Department of Health and Human Service; Administration of Children 
and Families & U.S. Census Bureau. Range = 1.43-13.18; Mean = 4.50; S.D. = 1.80). 
Policy-level variables 
(6) Groups Approved to Adopt – Measure: Captures the number of groups explicitly approved in state 
statute as potential adoptive parents; Interpretation: Higher numbers indicate more groups explicitly 
approved to be adoptive parents; Source:  CWIG, 2010. (Range = 2-5; Mean = 2.628; S.D. = 0.834). 
(7) Restrictions on Adoptive Groups – Measure: Captures the number of restrictions in state statute 
regarding adoptive parent eligibility; Interpretation: Higher numbers indicate fewer restrictions on 
potential adoptive parents; Source: CWIG. (Range = 2-5; Mean = 4.30; S.D. = 0.71). 
(8) ASFA Compliance Rate – Measure: Percentage of children in OOHC >21 months who have a TPR 
in place, by state; Interpretation: Higher numbers indicate the state is more in compliance with the 
ASFA mandate regarding timing of TPR; Source:  AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY2010 v.1. (Range 
= 0.023-.707; Mean = 0.389; S.D. = 0.159). 
(9) Relative Preference for Placement – Measure: State preference for placing children in OOHC with 
relatives; Interpretation: 0: no relative preference in placement; 1: officials “may consider” relatives; 
2: explicit preference for relatives in placement; Source: CWIG. (Range = 0-2; Mean = 1.87; S.D. = 
0.40). 
(10) Kinship Care Established in Statute – Measure: Captures if a state has established a Kinship Care 
program through state statute; Interpretation: 0: not established in statute; 1: Kinship Care established 
in statute; Source: CWIG. (Range = 0-1; Mean = 0.302; S.D. = 0.459). 
(11) Generosity of Benefit – Measure: Average annual Title IV-E foster care maintenance payment per 
Title IV-E eligible foster child, by state; Interpretation: Higher numbers indicate a state spends more 
on maintenance payments for Title IV-E eligible foster children; Source:  Child Trends Child Welfare 
Finance Data. (Range = 0-21,873; Mean = 6,829; S.D. = 3,777). 
(12) Generosity of Expenditures – Measure: Average child welfare expenditures per child in the general 
population, by state; Interpretation:  Higher numbers indicate a state spends more on child welfare on 
average in relation to the child population; Source:  Child Trends Child Welfare Finance Data. (Range 
= 107-3,827; Mean = 466; S.D. = 337). 
(13) Generosity of Access – Measure: Placement in OOHC rate per substantiated victim of child abuse and 
neglect; Interpretation: Higher numbers indicate that a state places a higher portion of substantiated 
victims in OOHC; Source: Dept of Health and Human Services, Child Maltreatment Report 2010. 
(Range = 0.163-3.003; Mean = 0.592; S.D. = 0.617). 
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Table F.1 (continued) 
Family-level variables 
(14) Parental Substance Abuse – Measure:  As a condition associated with a child’s removal from home 
and contact with the foster care system, the principal caretaker’s compulsive use of alcohol or drugs 
that is not of a temporary nature; Interpretation: Coded for the presence of drug and/or alcohol abuse; 
Source:  AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY2010 v1. (Range = 0-1; Mean = 0.30; S.D. = 0.44). 
(15) Parents Incarcerated – Measure:  As a condition associated with a  child’s removal from home and 
contact with the foster care system, temporary or permanent placement of a parent or caretaker in jail 
that adversely affects care for the child; Interpretation: Coded for the presence of parental 
incarceration; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY2010 v1. (Range = 0-1; Mean = 0.06; S.D. = 
0.25). 
(16) Married Family Structure – Measure:  The type of adult caretaker (parents or others) from whom the 
child was removed for the current foster care episode; Interpretation: Indicates a family of origin with 
married parents; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY2010 v1. (Range = 0-1; Mean = 0.172; S.D. 
= 0.377). 
(17) Unmarried Family Structure – Measure:  The type of adult caretaker (parents or others) from whom 
the child was removed for the current foster care episode; Interpretation: Indicates a family of origin 
with two unmarried parents in the home; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY2010 v1. (Range = 
0-1; Mean = 0.162; S.D. = 0.369). 
(18) Single Mother Family Structure – Measure:  The type of adult caretaker (parents or others) from 
whom the child was removed for the current foster care episode; Interpretation: Indicates a single 
mother household of origin; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY2010 v1. (Range = 0-1; Mean = 
0.468; S.D. = 0.499). 
(19) Single Father Family Structure – Measure:  The type of adult caretaker (parents or others) from 
whom the child was removed for the current foster care episode; Interpretation: Indicates a single 
father household of origin; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY2010 v1. (Range = 0-1; Mean = 
0.049; S.D. = 0.215). 
Child-level variables 
(20) Child Age – Measure:  Continuous years; Interpretation: Higher numbers indicate a child was older at 
beginning of spell in out-of-home placement; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY2010 v1. 
(Range = 0-18; Mean = 7.5; S.D. = 5.7). 
(21) Gender - Measure:  Child sex; Interpretation: Coded to indicate a male child; Source: AFCARS 
Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range = 0-1; Mean = 0.52; S.D. = 0.50). 
(22) Caucasian child - Measure:  Only racial category indicated for child was white; Interpretation: 
Indicates a white child; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range = 0-1; Mean = 
0.42; S.D. = 0.49). 
(23) Black / African American child - Measure:  Only racial category indicated for child was Black / 
African American; Interpretation:  Indicates an African American child; Source: AFCARS Foster 
Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range =0-1; Mean = 0.28; S.D. = 0.45). 
(24) American Indian / Alaskan Native child - Measure:  Only racial category indicated for child was 
American Indian / Alaskan Native; Interpretation:  Indicates a child of American Indian / Alaskan 
Native descent; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range = 0-1; Mean = 0.02; S.D. 
= 0.14). 
(25) Asian child - Measure:  Only racial category indicated for child was Asian; Interpretation: Indicates 
an Asian child; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range = 0-1; Mean = 0.007; S.D. 
= 0.08). 
(26) Hawaiian / Pacific Islander child - Measure:  Only racial category indicated for child was Hawaiian / 
Pacific Islander; Interpretation:  Indicates a child of Hawaiian / Pacific Island descent; Source: 
AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range = 0-1; Mean = 0.002; S.D. = 0.05). 
(27) Hispanic child - Measure: Only racial category indicated for child was Hispanic; Interpretation:  
Indicates a child of Hispanic descent; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range = 0-
1; Mean = 0.06; S.D. = 0.25). 
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Table F.1 (continued) 
(28) Multi-racial child - Measure:  Child had more than one racial category indicated; Interpretation:  
Child is of multi-racial descent; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range = 0-1; 
Mean = 0.19; S.D. = 0.39). 
(29) High Utilization County - Measure:  The FIPS Code for the County which has responsibility for the 
case; Interpretation:  Coded to indicate the child is placed in a county which has 1,000 or more out-of-
home cases identified during that fiscal year; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. 
(Range = 0-1; Mean = 0.49 S.D. = 0.50). 
(30) Diagnosed Disability - Measure:  If a qualified professional has clinically diagnose the child as 
having at least one disabilities (mental retardation, vision/hearing impaired, physical disability, 
emotional disability, other disability) listed below; Interpretation:  Indication of at least one disability 
category being present ; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range = 0-1; Mean = 
0.27; S.D. = 0.44). 
(31) Mental Retardation - Measure:  Significantly sub-average general cognitive and motor functioning 
existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior manifested during he developmental period 
that adversely affect a child’s/youth’s socialization and learning; Interpretation:  Indication of a child 
having mental retardation; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range = 0.019; Mean 
= 0.138; S.D. = 0.138). 
(32) Visual / Hearing Impaired - Measure:  Having a visual impairment that may significantly affect 
educational performance or development; or a hearing impairment, whether permanent or fluctuating 
that adversely affects educational performance; Interpretation:  Indication of a child with vision or 
hearing impairment; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range =0-1; Mean = 0.026; 
S.D. = 0.161). 
(33) Physical Disability - Measure:  A physical condition that adversely affects the child’s day to day 
motor functioning, such as cerebral palsy, spina bifida, multiple sclerosis, orthopedic impairments, and 
other physical disabilities; Interpretation: Indication that child has a physical disability; Source: 
AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range =0-1; Mean = 0.012; S.D. = 0.109). 
(34) Emotional Disturbance - Measure:  A condition exhibiting one or more of the following 
characteristics over a long period of time and to a marked degree: An inability to build or maintain 
satisfactory interpersonal relationships; inappropriate type of behavior or feelings under normal 
circumstances; a general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression, or a tendency to develop; or a 
tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal problems. The term includes 
persons who are socially maladjusted, unless it is determined that Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders Third Edition (DSM-III) or the most recent edition. Interpretation: Indicates a child 
with emotional disturbance; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range =0-1; Mean = 
0.156; S.D. = 0.363). 
(35) Other Medical Condition - Measure:   Conditions other than those noted previously which require 
special medical care such as chronic illnesses; Interpretation: Indicates child has a medical condition 
which needs special medical training on the part of parents; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 
2010 v1. (Range =0-1; Mean = 0.136; S.D. = 0.343). 
(36) Total number of disabilities - Measure: Total number of disability conditions indicated; 
Interpretation:  High numbers indicate a higher level of special needs on the part of the child; Source: 
AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range = 0-5; Mean = 0.366; S.D. = 0.662). 
(37) Voluntary removal from home - Measure:  For the current placement episode an official voluntary 
placement agreement has been executed between the caretaker and the agency; Interpretation:  
Indicates child has been voluntarily placed in OOHC; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 
v1. (Range = 0-1; Mean = 0.045; S.D. = 0.208). 
(38) Court-ordered removal from home - Measure:  For the current placement episode the court has 
issued an order which is the basis of the child’s removal; Interpretation:  Indicates child was removed 
from home based on court intervention; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range = 
0-1; Mean = 0.995; S.D. = 0.208). 
(39) Total number of removals from home - Measure:  The number of times the child was removed from 
home, including the current removal; Interpretation:  Higher numbers indicate a more extensive 
history of contact with the child welfare system; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. 
(Range = 1-10; Mean = 1.286; S.D. = 0.640). 
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Table F.1 (continued) 
(40) Removed for Physical Abuse - Measure:  As a condition with a child’s removal from home and 
contact with the foster care system, alleged or substantiated physical abuse, injury or maltreatment of 
the child by a person responsible for the child’s welfare; Interpretation:  Indicates if a child was 
removed for physical abuse; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range = 0-1; Mean 
0.157= ; S.D. = 0.364). 
(41) Removed for Sexual Abuse - Measure:  As a condition associated with a child’s removal from home 
and contact with the foster care system,, alleged or substantiated sexual abuse or exploitation of a child 
by a person who is responsible for the child’s welfare; Interpretation:  Indicates if a child was removed 
for sexual abuse; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range = 0-1; Mean = 0.052; 
S.D. = 0.222). 
(42) Removed for Neglect - Measure:  As a condition associated with a child’s removal from home and 
contact with the foster care system, alleged or substantiated negligent treatment or maltreatment, 
including failure to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter or care; Interpretation:  Indicates if a child 
was removed due to neglect; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range = 0-1; Mean 
= 0.561; S.D. = 0.496). 
(43) Removed for Child behavior only - Measure:  As a condition associated with a child’s removal from 
home and contact with the foster care system, the child’s compulsive use of or need for 
alcohol/narcotics; a clinical diagnosis by a qualified professional of a disability which led to the child’s 
removal; child behavior in the school and/or community that adversely affects socialization, learning, 
growth and moral development; Interpretation:  Indicates child was removed solely due to an issue 
with child behavior; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range =0-1; Mean = 0.082; 
S.D. = 0.274). 
(44) Removed for Parent issue only - Measure:  Includes cases in which, as a condition associated with a 
child’s removal from home and contact with the foster care system, one of the following criteria was 
met: compulsive use of alcohol/drugs by the caretaker; family stress or inability to care for child due to 
death of a parent or caretaker; temporary or permanent placement of a parent or caretaker in jail that 
adversely affects care for the child; physical or emotional illness or disabling condition adversely 
affecting the caretaker’s ability to care for the child; child has been abandoned by caretaker; parents 
have relinquished physical and legal custody of the child to the agency; or housing facilities were 
substandard, overcrowded, unsafe or otherwise inadequate resulting in their not being appropriate for 
the parents and child to reside together, including homelessness; Interpretation:  indicates child was 
removed solely due to an issue with their parents; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. 
(Range = 0-1; Mean = 0.191; S.D. = 0.393). 
(45) Number of reasons for removal - Measure:  The number of reasons indicated which contributed to 
the child being removed from home; Interpretation:  Higher numbers indicate more reasons 
contributed to the placement in OOHC; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range = 
0-15; Mean = 1.68; S.D. = 1.17). 
(46) Number of placements during current foster care stay- Measure:  The number of places the child 
has lived, including the current setting, during the current removal episode; Interpretation:  Higher 
numbers indicate the child has experienced more placement instability during the removal episode; 
Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range = 1-30; Mean = 2.96; S.D. = 3.28). 
(47) Placed in Non-relative foster care - Measure:  A licensed foster family home regarded by the stat as 
a foster care living arrangement; Interpretation:  Indicates child is currently living in a non-relative 
foster home; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range = 0-1; Mean = 0.397; S.D. = 
0.489). 
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Table F.1 (continued) 
(48) Placed in relative foster care - Measure:  A licensed or unlicensed home of the chi’s relatives 
regarded by the state as a foster care living arrangement for the child; Interpretation:  Indicates child is 
currently living in a foster home with relatives; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. 
(Range = 0-1; Mean = 0.232; S.D. = 0.422). 
(49) Placed at home - Measure:  Child is placed in a home-like setting. Either a home in which the family 
intends to adopt the child, who may or may not be receiving a foster care payment or an adoption 
subsidy on behalf of the child or the child has been returned to the principal caretaker for a limited and 
specified period of time under state agency supervision; Interpretation:  Indicates child is living in a 
permanent placement prior to the finalization of discharge; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 
2010 v1. (Range = 0-1; Mean = 0.193; S.D. = 0.395). 
(50) Placed in congregate care - Measure:  Child is placed in a congregate setting: A licensed or approved 
home providing 24-hour care for children in a small group setting that generally has from seven to 
twelve children or a child care facility operated by a public or private agency and providing 24-hour 
care and/or treatment for children who require separation from their own homes and group living 
experiences; Interpretation:  Indicates child is living in a group home or institution; Source: AFCARS 
Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range = 0-1; Mean = 0.140; S.D. = 0.347). 
(51) Placed in an independent living program - Measure:  An alternative traditional living arrangement 
where the child is under the supervision of the agency but without 24-hour adult supervision, is 
receiving financial support from the child welfare agency, and is in a setting which provides the 
opportunity for increased responsibility for self-care; Interpretation:  Indicates child is placed in a 
supervised independent living program; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset FY 2010 v1. (Range = 
0-1; Mean = 0.013; S.D. = 0.112). 
(52) Child missing from current placement - Measure:  The child has run away from the foster care 
setting; Interpretation:  Indicates the child has gone AWOL; Source: AFCARS Foster Care Dataset 
FY 2010 v1. (Range = 0-1; Mean = 0.017; S.D. = 0.130). 
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Appendix G: Full regression analysis results - Impact on child Length of Stay (in 
days), FY 2010 
Table G.1:  Full Regression Analysis Results – Impact on Child Length of Stay (in days), 
FY 2010 
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Error 
Policy-level factors 
Groups approved to adopt 9.025 1.260 ** 
Restrictions on who can adopt 35.236 1.381 ** 
ASFA compliance rate -95.335 8.682 ** 
Relative preference in placement 4.219 2.563  
Kinship Care designated in statute -30.337 2.510 ** 
IVE maintenance payment per IVE child 0.020 0.000 ** 
CW expenditure per child in population 0.013 0.006 * 
Placement rate per substantiated victim -39.854 1.790 ** 
State-level factors 
Unemployment 26.061 0.635 ** 
Poverty Rate -12.893 0.479 ** 
Percent Urban -1.267 0.104 ** 
CW administrative structure 20.378 1.521 ** 
CW "flow" -29.823 0.667 ** 
Family-level factors 
Parental Substance Abuse -27.489 2.425 ** 
Parental Incarceration -21.584 3.339 ** 
Unmarried birth family -92.807 2.770 ** 
Single mother home -80.128 2.316 ** 
Single father home -66.767 4.038 ** 
Child-level factors 
Age at placement -26.531 0.219 ** 
African American child 143.594 2.543 ** 
American Indian/Alaskan Native child 126.638 6.534 ** 
Asian child 27.039 11.494 * 
Hawaiian / Pacific Islander child -5.245 17.069  
Hispanic child -15.995 4.784 * 
Multiracial child 7.364 2.284 * 
High utilization county 74.971 2.072 ** 
Male child 33.193 1.823 ** 
Documented disability 5.933 6.787  
Mental Retardation 244.688 36.160 ** 
Vision or hearing impaired -114.043 35.326 * 
Physical disability 36.134 37.144  
Emotionally disturbed -9.270 34.891  
Other medical condition -129.840 34.859 ** 
Total number of disabilities 236.089 34.317 ** 
Total number of removals from home 3.688 1.516 * 
Total number of placements 135.320 0.528 ** 
Voluntary placement 9.753 4.615 * 
Physical abuse -21.425 3.224 ** 
Sexual abuse 85.554 4.415 ** 
Neglect 17.705 3.544 ** 
Removed because of child issue -24.399 4.524 ** 
Removed because of parent issue 71.158 4.020 ** 
Number of removal reasons 6.321 1.282 ** 
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Placed in non-relative foster care -70.749 2.324 ** 
Placed in home setting 47.734 2.216 ** 
Placed in congregate care -25.065 3.806 ** 
Placed in independent living 627.777 14.215 ** 
Runaway child 30.864 8.991 * 
_cons 290.167 15.436 ** 
N = 576,795; F-test:  F(53,576741) = 2603.8; Prob > F <0.0001 
Significance levels: ** <0.001; * <0.05 
Analysis controls for family and child level factors in addition to child state of residence.  
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Appendix H:  Full Hazard Model Results for Permanency and Specific Discharge Outcomes, FY 2010 
Table H.1:  Full Hazard Model Results for Permanency and Specific Discharge Outcomes, FY 2010 
_t 
General 
Permanency Model 
Specific Discharge Outcomes  
Reunification 
Model 
Adoption Model Guardianship Model 
Non-Permanency 
Model  
HR Std. Error HR Std. Error HR Std. Error HR Std. Error HR Std. Error 
Policy-level variables 
More groups approved to adopt 1.017 0.003 ** 1.028 0.004 ** 1.035 0.007 ** 0.845 0.011 ** 0.984 0.008 *  
Fewer restrictions on who can adopt 0.823 0.003 ** 0.810 0.004 ** 0.864 0.007 ** 0.782 0.012 ** 0.792 0.008 ** 
ASFA compliance rate 0.907 0.021 ** 0.787 0.023 ** 1.731 0.080 ** 1.323 0.119 * 3.838 0.234 ** 
Relative preference in placement 0.875 0.006 ** 0.888 0.007 ** 0.918 0.014 ** 0.843 0.021 ** 0.853 0.014 ** 
Kinship Care designated in statute 1.074 0.007 ** 1.060 0.008 ** 1.016 0.013   0.948 0.023 * 1.393 0.024 ** 
IVE maintenance payment per IVE 
child (in $1000 increments) 
0.959 0.001 ** 0.975 0.001 ** 0.963 0.002 ** 0.799 0.003 ** 0.986 0.003 ** 
CW expenditure per child in 
population (in $100 increments) 
0.989 0.001 ** 0.982 0.002 ** 0.986 0.002 ** 1.059 0.005 ** 0.977 0.003 ** 
Placement rate per substantiated 
victim 
1.169 0.006 ** 1.131 0.007 ** 1.374 0.013 ** 1.184 0.020 ** 0.957 0.011  ** 
State-level factors 
Unemployment 0.957 0.002 ** 0.952 0.002 ** 0.973 0.003 **  0.892 0.006 ** 0.927 0.004 ** 
Poverty Rate 1.042 0.001 ** 1.051 0.002 ** 1.011 0.003 ** 1.051 0.005 ** 1.010 0.003 * 
Percent Urban 1.006 0.000 ** 1.002 0.000 ** 1.008 0.001 ** 1.018 0.001 ** 1.011 0.001 ** 
CW administrative structure 1.030 0.004 ** 1.044 0.005 ** 0.920 0.007 ** 1.106 0.016 ** 1.219 0.011 ** 
CW "flow" 1.073 0.002 ** 1.078 0.002 ** 1.057 0.004 ** 1.145 0.008 ** 1.102 0.005 ** 
Family-level factors 
 
Parental Substance Abuse 1.082 0.007 ** 1.036 0.009 ** 1.162 0.014 ** 1.331 0.029 ** 0.837 0.016 ** 
Parental Incarceration 1.176 0.011 ** 1.348 0.016 ** 0.835 0.016 ** 1.212 0.036 ** 0.996 0.028   
Unmarried birth family 1.142 0.008 ** 1.152 0.011 ** 1.313 0.019 ** 1.070 0.029 * 0.933 0.021 *  
Single mother home 1.147 0.006 ** 1.120 0.007 ** 1.323 0.015 ** 1.179 0.023 ** 1.053 0.013 ** 
Single father home 1.133 0.013 ** 1.091 0.015 ** 1.310 0.035 ** 1.197 0.045 ** 1.048 0.024 * 
Child-level factors 
Age at placement 1.028 0.001 ** 1.056 0.001 ** 0.922 0.001 ** 1.066 0.002 ** 1.495 0.004 ** 
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Table H.1 (continued) 
African American child 0.874 0.005 ** 0.920 0.007 ** 0.582 0.007 ** 0.843 0.018 ** 0.983 0.014  
American Indian/Alaskan Native 
child 
0.724 0.013 ** 0.774 0.017 ** 0.463 0.018 ** 0.764 0.038 ** 1.539 0.056 ** 
Asian child 1.103 0.030 ** 1.181 0.037 ** 0.783 0.054 ** 1.025 0.098   1.065 0.068   
Hawaiian / Pacific Islander child 1.317 0.060 ** 1.547 0.080 ** 0.722 0.077 *  0.577 0.121 *  1.161 0.146   
Hispanic child 0.990 0.011  1.070 0.014 ** 0.806 0.019 ** 0.782 0.031 ** 1.153 0.030 ** 
Multiracial child 0.966 0.006 ** 0.987 0.008   0.906 0.012 ** 0.817 0.020 ** 0.938 0.017 ** 
High utilization county 0.858 0.005 ** 0.880 0.006 ** 0.833 0.009 ** 0.665 0.013 ** 0.901 0.012 ** 
Male child 0.977 0.005 ** 0.994 0.006   0.940 0.009 ** 0.966 0.016 * 0.944 0.011 ** 
Documented disability 0.901 0.013 ** 0.777 0.015 ** 1.281 0.031 ** 0.842 0.043 * 0.899 0.023 ** 
Mental Retardation 0.482 0.027 ** 0.519 0.039 ** 0.377 0.033 ** 0.567 0.114  * 0.958 0.126   
Vision or hearing impaired 0.855 0.046  * 0.875 0.064   0.823 0.070 *  0.806 0.158   0.967 0.129   
Physical disability 0.713 0.040 ** 0.729 0.056 ** 0.442 0.039 ** 0.545 0.112  * 1.027 0.140   
Emotionally disturbed 0.725 0.038 ** 0.902 0.064   0.470 0.039 ** 0.569 0.110  * 0.905 0.118   
Other medical condition 0.829 0.043 ** 0.948 0.067   0.557 0.046 ** 0.566 0.109  * 1.105 0.144   
Total number of disabilities 1.023 0.052   0.897 0.061   1.298 0.104 * 1.292 0.242   0.983 0.127   
Total number of removals from 
home 
0.915 0.004 ** 0.879 0.004 ** 1.037 0.010 ** 1.062 0.013 ** 1.002 0.007   
Total number of placements 0.754 0.001 ** 0.705 0.001 ** 0.818 0.002 ** 0.765 0.004 ** 0.972 0.001 ** 
Voluntary placement 1.339 0.015 ** 1.469 0.019 ** 1.187 0.030 ** 1.062 0.044  1.150 0.026 ** 
Physical abuse 1.148 0.010 ** 1.301 0.013 ** 0.968 0.017  0.800 0.027 ** 0.968 0.019   
Sexual abuse 0.906 0.011 ** 0.925 0.013 ** 0.964 0.024  0.721 0.033 ** 0.847 0.020 ** 
Neglect 0.935 0.008 ** 0.962 0.010 ** 1.105 0.022 ** 0.695 0.024 ** 0.977 0.018   
Removed because of child issue 1.143 0.014 ** 1.079 0.015 ** 0.439 0.025 ** 0.471 0.030 ** 1.136 0.024 ** 
Removed because of parent issue 0.860 0.009 ** 0.766 0.009 ** 1.208 0.026 ** 0.786 0.028 ** 1.050 0.022 * 
Number of removal reasons 0.935 0.003 ** 0.877 0.004 ** 1.055 0.006 ** 0.935 0.011 ** 1.022 0.007 * 
Placed in non-relative foster care 1.501 0.010 ** 1.214 0.010 ** 1.172 0.023 ** 5.367 0.109 ** 0.931 0.020 * 
Placed in home setting 2.865 0.017 ** 2.108 0.015 ** 9.194 0.121 ** 0.293 0.013 ** 0.353 0.012 ** 
Placed in congregate care 1.252 0.012 ** 1.359 0.015 ** 0.033 0.005 ** 0.306 0.019 ** 1.107 0.017 ** 
Placed in independent living 0.152 0.009 ** 0.197 0.013 ** 0.019 0.007 ** 0.088 0.023 ** 1.481 0.031 ** 
Runaway child 0.368 0.014 ** 0.398 0.016 ** 0.011 0.008 ** 0.132 0.030 ** 2.028 0.041 ** 
/ln_p -0.054 0.002 ** -0.301 0.002 ** 0.746 0.003 ** 0.295 0.006 ** 0.669 0.004 ** 
p 0.947 0.002   
  
0.740 0.002   
  
2.109 0.006   
  
1.343 0.007   
  
1.952 0.008   
  1/p 1.056 0.002 1.351 0.003 0.474 0.001 0.744 0.004 0.512 0.002 
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Table H.1 (continued) 
LR chi2(52) 172810 ** 117201 ** 122361 ** 38919 ** 75812 ** 
** <0.001; *<0.05 
Results have controlled for state, race unknown, sex unknown, disability missing, removal reason unknown, removal type unknown, missing from placement  
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Appendix I:  Marginal Effects of Explanatory Variables on Predicted Time to Permanency & Specific Discharge Outcome 
Table I.1:  Marginal Effects of Explanatory Variables on Predicted Time to Permanency & Specific Discharge Outcomes 
_t 
General 
Permanency Model 
Specific Discharge Outcomes 
Mean Reunification Adoption Guardianship 
Non-Permanent 
Outcome 
ey/ex Std. Err ey/ex Std. Err. ey/ex Std. Err ey/ex Std. Err. ey/ex Std. Err 
Policy-level factors 
More groups approved to 
adopt 
-0.046 0.009 ** -0.094 0.014 ** -0.042 0.008 ** 0.318 0.025 ** 0.021 0.010 * 2.542 
Fewer restrictions on who can 
adopt 
0.878 0.018 ** 1.217 0.028 ** 0.296 0.016 ** 0.782 0.048 ** 0.508 0.023 ** 4.263 
ASFA compliance rate 0.041 0.010 ** 0.128 0.015 ** -0.103 0.009 ** -0.083 0.027 * -0.273 0.012 ** 0.3965 
Relative preference in 
placement 
0.262 0.013 ** 0.300 0.020 ** 0.075 0.013 ** 0.237 0.034 ** 0.152 0.016 ** 1.866 
Kinship Care designated in 
statute 
-0.024 0.002 ** -0.025 0.003 ** -0.002 0.002  0.013 0.006 * -0.054 0.003 ** 0.316 
IVE payment per IVE child 0.283 0.007 ** 0.218 0.011 ** 0.114 0.006 ** 1.061 0.021 ** 0.046 0.009 ** 6341.8 
CW expend per child in pop 0.049 0.006 ** 0.105 0.009 ** 0.029 0.005 ** -0.183 0.015 ** 0.051 0.006 ** 428.20 
Placement rate per 
substantiated victim 
-0.100 0.003 ** -0.101 0.005 ** -0.091 0.003 ** -0.076 0.008 ** 0.014 0.004 ** 0.607 
State-level factors 
Unemployment 0.456 0.018 ** 0.652 0.029 ** 0.127 0.016 ** 0.828 0.051 ** 0.378 0.023 ** 9.768 
Poverty Rate -0.648 0.020 ** -1.006 0.031 ** -0.079 0.018 ** -0.558 0.054 ** -0.076 0.024 * 15.063 
Percent Urban -0.462 0.024 ** -0.240 0.038 ** -0.299 0.022 ** -1.078 0.066 ** -0.456 0.031 ** 254.14 
CW administrative structure -0.021 0.003 ** -0.040 0.004 ** 0.027 0.002 ** -0.051 0.007 ** -0.069 0.003 ** 0.684 
CW "flow" -0.281 0.007 ** -0.387 0.011 ** -0.099 0.007 ** -0.384 0.019 ** -0.189 0.009 ** 3.805 
Family-level factors 
Parental Substance Abuse -0.023 0.002 ** -0.013 0.003 ** -0.019 0.002 ** -0.058 0.004 ** 0.025 0.003 ** 0.272 
Parental Incarceration -0.012 0.001 ** -0.028 0.001 ** 0.006 0.001 ** -0.010 0.002 ** 0.000 0.001  0.069 
Unmarried birth family -0.023 0.001 ** -0.031 0.002 ** -0.021 0.001 ** -0.008 0.003 ** 0.006 0.002 * 0.163 
Single mother home -0.068 0.003 ** -0.071 0.004 ** -0.062 0.003 ** -0.057 0.007 ** -0.012 0.003 ** 0.467 
Single father home -0.006 0.001 ** -0.006 0.001 ** -0.006 0.001 ** -0.007 0.001 ** -0.001 0.001 * 0.049 
Child-level factors 
Age at placement -0.222 0.004 ** -0.548 0.006 ** 0.290 0.005 ** -0.356 0.010 ** -1.544 0.009 ** 7.505 
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Table I.1 (continued) 
African American 0.040 0.002 ** 0.032 0.003 ** 0.072 0.002 ** 0.036 0.004 ** 0.002 0.002  0.281 
American Indian/Alaskan 
Native 
0.007 0.000 ** 0.007 0.001 ** 0.007 0.000 ** 0.004 0.001 ** -0.004 0.000 ** 0.020 
Asian  -0.001 0.000 ** -0.001 0.000 ** 0.001 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.007 
Hawaiian / Pacific Islander -0.001 0.000 ** -0.001 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 * 0.001 0.000 * 0.000 0.000  0.002 
Hispanic 0.001 0.001  -0.006 0.001 ** 0.007 0.001 ** 0.013 0.002 ** -0.005 0.001 ** 0.069 
Multiracial 0.006 0.001 ** 0.003 0.002  0.008 0.001 ** 0.026 0.003 ** 0.006 0.002 ** 0.176 
High utilization county 0.075 0.003 ** 0.080 0.004 ** 0.040 0.002 ** 0.141 0.007 ** 0.025 0.003 ** 0.464 
Male child 0.013 0.003 ** 0.004 0.004  0.015 0.002 ** 0.013 0.006 * 0.015 0.003 ** 0.523 
Documented disability 0.030 0.004 ** 0.093 0.007 ** -0.032 0.003 ** 0.035 0.010 * 0.015 0.004 ** 0.274 
Mental Retardation 0.015 0.001 ** 0.018 0.002 ** 0.009 0.001 ** 0.008 0.003 * 0.000 0.001  0.020 
Vision or hearing impaired 0.005 0.002 * 0.005 0.003  0.003 0.001 * 0.005 0.004  0.000 0.002  0.029 
Physical disability 0.004 0.001 ** 0.005 0.001 ** 0.005 0.001 ** 0.006 0.002 * 0.000 0.001  0.012 
Emotionally disturbed 0.053 0.009 ** 0.022 0.015  0.056 0.006 ** 0.065 0.022 * 0.008 0.010  0.155 
Other medical condition 0.027 0.008 ** 0.010 0.013  0.038 0.005 ** 0.058 0.020 * -0.007 0.009  0.137 
Total number of disabilities -0.008 0.019  0.052 0.033  -0.044 0.013 * -0.068 0.049  0.003 0.023  0.355 
Total number of removals  0.120 0.006 ** 0.224 0.009 ** -0.022 0.006 ** -0.057 0.012 ** -0.001 0.004  1.286 
Total number of placements 0.902 0.005 ** 1.428 0.008 ** 0.288 0.003 ** 0.604 0.011 ** 0.044 0.002 ** 3.026 
Voluntary placement -0.014 0.001 ** -0.023 0.001 ** -0.004 0.001 ** -0.002 0.001  -0.003 0.001 ** 0.045 
Physical abuse -0.022 0.001 ** -0.053 0.002 ** 0.002 0.001  0.025 0.004 ** 0.002 0.002  0.149 
Sexual abuse 0.005 0.001 ** 0.006 0.001 ** 0.001 0.001  0.013 0.002 ** 0.004 0.001 ** 0.052 
Neglect 0.040 0.005 ** 0.029 0.008 ** -0.027 0.005 ** 0.152 0.014 ** 0.007 0.005  0.562 
Removed due to child issue -0.012 0.001 ** -0.009 0.002 ** 0.033 0.002 ** 0.048 0.004 ** -0.006 0.001 ** 0.085 
Removed due to parent issue 0.033 0.002 ** 0.074 0.003 ** -0.018 0.002 ** 0.037 0.005 ** -0.005 0.002 * 0.207 
Number of removal reasons 0.121 0.006 ** 0.303 0.010 ** -0.044 0.005 ** 0.085 0.015 ** -0.019 0.006 * 1.709 
Placed in non-relative foster 
care 
-0.101 0.002 ** -0.061 0.003 ** -0.018 0.002 ** -0.294 0.004 ** 0.009 0.003 * 0.235 
Placed in home setting -0.216 0.001 ** -0.196 0.002 ** -0.204 0.001 ** 0.177 0.007 ** 0.103 0.003 ** 0.194 
Placed in congregate care -0.033 0.001 ** -0.057 0.002 ** 0.223 0.009 ** 0.122 0.006 ** -0.007 0.001 ** 0.138 
Placed in independent living 0.027 0.001 ** 0.030 0.001 ** 0.025 0.002 ** 0.024 0.003 ** -0.003 0.000 ** 0.014 
Runaway child 0.018 0.001 ** 0.021 0.001 ** 0.037 0.006 ** 0.026 0.003 ** -0.006 0.000 ** 0.017 
y = predicted median _t  
in days (years) 
1581.89 
(4.33) 
3532.27 
(9.67) 
4771.36 
(13.08) 
13836.5 
(38.13) 
7470.44 
(20.52) 
 
** <0.001; *<0.05 
Results have controlled for state, race unknown, sex unknown, disability missing, removal reason unknown, removal type unknown, missing from placement 
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Appendix J:  Speed of Discharge to Various Outcomes, Ranked by State 
Table J.1:  Speed of Discharge to Various Outcomes, Ranked by State 
 Permanency  Reunification Adopt Guardianship Non-permanent  F
a
stest
 
Wyoming * Wyoming * Washington * Wyoming * Arizona * 
F
a
stest 
South Dakota * New York * Idaho * Idaho * North Dakota * 
New Jersey * South Dakota * New Mexico * South Dakota * Minnesota * 
Idaho * New Jersey * Alaska * New Hampshire Kentucky * 
New York * Idaho * Nevada * Oregon Tennessee * 
North Dakota North Dakota Montana * New Jersey Wyoming * 
Tennessee Virginia South Dakota * Alabama Colorado * 
Iowa Alabama New Jersey * Indiana Idaho * 
Virginia Tennessee Indiana * Iowa * Delaware * 
Oregon South Carolina Oklahoma * Ohio * Ohio * 
Montana Oregon North Carolina * Pennsylvania * South Dakota * 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Alabama Montana Texas * Delaware Wisconsin *   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Ohio Georgia Tennessee * Minnesota * Connecticut * 
Georgia Iowa Kansas * Montana * Virginia * 
Pennsylvania Ohio Louisiana * Florida * Mississippi * 
South Carolina Delaware Kentucky * Georgia * Nebraska * 
New Hampshire Mississippi Maine * Washington * Vermont * 
Indiana Kentucky Arkansas * Alaska * West Virginia * 
Connecticut Alaska Hawaii * Arkansas * Arkansas * 
Alaska North Carolina Ohio * Virginia * New Hampshire * 
West Virginia Pennsylvania Mississippi * Kentucky * Hawaii * 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Kentucky * West Virginia Iowa * Wisconsin * Rhode Island *   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Delaware Indiana New Hampshire Tennessee * Florida * 
North Carolina * Colorado * Florida North Carolina * Kansas * 
Washington * Louisiana South Carolina Colorado * Utah * 
Mississippi * New Hampshire Georgia Connecticut * Georgia * 
Louisiana * Washington * Arizona South Carolina * Indiana * 
Colorado * Vermont Delaware Arizona * Pennsylvania * 
Arizona * Michigan Connecticut Nebraska * Louisiana * 
California * Arkansas * Wisconsin Hawaii * South Carolina * 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Nebraska * Connecticut Alabama Nevada * California *   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Michigan * Arizona * Oregon Mississippi * Alabama 
Arkansas * Nebraska * Michigan California * Iowa 
Wisconsin * California * Wyoming Michigan * Oregon 
Texas * Maryland Utah * Oklahoma * Montana 
Rhode Island Hawaii Pennsylvania * New Mexico * Oklahoma * 
Hawaii * Massachusetts * Virginia * Utah * Nevada * 
Nevada * Texas * West Virginia * Louisiana * Texas * 
Vermont Rhode Island Massachusetts * Kansas * New Mexico * 
Minnesota * Wisconsin * California * Missouri * North Carolina * 
S
lo
w
est  
Oklahoma * Oklahoma * North Dakota * North Dakota * New Jersey * 
S
lo
w
est   
Massachusetts * Florida * Missouri * Rhode Island * Massachusetts * 
Maryland * Nevada Vermont * DC * Michigan * 
New Mexico Minnesota * Minnesota * West Virginia * New York * 
Florida * New Mexico Maryland * Texas * Maine * 
Utah * Utah * Nebraska * Maine * Missouri * 
DC * DC Rhode Island * Massachusetts * DC * 
Maine * Maine * New York * Vermont * Washington * 
Missouri * Kansas * Colorado * New York * Maryland * 
Kansas * Missouri * Illinois * Maryland * Alaska * 
Illinois * Illinois * DC * Illinois * Illinois * 
* indicates the state discharges to outcome significantly faster/slower than predicted based on explanatory variables in hazard model.  
~ The horizontal bar in each column is zero. States above the bar are taking less time to reach the outcomes, whereas states below the 
bar are taking longer.  
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Appendix K:  Significant Predictors of Child Discharge Outcomes 
Table K.1:  Significant Predictors of Child Discharge Outcomes 
Permanency 
Increased Likelihood Decreased Likelihood 
Policy 
 Groups approved to adopt 
 Kinship care in statute 
 Placement rate per victim 
State 
 Decentralized CW administrative 
structure 
 Poverty rate 
 Percent urban 
 CW flow 
Family 
 Parental substance abuse 
 Parental incarceration 
 Unmarried parents 
 Single mother 
 Single father 
Child 
 Age at removal 
 Asian child 
 Hawaiian/Pacific islander child 
 Voluntary placement 
 Physical abuse 
 Removal because of child issue 
 Relative FC 
 Home placement 
 Congregate care 
Policy 
 Adoption restrictions 
 ASFA compliance 
 Relative preference in statute 
 Payment generosity 
 Expenditure generosity 
State 
 Unemployment 
Child 
 Black child 
 American Indian/Alaskan Native child 
 Multiracial 
 High utilization county 
 Male 
 Disability 
 Mental retardation 
 Physical disability 
 Emotional disability 
 Other medical disability 
 Total number of removals 
 Number of placements 
 Sexual abuse 
 Neglect 
 Removed because of parent issue 
 Number or removal reasons 
 IL 
 AWOL 
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Table K.1 (continued) 
Reunified 
Increased Likelihood Decreased Likelihood 
Policy 
 Groups approved to adopt 
 Kinship care in statute 
 Generosity of access 
State 
 Decentralized CW administrative 
structure 
 Poverty rate 
 % urban 
 CW flow 
Family 
 Parental substance abuse 
 Parental incarceration 
 Unmarried parents 
 Single mother 
 Single father 
Child 
 Age at removal 
 Asian child 
 Hawaiian/Pacific Islander child 
 Hispanic child 
 Voluntary placement 
 Physical abuse 
 Removal for child issue 
 Relative FC 
 Home placement 
 Congregate care 
Policy 
 Adoption restrictions 
 ASFA compliance 
 Relative preference in statute 
 Payment generosity 
 Expenditure generosity 
State 
 Unemployment 
Child 
 Black child 
 American Indian/Alaskan Native child 
 High utilization county 
 Disability 
 Mental retardation 
 Physical disability 
 Total number of removals 
 Number of placements 
 Sexual abuse 
 Neglect 
 Removed because of parent issue 
 Number or removal reasons 
 IL 
 AWOL 
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Table K.1 (continued) 
Adoption 
Increased Likelihood Decreased Likelihood 
Policy 
 Groups approved to adopt 
 ASFA compliance rate 
 Generosity of access 
State 
 Poverty rate 
 % urban 
 CW flow 
Family 
 Parental substance abuse 
 Unmarried parents 
 Single mother 
 Single father 
Child 
 Disability 
 Total number of removals 
 Voluntary placement 
 Neglect 
 Removed because of parent issue 
 Number of removal reasons 
 Relative FC 
 Home placement 
Policy 
 Adoption restrictions 
 Relative preference in statute 
 Payment generosity 
 Expenditure generosity 
State 
 Unemployment 
 Decentralized CW administrative 
structure 
Family 
 Parental incarceration 
Child 
 Age at removal 
 Black child  
 American Indian/Alaskan Native child 
 Asian child 
 Hispanic child 
 Multiracial child 
 High utilization county 
 Male 
 Mental retardation 
 Physical disability 
 Emotional disability 
 Other medical condition 
 Number of placements 
 Removed for child issue 
 Congregate care 
 IL 
 AOWL 
  
 
146 
Table K.1 (continued) 
Other Permanency (i.e. Guardianship) 
Increased Likelihood Decreased Likelihood 
Policy 
 Expenditure generosity 
 Generosity of access 
State 
 Decentralized CW administrative 
structure 
 Poverty rate 
 % urban 
 CW flow 
Family 
 Parental substance abuse 
 Parental incarceration 
 Single mother 
 Single father 
Child 
 Age at removal 
 Total number of removals 
 Relative FC 
Policy 
 Groups approved to adopt 
 Adoption restrictions 
 Relative preference in statute 
 Payment generosity 
State 
 Unemployment 
Child 
 Black child  
 American Indian/Alaskan Native child 
 Hispanic child 
 Multiracial child 
 High utilization county 
 Number of placements 
 Physical abuse 
 Sexual abuse 
 Neglect 
 Removed for child issue 
 Removed for parental issue 
 Number of removal reasons 
 Home placement 
 Congregate care 
 IL 
 AOWL 
Non-Permanent Outcome (i.e. Aged-Out) 
Increased Likelihood Decreased Likelihood 
Policy 
 ASFA compliance rate 
 KC in statute 
State 
 Decentralized administrative structure 
 % urban 
 CW flow 
Family 
 Single mother 
Child 
 Age at removal 
 American Indian/Native American child 
 Hispanic 
 Voluntary placement 
 Removed for child issue 
 Congregate care 
 IL 
 AWOL 
Policy 
 Adoption restrictions 
 Relative preference in placement 
 Generosity of payment 
 Generosity of expenditures 
 Generosity of access 
State 
 Unemployment 
Family  
 Parental substance abuse 
Child 
 Multiracial 
 High utilization county 
 Male 
 Disability 
 Number of placements 
 Sexual abuse 
 Home placement 
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